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This book is the product of multiple anthropological temporalities. Its biogra-
phy bridges two main areas of my academic interests: Siberian studies, where I 
have been involved since my initial fieldwork in Siberia in the late 1980s; and 
research into gift giving to Soviet leaders, which I have conducted since the early 
2000s. The topic of time has been important for both. This book has developed 
as a conceptual sequel to an article on the heterochrony of Stalin’s 70th birthday 
gifts, in 1949. In Siberia, I focused on deferral, delay, and teleological temporali-
ties of Russian and Soviet statehood among indigenous Evenki. However, I first 
thought of combining these two kinds of material in a comparative and theo-
retical argument about temporal multiplicity when Victor Vakhstayn invited 
me to give a keynote address at the conference “Future as culture: Prognoses, 
representations, scenarios” at Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences 
(2010). I am grateful to Laura Bear, who ran a seminar series, “Conflicts in 
time: Rethinking ‘contemporary’ globalization” (2008–11), in which I took part; 
she suggested that this might be a book-length project. I presented versions of 
this book’s argument at London School of Economics, Russian University for 
the Humanities, University of Pennsylvania, University of Helsinki, University 
of Ekaterinburg, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 
and European University at St. Petersburg. In following the American Anthro-
pological Association’s Code of Ethics, I have anonymized the names of my 
informants and fieldwork locations. This project would not have been possible 
without the hospitality and collaboration of residents of the Siberian village 
that I call Katonga as well as the support by the Russian Foundation for Basic 
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Research, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences (Grant 15-01-00452 
“Anthropology of the market and social transformations among Indigenous 
peoples of the north”). It would be equally impossible without research and 
curatorial collaboration with Olga Sosnina, particularly on the exhibition Gifts 
to Soviet leaders (Moscow 2006). Some of the viewers of this exhibition kindly 
consented to be interviewed, and many more left rich commentary in the ex-
hibition response book, which became one of this project’s sources. At various 
stages of work on this book I have also benefitted from intellectual exchanges 
on its themes and arguments with Alexander Semyonov, Alexei Vasiliev, Andrey 
Menshikov, Bruce Grant, Caroline Humphrey, Catriona Kelly, Greg Yudin, 
François-Xavier Nérard, Kevin Platt, Maria Loskutova, Mikhail Boytsov, Paolo 
Heywood, Peter Holquist, Sarah Green, Stephan Feuchtwang, Theodor Shanin, 
Timo Kaartinen, the late Tod Hartman, Vadim Radaev, and Vyacheslav Ivanov. 
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this book’s manuscript and to Alex 
Skinner, Heather Paxson, and Stefan Helmreich for thorough and insightful 
engagement with this text as a whole.
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Figure 1. Sculptural composition, Eritis sicut deus, by Hugo Wolfgang Rheinhold, circa 
1893. Gift to V. I. Lenin from American businessman Armand Hammer, October 
1921. Courtesy of the Museum of Lenin’s Flat and Study, Gorki Leninskie.
chapter 1
“You will be as gods”
 March on, my land, move on, my land,
 The commune is at the gates!
 Forward, time!
 Time—forward!
 —Vladimir Mayakovski, “The march of time”
 “What day is it?” asked Pooh.
 “It’s today,” squeaked Piglet.
 “My favorite day,” said Pooh.
 —A. A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh
An ape sits on the works of Darwin, holding a drawing compass with the toes 
of one of its feet over the pages of an open book. The ape contemplates a skull, 
which it holds in its right hand (see fig. 1). The Latin inscription on the open 
page of the book reads, “You will be as gods” (Eritis sicut deus). These words, 
which gave the figurine its title, come from Genesis 3:5: “But God knows that 
in the day that you eat of [the fruit of the tree, which is among the paradise], 
your eyes will open and you will be as gods, knowing good and evil [scientes 
bonum et malum].” This figurine is Hugo Wolfgang Rheinhold’s, circa 1893. It is 
a bronze cast, 32.4 centimeters high, which exists in a number of copies.
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The inscription, while Biblical, nonetheless denotes a message that is resolute-
ly secular. It gives us a “Darwinian plot” (Beer 2000), which made this figurine a 
popular collection item in the early twentieth century in the world of biology and 
medicine. Its casts are on display at the Boston Medical Library, the University of 
Edinburgh’s Institute of Evolutionary Biology, the Aberdeen Medico-Chirurgical 
Society, the Medical Library of Queen’s University, Canada, and many more plac-
es (cf. Richter and Schmetzke 2007). But the particular cast of which I write here 
is in an unlikely location. It holds pride of place in the Museum of the Kremlin’s 
Flat of Vladimir Lenin. Lenin received it as a gift from a young American busi-
nessman, Armand Hammer, who visited him in 1921. As a gift, the figurine re-
ceived an unintended, yet well-fitting, Marxist meaning: “You will be as gods,” the 
inscription seems to say, in building a new and radically different society.
Whether it represents a triumph of natural science or socialism, the Eritis 
sicut deus sculpture presents a temporal narrative—in fact, several narratives, each 
held in a mirror reflection of the others. The main narrative is one of Darwinian 
time. This biological time of evolution inverts another temporality, Christian, 
since what the sculpture represents is not a fall from Eden but rather an ascent 
of Man. At first glance, this all meshes well with Marxist historical materialist 
time. But in this context, Darwinian time is not just reflected in—or aligned 
with—Marxist time but rather split into two temporalities: biological and so-
cial. As Friedrich Engels famously stated, “just as Darwin discovered the law of 
development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of 
human history” (Engels 1989: 467). But Marxism rejected social Darwinism as 
the “bourgeois ideology” par excellence that naturalizes capitalist market rela-
tions. Equally famously, Engels observes that
The whole Darwinian theory of the struggle for life is simply the transference from 
society to organic nature of Hobbes’ theory of bellum omnium contra omnes [the war 
of each against all], and of the bourgeois economic theory of competition, as well 
as the Malthusian theory of population. When once this feat has been accom-
plished . . . , it is very easy to transfer these theories back again from natural history 
to the history of society, and altogether too naïvely to maintain that thereby these 
assertions have been proved as eternal natural laws of society. (Engels 1991: 107–8)
In Marxist perspective, social Darwinism does not just give a social version of 
the biological evolutionary time. It de-temporalizes a particular version of capi-
talist modernity as “eternal natural laws.”
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But the sculpture itself refers only to Christianity and Darwinism. The 
Marxist temporality is manifested in this item only because this particular cast 
is a gift to Lenin. This gift act further complicates the canvass of temporalities 
of Eritis sicut deus, as it is not just the Marxist temporality that is added to the 
picture but also the time of the gift. As a part of the display of the Museum of 
the Lenin’s Kremlin Flat, the statue stands for a distinctly Soviet understanding 
of gift reciprocity that links the very concept of socialist modernity—the new 
dawn of history, in which “You will be as gods”—with the grateful world to 
which this modernity is given. In this perspective, Hammer’s figurine is a coun-
tergift. But this gift time is itself complex: its circular reciprocity is about a gift 
of the new time that “marches” toward the commune that is already “at the gates” 
(to quote Vladimir Mayakovski’s poem, “The march of time”).
***
Time—in anthropological perspective—is a culturally specific construct that 
combines ways of structuring daily activities with broader meanings about the 
past, present, and future. The case of Hammer’s gift and his relations with Lenin 
and the Soviet Union condenses several meanings of time. They are culturally 
specific to early twentieth-century modernity, including Marxism. In fact, we 
see how his gift makes visible multiple and contested meanings of modernity 
through multiple and contested meanings of time. Modernity has long been 
understood as producing a homogeneous time that is “uniform, infinitely di-
visible, and continuous” (Sorokin and Merton 1937: 616). Indeed, one of 
the first things the Soviet government did after the revolution was to adopt 
the Gregorian calendar, thereby eliminating a two-week time difference with 
the Julian calendar that Russia had previously followed. Doing so integrated 
Russia into the emergent frameworks of standard global time (Conrad 2016; 
Ogle 2015). But this immediately complicated Soviet revolutionary chronology. 
The storming of the Winter Palace on October 23, 1917—which marked the 
start of Bolshevik Revolution and quickly became the major Soviet holiday, the 
“Day of October Revolution”—according to the new calendar was to be cel-
ebrated on November 7. Settling on a global, shared territory of calendar time 
(although see Gumerova [n.d.] on Soviet calendar experiments such as the five-
day week and rotating holidays), Soviet time then moved to make a claim to a 
radical difference in terms of something else: the time that is epochal. In this new 
epochal time, it hardly mattered that the “Day of October Revolution” was in 
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November. Rather than being purely chronological, this epochal time mapped 
history and humanity through a new time of socialist modernity. It started with 
the October Revolution as a new dawn of history, celebrated by statements such 
as Mayakovski’s “March of time” or material objects like an electric light bulb 
with a filament in the shape of Lenin (see fig. 2).
But in the early 1920s, when Hammer visited Lenin, these new times of 
energetic socialist futurism coexisted with the equally energetic capitalism of 
Lenin’s New Economic Policies. Hammer was instrumental in this turn to capi-
talism and benefited from it personally. Indeed, perhaps his gift to Lenin turned 
out, rather, to be a ricocheting gift to Hammer who subsequently made a busi-
ness empire out of contacts with the Soviet Union. Perhaps this very statue was 
a business gift and followed the reciprocal temporality of business, rather than 
gifts. Moreover, given the importance of American business concessions, which 
Lenin discussed with Hammer during his audience, and of Fordism, which 
Lenin took as a model for Soviet industrialization, this sculpture may equally 
problematize who is giving gifts of new time and to whom. The inscription—
“You will be as gods”—may well stand for the gift of American modernity to 
Russia, rather than the Russian revolutionary gift to the world.
***
The reader must now be persuaded that the many meanings of time of moder-
nity that this gift articulates and in fact celebrates can be expanded almost to 
infinity. But my aim here is not to ask how many angels can dance on the head 
of a pin. It is well established that sociocultural time is multiple. Ethnographic 
inquiry no longer proceeds by assuming either a universal singularity of time or 
its cultural singularity within a given society as an isolated unit—for example, 
the Nuer or Balinese time (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Geertz 1966). Anthropology 
acknowledges composite and hierarchically assembled temporalities of most of 
the phenomena that it explores. It is not just that empire or nation, state so-
cialism, or global capitalism constitutes multiple temporalities. Each of their 
“parts”—the temporalities of the market, governance, consumption, reproduc-
tion, work, politics, etc.—are in turn intrinsic multiplicities (cf. Abu-Shams and 
González-Vázquez 2014; Bear 2014; Bestor 2001; Birth 2012; Chelcea 2014; 
Dick 2010; Franklin 2014; Greenhouse 1996; Lazar 2014; May and Thrift 
2003; Miyazaki 2003; Rosenberg and Grafton 2010; Rowlands 1995; Shove, 
Trentmann, and Wilk 2009; Verdery 1996; Wengrow 2005).
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Figure 2. Electric light bulb of a half-watt 1000 svechi, with a filament in the shape of 
V. I. Lenin. Gift to the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 
from the workers of the First and Second United Electric Lamp Factory, April 23, 
1923. Courtesy of the Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia.
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My own moment of “discovering” temporal multiplicity occurred when I 
explored a single event: Joseph Stalin’s birthday of 1949. I did it through the 
lens of a single practice of birthday gift giving and an institutional singularity of 
the exhibition of these gifts at the Pushkin Fine Arts Museum, Moscow, where 
these gifts displaced art—to the triumph of some and the horror of others—over 
the ten days leading up to the birthday celebration (Ssorin-Chaikov 2006a). I 
was interested in charting how the temporality of birthday gift giving was divis-
ible into the temporality of the birthday and the gift, the conflicting eternities 
of the teleological time of socialism and of the high art, the geopolitical time 
of the Cold War, and the micromaterial time of exhibition construction and its 
entropy—with bottles of wine from French Communists arriving half-empty 
or exhibition draping accumulating moths and dangerous dampness before its 
display was completed. This is, indeed, but one example of sociocultural time ap-
pearing as a composite. As Nancy Munn put it, time is “divisible” not just by cul-
ture or concepts but by “action systems” or “systems of movement,” each of which 
“produce[s] . . . its own time’” (Munn 1983: 280). Whatever is taken as a single 
“sociocultural time,” it can be shown to contain “multiple dimensions” such as 
“sequencing, timing, past-present-future relations, etc.” (Munn 1992: 116). The 
three questions that follow from this constitute this book’s problematic.
Three questions
First, all this means that we are at a point when temporal multiplicity and com-
plexity is hardly in need of another confirmation. The issue, rather, is where 
we go from here. Multiplicity and complexity are good questions, but they are 
poor answers if they come (as they so often do) without qualification as to 
how a given multiplicity is organized and what we can tell in addition to ac-
knowledging that “X is complex and multiple.” In this book, multiplicity is not 
a destination where an argument finally arrives but a point of departure. Once 
acknowledged, multiplicity immediately prompts questions about its composi-
tion: what exactly it is, how it is structured, and how different temporalities that 
are in it are interrelated.
The second question is how to conceptualize these relations between tem-
poralities precisely as relations. This book’s key proposition in regard to time is 
relational rather than relativist. What is important for me when considering, for 
example, Eritis sicut deus, is not that each of its Christian, Darwinist, Marxist, 
and gift temporalities constitute culturally distinct singularities. The issue is, 
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rather, that each is what it is through the lens of others. We see Christian tem-
porality through the Darwinian narrative, and Darwinian through the Marxist 
narrative. Together, they form a relationship that is itself specific to the time and 
place when these temporalities were articulated together—that is, Soviet Russia 
of the early 1920s.
Incidentally, it was at about the same time, in 1923, that Russian anthro-
pologist Vladimir Bogoraz published what has become an important relativist 
statement in the anthropology of time. His book Einstein and religion opens 
with the premise that “each system S, each realm of phenomena, has its own 
space and its own time” (Bogoraz 1923: 4). This explicitly draws on relativity 
theory, but Bogoraz’ move is characteristic of cultural relativism, which in the 
form of Boasian anthropology predates relativity theory. As early as in 1887, 
Franz Boas argued that “civilization is not something absolute, but that it is 
relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civiliza-
tion goes” (Boas 1974: 64). “System S” in Bogoraz’ formulation stands for cul-
ture, that is, for a culturally specific belief system (shamanism is Bogoraz’ prime 
concern): “it is only from this point of view we can interpret the measurement 
data in the religious sphere” (Bogoraz 1923; see Bogoras 1925 for an English-
language summary of this perspective). Such a cultural system appears as an 
isolated universe that encapsulates its own difference—a uniquely structured 
timespace.
In contrast to cultural relativism, relativity theory takes this very difference 
to be relational, that is, a matter of a mutually constituted system of movement. 
It is grounded in the philosophical premise that time is not an essence but a 
relation. Time is not a substance that “flows” or an area that “begins” or “ends.” It 
is not a thing but a relation between things. Anthropologists, Bogoraz included, 
have shared this premise in regard to sociocultural time. But this shared premise 
has different implications for perspectives that are relational and relativist. My 
question is how to extend the relational perspective to relations between tempo-
ralities, in addition to treating each individual temporality as a relation.
But this question is linked to a trickier issue. What is the status of temporal 
multiplicity in relation to what it describes—that is, to time? What does it actu-
ally mean to say that sociocultural time is multiple? When we say that some-
thing happened at the same time as something else, “at the same time” refers 
to the simultaneity of the two events. But how it is that a different time exists 
“at the same time”? My third question is precisely this: what is this “same time” 
in which others exist? In what way, if at all, does this “same time” constitute 
8 TWO LENINS
simultaneity? If so, what exactly is “simultaneity” in relation to different notions 
of time that it encompasses?
Two Lenins
This book’s title refers to two different persons at the center of two kinds of 
material on which I draw in the discussion of these questions. One is the Soviet 
leader, Vladimir Lenin, whom readers will see receiving gifts from American 
businessman Armand Hammer in early 1920s Moscow. The other will take us 
to a very different territory, four time zones away from Moscow, to the north 
of the Siberian Krasnoyarsk province, where we will see an indigenous Evenki 
hunter, also named Vladimir and jokingly nicknamed “Lenin,” living through 
late socialism and postsocialism.
The Evenki “Lenin” visited Lenin’s Tomb in Moscow in the 1960s and re-
ceived his nickname after that trip. But the book is not about this or any other 
encounter between the two Lenins, nor about their juxtaposition. This is not a 
study of Lenin’s cult in Russia (cf. Dickerman 2001; Tumarkin 1987; Yurchak 
2015). Chapters of this book do not add up to a “provincialized” (Chakrabarty 
2000) exploration of the Russian and Soviet imperial space, although they in-
clude materials on its “central” and “remote” locations on an equal footing, nor 
are they episodes of the global history of the Soviet project, although some 
of the discussion links Russia and the United States. Some of this material 
is about the 1920s and other material is about the 1990s, but this book is not 
a cross-temporal comparison (cf. Armitage 2015). If anything, the book is 
brought together by the issue of Soviet modernity, and modernity more broadly. 
In chapters 5 and 6, I offer some conclusions about this. I suggest that while 
modernity is associated with the homogenized chronological time, it is impor-
tant to approach it as a temporal multiplicity. I also suggest viewing modernity 
not merely as a distinct condition that has its own temporal organization but 
as itself a form of time. But these substantive observations are tentative. My 
primary goal in this book is, rather, to put forward a methodological argument. 
I ask not just what the multiple temporalities are at work in the cases of the 
two Lenins; I also ask how they are interrelated in each of them. My aim is to 
link the ethnographic questions of how (how to see relatedness in a temporal 
multiplicity? how does it work?) with the theoretical questions of what (that 
is, what about the implications of this relatedness for the understanding of 
the temporalities in question). Case studies about two Lenins highlight two 
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different ways in which I suggest we can think about relatedness within a tem-
poral multiplicity.
Change and exchange
This book is a thought experiment with two kinds of relationships between tem-
poralities that I call change and exchange. Let me use the example of Hammer’s 
gift to introduce them both. As we have already seen, in this particular instance, 
Christianity, Darwinism, and Marxism easily form a sequence of competing 
truth claims about time. Change (my first form of relatedness) here is not so 
much—and not just—a linear change assumed by these temporal frameworks. 
Rather, it is a change from one temporal framework to another in a way that 
renders a preceding framework untrue completely (e.g., Darwinism in regard to 
Christianity) or partially (e.g., Marxism splitting Darwinian time into biologi-
cal and social).
These sequences are relations of rupture. Also, in this particular linear move-
ment (change) from one temporality to another, these relations of change are at 
the same time the relations of truth. These change relations of truth are modern-
ist in a broad sense of the term: they include both modernity’s secular contexts 
and monotheistic background. A disagreement about the true meaning of time 
(whether it is Christian, Darwinist, or Marxist) is underpinned by a shared 
understanding that the truth, like God, is one (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995). 
Since this movement takes place on the grounds of the truth-value of each of 
these frameworks, to maintain one of them is possible only at the expense of 
the other: the temporality of the world was thought to be X but “in fact,” as it 
turns out, it is not X but Y. The relation “X is in fact Y” is not equivalent to X 
= Y. The equation works only in one direction: X is revealed as Y. But that does 
not then mean that Y could be revealed as X. X is Y, but Y is not X. If these 
different frameworks coexist—as they do inscribed on the ape figurine—they 
form a hierarchy or chronotope (Bakhtin 1975) in which it is the transition “X 
is in fact Y” that is actually depicted. These are hierarchies of things that are true 
and those that are not at all, or less so. From the point of view of Marxist time 
in the composite aesthetics of Eritis sicut deus, it is this time that forms the top 
of a hierarchy of truth; Darwinian time is the next step down, while Christian 
time is at the bottom.
Exchange is another modality of relatedness between temporalities. Re-
call this gift’s ambiguity. Perhaps it was a gift of gratitude to Lenin for Soviet 
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Russia’s socialism as a gift to the world. Perhaps it was a token of the American 
gift of modernity to Russia. Perhaps this was a way to begin relations that 
led to Hammer’s business empire. The point is, none of this is actually untrue. 
Each of these meanings is temporal, highlighting not just capitalist and social-
ist temporalities but also biographical temporalities of Lenin and Hammer, 
and the biography of Hammer’s wealth. Hammer had communist sympathies, 
but this did not stop him from being a shrewd capitalist. Neither Marxism nor 
capitalism, neither Leninist Communist plans nor the Social-Darwinist jungle 
of the market is rendered false in this particular instance of giving. Rather, as 
I discuss in detail in chapter 3, each temporality is a resource for others. Each 
takes the other in, uses it, and absorbs it, without, however, transforming it into 
itself completely. To stress this difference, I call these relations of exchange (and 
not change). They substitute X with Y; in doing so, they displace X but do not 
erase it.
This exchange works very differently from change. As noted above, in change, 
when the temporality of the world was thought to be X, it turns out to be not 
X but Y. X is Y but Y is not X. In exchange, X = Y and Y = X. There is no linear 
progress from one meaning of time to the other; instead, there is a trade and 
an accumulation. Soviet Russia benefits from Hammer’s gifts of capitalism and 
Hammer undoubtedly benefits from Soviet Russia. Exchange is a way to con-
ceptualize temporalities that transpire when time is taken and time is given.
But, if change is a relation of unbridgeable difference, exchange is a relation 
of identity (X = Y), which nonetheless preserves difference. As Marx (1996) 
famously put it for economic exchange, if grain is exchanged for iron, there is 
something common in both, and in the same proportion. But if they really were 
equivalent, there would be no need for exchange. Marx himself sees this ex-
change through the lens of labor time that underscores each of these commodi-
ties. Abstract labor time is what is common, for Marx, in both grain and iron, 
and in the same proportion, while it is the concrete labor time of making grain 
and iron that is being exchanged. This Marxist analytic is useful here, but with 
a qualification that it is not merely something that explains, but something that 
needs explaining—it is one of the temporalities to be explored in a relationship 
of exchange with others. Now, let us think of Marxist time itself as exchanged 
for the time of social Darwinism, as in Lenin’s complex exchanges with Ham-
mer. There is something common there, and in the same proportion. But if these 
temporalities really were equivalent, there would be no need for exchange. Here, 
different temporalities are substituted and translated into one another, but not 
11“YOU WILL BE AS GODS”
erased. Furthermore, each works as a measuring devise for the other. If, in Marx’ 
example, grain is a measure of value for iron, and iron for the value of grain, here 
Marxist temporality is a measure of value for the time of social Darwinism. But 
unlike Marx’s discussion, there is no real time that in fact underscores these 
exchanges, as labor time does for Marx in his understanding of the value of com-
modity. Marx’ proposition of labor time would be a case in relations of change 
between temporalities in which one modality of time falsifies others, such as the 
temporalities of the market that do not just mask the labor time but also “eter-
nalize” the “Darwinian theory of the struggle for life” (Engels 1991: 107) and 
require a Marxist description of the truth of these processes of alienation and 
naturalization. In contrast, exchange measures but it does not falsify. It just shows 
exactly how Marxism and social Darwinism are different, while change follows 
from one out of the two being false. These two forms of relations between tem-
poralities, change and exchange, are detailed in chapter 2 and chapter 3.
Simultaneity
In what ways, if at all, does this multiplicity constitute simultaneity? What is 
the time in which these different times exist at the same time? One way to think 
about simultaneity is structural. For instance, consider Marcel Mauss’ concept of 
“total” social phenomena, such as gifts, which express “all at once and at a stroke 
all sorts of institutions” that are “at the same time” religious, economic, political, 
familial, aesthetic, etc. (Mauss 2016: 59; emphasis added). In the case of mean-
ing of time of Hammer’s gift, the temporal multiplicity that it articulates could 
be a Maussian total social fact. To paraphrase Mauss, in this multiplicity, all 
kinds of temporalities of modernity are given expression at the same time: reli-
gious (Christian), scientific (Darwinist), economic (social-Darwinist), political 
(Marxist), etc. Although Mauss himself acknowledged that this is “multiplicity 
of social things in motion” (Mauss 2016: 59), simultaneity as a structural con-
struct is itself out of time in his conceptualization of the gift, that is, it works by 
the omission of any detailed qualification of its own temporality. The structural 
timelessness of the simultaneity of total social fact seems to be the flip side of 
what Johannes Fabian (1983) critiqued: the timelessness of the ethnographic 
present, “the other time” in which the subjects of ethnography existed, distinct 
from linear and historical time of anthropology itself. “One and the same time” 
stands for the totality, and truth, of the perspective of the anthropologist as an 
outsider.
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In chapter 4, I add my own research time to the temporalities that this book 
explores. While in this analytical move I am inspired by Fabian’s critique of clas-
sical anthropological temporalities, it made me note the limitations of Fabian’s 
own notion of simultaneity, which he terms as coevalness. Fabian develops it 
with the aim to counter structural, evolutionary, and relativist orderings of cul-
tural multiplicity. His aim is to explore the ways in which assumptions about 
time enter the construction of objects of anthropological research. But while 
Fabian calls for anthropology “to meet the Other on the same ground, in the 
same Time” (1983: 165), he does not ask what this “same time” is. His describes 
this simultaneity merely as a “spatialization”—that is, as positioning differences, 
including differences between anthropologists and informants and, by implica-
tion, between different cultural models of time, “side by side.” There are different 
articulations, frequencies, pitches, and tempos of interactions, he concludes, and 
all are contemporary. All these “dimensions of time” can and should be “tran-
scribed as spatial relations” (Fabian 1983: 162–63).
But space, while good for cataloging, for putting things “side by side,” is not 
necessarily good for conceptualizing dynamic relatedness. As Doreen Massey 
puts it, we can only imagine a spatial concept of simultaneity through a par-
ticular time—as if “an instant flashing of a pin-ball machine.” This notion of 
space “is inadequate” precisely because it is also time (Massey 1992: 80). I ar-
gue that in order to understand simultaneity, we do need to incorporate space 
into the discussion of time, not in the sense of Fabian but following Henri 
Bergson (1965). However, this would not be in contradiction with Fabian’s key 
thesis that the temporalities of the observer and the observed are on the par 
with each other. This, in fact, also incorporates Mauss, but only if we recall, fol-
lowing Claude Lévi-Strauss, that “to call the social fact total is not merely to 
signify that everything observed is part of the observation but also, and above 
all, that .  .  . the observer himself is a part of the observation” (Lévi-Strauss 
1987: 29).
Bergson argues that our (that is, modern philosophical) conceptualization of 
time is spatial. We “spatialize time” when we think about it—we imagine it as a 
line or a circle. In this imagination, instant and duration are properties of space 
(“dot” and “line”). For Bergson, however, this space is not the physical space or 
“the same ground” as we saw with Fabian, where we “put side by side” cultural 
and temporal differences. Bergson’s space is that of “time that is spatialized” as a 
matter of measurement. Time is measured through motion. But measurement is 
possible “because we are capable of performing motions ourselves and because 
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these motions then have a dual aspect. As muscular sensation, they are a part of 
the stream of our conscious life, they endure; as visual perception, they describe 
a trajectory, they claim a space” (Bergson 1965: 50; emphasis added). For example, 
in order to measure time, we imagine it as a line.
The motion that we perform ourselves is “contemporaneous” with the mo-
tion with which we measure time. Motion is a relationship between at least two 
bodies, and thus it is already a matter of simultaneity:
But, if we can correlate these two unwindings, it is only because we have at our 
disposal the concept of simultaneity; and we owe this concept to our ability to 
perceive external flows of events either together with the flow of our own dura-
tion, or separately from it, or, still better, both separately and together, at one 
and the same time. If we then refer to two external flows which take up the same 
duration as being “simultaneous,” it is because they abide within the duration of 
yet a third, our own. (Bergson 1965: 51; emphasis added)
Bergson defines simultaneity as at least two instantaneous perceptions in the 
same mental act, out of which we should be able to make one or two “at will” 
(1965: 51). But we can have, he goes on to say, the idea of an “instant” as long 
as we are cable of converting time into space. Duration has no instants, while a 
line, a spatial representation of duration, is divisible into points.
“As soon as we make a line correspond to a duration, to portions of this line 
there must correspond ‘portions of duration’ and to an extremity of the line, an 
‘extremity of duration’; such as the instant—something that does not exist actu-
ally, but virtually” (Bergson 1965: 53). Bergson insists on the intuitive match 
between these perceptions and the world. For him, this is possible because these 
perceptions are already given to us in the shape of the world that we have. It is 
not just “entirely in our interest” to take a motion that is independent of the mo-
tion of our own body, consciousness and concepts for the “unfolding of time.” 
“In truth, we find it already taken. Society has adopted it for us. It is the earth’s 
rotational motion” (Bergson 1965: 51).
Bergson aims at a philosophical critique of relativity theory and insists that 
there are multiple “real” times, rather than the relativity of the single real time 
(cf. Canales 2015). However, in this book, what I have taken from this is not 
what anthropology has already taken for granted—for example, what is “real” is 
multiple. Rather, I am interested in thinking with Bergson’s relatedness of mo-
tion—more precisely, the reciprocity of motion (cf. Bergson 1965: 75–79)—in 
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order to “spatialize” conceptually not merely time but relatedness between dif-
ferent temporalities.
Benedict Anderson (1983) comes close to this when he proposes the no-
tion of “homogeneous, empty time” as a particular kind of simultaneity that 
is central to nation as an imagined community. He speaks of “simultaneity-
along-time” and simultaneity as “transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefig-
uring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and 
calendar” (1983: 24; emphasis added). Anderson discusses this simultaneity 
by drawing on Walter Benjamin and Erich Auerbach rather than Bergson. 
But it is possible to put this in Bergson’s terms. These simultaneities-along-
time are measuring devices, which enable temporalities to be perceived, 
via Bergson, either together or separately—“or, still better, both separately 
and together, at one and the same time (Bergson 1965: 51; emphasis added). 
This has been my point precisely when I proposed above that the Christian, 
Darwinist, Marxist, and gift temporalities of Eritis sicut deus mirror of each 
other, and in doing so they measure each other. This mirroring and measuring 
is exchange between them.
In turn, Tom Boellstorff (2007) queries the notion of coincidence. Boellstorff 
takes Indonesia as his point of departure (which was also Anderson’s concern), 
focusing on the coincidences of discourses on the nation and sexuality, and de-
velops his interpretive frame out of coincidences of these discourses and those 
of anthropology and queers studies. Boellstorff problematizes the notion of flow, 
which can include a taken-for-granted assumption of linear “straight” time. He 
“queers” this straight time from the point of view of oscillations and conver-
gence of the temporalities of nation, sexuality, research, and activism (Boellstorff 
2007: 26–32). He suggests that coincidence is, first, a moment when two or 
more temporal regimes meet, and, second, that it is a temporality of its own, 
rather than thinking of coincidence as something that happens within a singu-
lar, overarching time.
Temporal mapping
Simultaneity and coincidence, as Anderson and Boellstorff see them, are not 
categories of a universal philosophy of time, as they are for Bergson. They are 
empirical devices that account for cultural roots of nationalism (Anderson) 
or those of sexuality and desire as well as temporalities of Indonesian mo-
dernity and anthropology (Boellstorff ). In this book, my goal is also similarly 
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ethnographic. I am concerned with specific configurations of temporal multi-
plicity that are at work in socialist modernity. Here, I would like to make a leap 
from Bergson’s “time that is spatialized” to Alfred Gell’s “temporal mapping.” 
Gell (1992) draws on J. M. E. McTaggart and the subsequent analytical phi-
losophy of time that develops time-maps as the formal concept of temporal se-
ries “A” and “B.” A-series are culturally or perceptually different notions of past, 
present, and future. B-series are categorizations of time according to whether 
they occur before or after one another. This before/after series “is just a row of 
events strung together, like the beads on a necklace” (Gell 1992: 151).
According to McTaggart (1908), the distinction between A- and B-series 
was subsequently appended by two camps of theorists that disagreed as to 
which of these two models of time is correct (cf. Prior 1957; Mellor 1998). For 
Gell, A-series are cultural constructs, or “perceptions” while B-series are their 
elementary units that are, in contrast, objective and “real,” and reflect the tem-
poral relationships between events “as they really are, out there.” But, he argues, 
we do not have direct access to the B-series: “we know B-series time through 
temporal models [the A-series], which reflect the structure of B-series time 
without accessing it directly” (1992: 161, 240). Analytical philosophers may well 
disagree with this, depending on which camp they are in; and an anthropologi-
cal objection would be to question who exactly the we are who draw a distinc-
tion between a cultural perception and reality. If we are anthropologists who can 
see elementary units of true time, we construct a hierarchy between scientific 
knowledge and cultural constructs. If we are all those who do not have direct 
access to the B-series, how do we know about it?
My own take on these questions is close to McTaggart’s original notion. 
Both A- and B-series are perceptions or theories, but both are necessary: “It 
is essential to the reality of time that its events should form an A series as well 
as a B series” (McTaggart 1908: 458). But I apply the A- and B-series distinc-
tion differently. Temporalities that I discuss as examples here, such as the ones 
of Christianity, Darwinism, and Marxism can be described as an A-series. But 
relations of change and exchange between these temporalities that can be put in 
terms of the B-series: if Darwinism is true, and not Christianity, then Darwinism 
is after Christianity. In other words, the reason I turn to this particular language 
of description of time is that it is useful for developing a relational (and not 
relativist) perspective on temporal multiplicity. I apply the concept of B-series 
to sequences of competing truth claims about time. It is these sequences that can 
be categorized on the basis on what comes first and what comes second.
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One of the problems that I consider below is an extent to which “exchange” 
may be characterized in terms of such B-series. The problem is that while 
B-series of time can be thought of as “a row of events strung together, like the 
beads on a necklace” (Gell 1992: 151), not all exchange can be imagined as a 
movement of a bead, as in a circular row of a rosary. The actual complexities 
of exchange relations between temporalities break the linearity of the B-series 
distinctions (see chapters 3 and 5). It is also important to acknowledge that the 
vocabulary of A- and B-series has formalist overtones, and so does my typology 
of change versus exchange. This suggests finding formal plots and stories, and is 
indeed close to the Russian formalism of Vladimir Propp and Victor Shklovski. 
But in what follows below, there will be very little formal plot analysis and no 
Bergson lines and dots. Instead of plots there will be narratives of change and 
exchange as descriptions of ethnographic situations. What I take from formal-
ism is a broad interest in morphology in the sense of Goethe’s, as it was used by 
Propp—that is, not so much assuming that “there is a single . . . type that runs 
through all organic creatures,” but that “a theory of form is a theory of transfor-
mations” (Goethe cited in Propp 1968: 20, 80).
In addressing this question, it is instructive to keep in mind another cultural 
conceptualization of timespace that originated in the 1920s: Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
notion of “chronotope” (which, as a term, also a borrows from Einstein). Bakhtin 
is widely credited for demonstrating that time and space constitute a narrative 
and cultural unity. But what is rarely acknowledged is that one of his key con-
clusions is that a single chronotope is likely to be a multiplicity. Internally, each 
“major” chronotope, he submits, contains a number of “minor” ones to the point 
that each literary motif in a novel is a chronotope of its own kind; further, and 
very importantly, each textual chronotope “extends” to external world. It ex-
ists in a relation to the chronotope of this text’s performer, listener, and reader 
(Bakhtin 1975: 400–401)—and, by implication, as I will discuss in chapter 4 
below, in relation to the chronotope of the scholar as a particular kind of listener 
and reader.
***
The book will unfold in the following chapters. Chapter 2, “Lenin and the com-
bined fodder” will take us to a post-Soviet collective farm. I use a case of the 
disappearance of a load of combined fodder to illustrate the relations of change 
between a linear temporality of Soviet developmental time, cyclical rhythms of 
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travel and infrastructure, and a modality of time that appears as timelessness. 
Chapter 3, “An American in Moscow” charts a beginning of Armand Hammer’s 
business in the Soviet Union and his encounter with Lenin as a case in point of 
exchange relations between market, gift, and state temporalities. In chapter 4, 
“Time for the field diary,” I turn to the temporalities of my own ethnography. 
I focus on relatedness between research temporality and the temporalities that 
this research charts. I will be interested in the exchange relationships of state 
time and research time in the two projects, on a northern Siberian collective and 
on gifts to Soviet leaders, which provide ethnographic material for this book. 
The next two chapters constitute this book’s conclusion. In these chapters, I ask 
what are configurations of modernity (Western and Soviet) in specific rela-
tions among the various agents and institutions that I chart and that include an 
American, a Soviet leader, an Evenki hunter, the Kremlin, a Siberian state farm, 
a Soviet American Concession, and more. I discuss this in chapter 5, “Hobbes’ 
gift,” and chapter 6, “Modernity as time.”

chapter 2
Lenin and the combined fodder
Vladimir, an Evenki hunter in his 60s (during my fieldwork of 1993–95), 
was nicknamed “Lenin” for many reasons. First, his first name was the same 
as the early twentieth-century Soviet leader’s name. He visited Moscow and 
Lenin’s Tomb in 1967 and afterward was noted as exhibiting a characteris-
tic hand gesture that reminded people of Lenin. Finally, “Lenin’s” wife was 
named Nadezhda, which echoed the name of the “real” Lenin’s wife, Nadezhda 
Krupskaia. Vladimir is Evenki (pl. Evenkil, ilel, or orichil: “people” or “reindeer 
people”), a name that identifies a group of Tungus-speaking Subarctic forest 
(taiga) hunters and reindeer herders.
In October 1994, Vladimir came to Katonga village1 from of his forest rein-
deer camp, about 50 km north of this settlement. Katonga is the center of a 
state collective farm on a northern tributary of the Yenisei River, central Siberia. 
One day, as we were walking to the village store past the collective farm office, 
the farm director opened his office window (fortochka) and yelled at Vladimir: 
“Come up here at once! Or should I go hunt you down in the forest?” Vladimir 
walked into the office and found himself shouted at again. As he explained to 
me, in front of the director, “you always feel guilty of something.” But when he 
managed to inquire what was wrong, the director asked about the combined 
1. Katonga is a pseudonym for the village where I conducted the fieldwork upon 
which this and other chapters are based.
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fodder. The combined fodder. He referred here to an episode that had happened 
the previous winter and had become a long-standing joke in Katonga through-
out 1994.
Combined fodder (kombikorm) is an industrially produced fodder for cattle 
that was widely used in Soviet-era collective farms. The director, named Igor, 
but referred to by everyone either as the “director” or by his patronymic “Gen-
nadievich,” was a Russian man in his mid-50s, who had spent most of his career 
managing northern state farms. He took pride in the fact that during the hard 
times of the market transition, he was still able to get fodder for “his” collective. 
The previous winter, Igor spent quite a lot of time procuring it. He managed 
somehow to “beat out” (vybit’) a subsidy for it in the provincial capital, Kras-
noyarsk, purchase the fodder, and truck it to Katonga over the winter road—a 
long route from the south of the province, which is the only ground access to 
the area and is cut through the snow every winter only to melt and disappear 
each spring.
Vladimir was eligible for a few sacks of this fodder for his small reindeer 
herd and, like other forest Evenki, he was waiting for the collective farm’s cross-
country vehicle to deliver the fodder to the forest. The cross-country vehicle 
would normally go around to Evenki forest camps to drop the supplies. This 
was contingent, however, on the director’s success in “beating out” fuel for the 
vehicle. While the director was away beating the fuel out, herders and hunters 
were waiting and fueling themselves with spirits. Most had already spent all the 
money they made from the previous fur-hunting season, and Vladimir sold his 
portion of the fodder to a Russian villager who could use it to feed pigs.
I heard this story from many sources, most of whom disagreed only about 
who was the first to start the trade. Whoever this first person was, this act of 
trade triggered a chain reaction of drinking parties in Katonga. When the direc-
tor returned with the fuel, he found the entire annual supply of fodder gone, as 
well as the hunters and herders, who had fled the village guiltily. He launched 
an investigation in which Vladimir was a plausible candidate for being a culprit 
in initiating the partying that made the supply of the fodder disappear. But the 
director also knew his investigation was largely pointless. He needed to be seen 
to be doing something but was unlikely to get to the bottom of what happened. 
Commenting to me on this case, as well as on the two decades during which he 
was in management of northern collectives, Igor said, “The problem is that the 
state collective farms work fine if you are there managing it. You cannot leave 
it, and go away for work or on holiday. Once you go away, all falls apart. This is 
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like the zimniki [winter roads].” He meant the winter roads that connect these 
collectives to the mainland.
Developmental time (i): Routes in the forest
This episode reveals multiple temporalities of movement of forest Evenki, col-
lective farm administrators, and material objects such as the fodder. In this 
chapter, I use this episode as a crossing point between linear time of develop-
ment, cyclical temporalities of infrastructure and travel, and a time that appears 
to be outside time, that is, timelessness. In the sections that follow, I introduce 
these temporalities and discuss relations between them. The point of this discus-
sion is to highlight relations of change between them (see chapter 1).
Combined fodder was a standard part of collective farm economy. But in 
this area the fodder and this very collective economy was also “help,” ubiqui-
tous in the Soviet state discourse on “development of indigenous peoples of 
the north” (razvitie korennyh narodov Severa). This development was to bridge 
a spatial isolation of Siberian north and the temporal or evolutionary distance 
between indigenous and Soviet ways of life. It consisted in a maximum possible 
approximation of life in the north to that of rural collective farms in central 
Russia and, ideally, the Soviet industrial society.
In this particular area, nomadic hunting-gathering and reindeer herding of 
Evenki were the targets of this development. The Soviet collectivization of the 
1930s, and the construction of institutions such as local soviets took place there 
as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but with a distinct developmental connota-
tion. It was accompanied with boarding-school education, set for the children 
of nomadic hunters and herders, and with attempts to settle these nomads down 
in purposefully enlarged villages in the 1960–70s. I conducted fieldwork in Ka-
tonga in 1988–89 and 1993–95, when many Evenki combined village jobs with 
forest hunting but some, like Vladimir and Nadezhda, stayed in the forest most 
of the year and only occasionally came out to the village.
In this subarctic area, “development” as a version of the time of progress was 
embedded in a chronotope of “forest” versus “village” lifestyles and identities as 
well as in the seasonal temporalities of infrastructure of travel and access. This 
area is part of the northern permafrost zone. Katonga is located on the banks of 
the Podkamennaia Tunguska, which is Russian for the “Stony River of the Tun-
gus.” The Tungus is the Russian colonial name for the Evenki. The designation 
of the tributary of the Yenisei as “stony” follows from rapids that separate the 
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upper part of this river from the rest of the Yenisei basin and make it inacces-
sible by riverboat most of the year, apart from the short period of spring flood.
The only ground access to the village is by seasonal winter routes. Otherwise, 
the village gets supplies by boat once a year, at the time of spring flood, when 
cargo boats can sail up to Katonga over the rapids. There are flights to the village 
from the regional center Baikit by a small Antonov biplane that lands in winter 
on river ice and in summer on a tiny airstrip in a glade cleared from the forest, 
about three kilometers from the village. In Soviet times, these flights came in 
twice a week, except for the late spring and early autumn, when ice was melt-
ing on the river and the unpaved airstrip turned into a swamp of either melting 
snow or autumn rain. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, state subsidies 
for these flights were also gone, and the flights became much less frequent and 
the tickets became more expensive. There were helicopter flights, also from the 
regional center, which could land right in the middle of the village, no matter 
how solid or soggy the ground was. But they were even more expensive as they 
consumed more fuel, and thus were even less frequent.
The trucks that used winter routes were the cheapest, in terms of the ratio 
of cargo they could bring to the fuel they spent. These routes are not paved 
roads but ground roads that run through the forest from the south. Trucks pave 
these routes in early winter when the moss that covers permafrost freezes and 
can therefore take the weight of the truck. Once this road is paved in snow, 
traffic to northern villages is frequent enough to not be stopped by snowfalls. 
By December, such routes are solid tracks coming over the snow, rammed with 
each passing of a truck. But these routes melt every spring, and they have to be 
built anew every year.
Developmental time (ii): Paths to noncapitalism
Here, developmental time is simultaneously a frame of a long-term time of pro-
gress and a frame of cyclical rhythms of infrastructure of access. Deliveries of 
combined fodder, not just to the village but also to reindeer herds in the forest, 
were part of the plan to bring a greater regularity to forest nomadism that was 
to achieve the same purpose. Another component of the package of this “help” 
was a project to build reindeer fences to fix territories where reindeer migrate 
seasonally, and in doing so make herding easier. I started my first fieldwork in 
this region in 1988 by working in a brigade that was to construct such fences in 
a neighboring collective farm. “When we have the area fenced in,” the director 
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of that farm explained to me, “they [Evenki] won’t have to watch reindeer all 
the time and move camps along the reindeer migration routes [po marshrutu 
kochevaniia]; then we can deliver combined fodder to these camps and build 
permanent bases in the center of the fenced areas—say, four for each seasonal 
pasture. There will be a proper [wooden] house, a sauna, and perhaps even a 
small school for kids.” In this instance of what James Scott (1998) described 
as “seeing like a state,” reindeer moved in an orderly and legible fashion from 
one fenced area to another, where they consume lichen and, at assigned places, 
the combined fodder; Evenki orderly moved from one seasonal residence to 
another; and children grew up studying near their relatives—and not in village 
boarding school—and learn reindeer herding in addition to standard school 
subjects.
The particular designs of orderly reindeer herding were short-lived as they 
were created in the late 1970s and 1980s and were brought to an end by the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. But these designs have a complex archaeology back 
in Soviet history. They were preceded by collective farm enlargement and indig-
enous sedentarization as a “solution” of the problem of nomadism (1960–70s), 
and before that, by collectivization of the 1930s, “adapted” to the “special con-
ditions” of the north—namely, by what Soviet reformers and ethnographers 
understood as a combination of precapitalist hunting-gathering and reindeer 
herding modes of production and colonial capitalism. Help was the main idiom 
of all these reforms, and continuously so since the establishment, during the late 
1920s, of “culture bases” [kul’tbasy] that were to start Soviet reforms and become 
centers of Soviet culture, education, and hygiene, as well as depositories of eth-
nographic knowledge, et cetera. This was preceded by help as in hunger relief in 
the aftermath of the Civil War in the early 1920s. For Scott, such schemes to 
improve human condition by making social life legible and predictable inevita-
bly fail; in my perspective, what is interesting about such projects is how they are 
capable of rising from the ashes. All these developmental projects did not work 
according to their design; there is a temporal cyclicality of projects, in addition 
to the linearity of their concepts of time, as their respective forms of “help” that 
were coming around as new forms of order and new solutions to the problems 
of chronic failure (Ssorin-Chaikov 2016).
The ideology of this help was linear and explicitly linked with Lenin-the-
Soviet-leader’s views on noncapitalist development. These views permeate his 
writings from the 1899 treatise The development of capitalism in Russia onward 
(Lenin 1971). But most explicitly, they were formulated after the Revolution of 
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1917 in the speech that Lenin gave for the Commission on the National and 
Colonial Question of the II Congress of the Comintern ( July 26, 1920):
The question that was put forward to us was the following: can we consider as 
correct the thesis that the capitalist stage of development of peoples’ economy 
[narodnogo khozaistva] is inevitable for those backward peoples that are now lib-
erating themselves, and among which now, after the [First World] War, progress 
is visible. We have answered this question in the negative. If the revolutionary, 
victorious proletariat carries out systematic propaganda work among them, and 
if soviet governments come helping with all the means in their disposal, then 
it is incorrect to believe that the capitalist stage is inevitable for the backward 
peoples. In all colonies and backward countries we need not merely to form in-
dependent cadres of fighters [for communism], that is, party organizations, not 
only to conduct propaganda for the organization of peasant soviets, and strive 
to adapt them to the pre-capitalist conditions, but the Communist International 
[itself ] needs to establish and justify theoretically the thesis that with the help of 
the proletariat of the advanced countries the backward countries can come to the 
soviet order bypassing certain states of development—[come] to communism 
bypassing the capitalist stage. (Lenin 1981: 245–46; emphasis added)
Note a clear linear temporal vision of this view. Countries and peoples are divid-
ed into categories of “advanced” and “backward.” The colonized are considered 
as politically contiguous with the exploited working classes in the “advanced” 
countries. Lenin argued that former Czarist “colonies” such as Turkestan, 
Central Asia, show a similar “backward” condition and valuable experience of 
Bolshevik work (Lenin 1981: 244). Elsewhere, he stated that this path of non-
capitalist development is applicable to Mongolia, as the first foreign country 
that follows Soviet Russia in communist reforms (Lenin 1970a: 233). In turn, 
Soviet ethnographers and reformers elaborated these views for various regions 
of the Soviet Union. The magisterial Noncapitalist path of development of the small 
peoples of the north by Mikhail Sergeev (1955) remains one of the most detailed 
theoretical elaborations and historical surveys of Soviet reforms from this point 
of view.
Here, linear time is installed by the gift of development (“help”), had both 
class and postcolonial connotations, and has visible analogies with developmen-
tal time elsewhere. What makes the Soviet case distinct is a historical longevity 
of this idiom of developmental time that stems not from “the Marshall plan 
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for the Third World” (Escobar 1995; Cooper and Packard 1997) but from the 
constitution of the Second World out of Marxist revolutionary time (Hanson 
1997). The temporality of the revolutionary leap forward that I introduced with 
the example of the gift to Lenin of the figurine, Eritis sicut deus (see chapter 1; 
see also fig. 1, p. xiv), overlaps with the temporality of assistance and paternalism 
toward “backward peoples” of noncapitalist periphery of a self-identified post-
capitalism of the Soviet project. If Lenin himself “ate” from the tree of knowl-
edge, daring to be “as gods” (see chapter 1), the parents and grandparents of 
the Evenki “Lenin” were a part of a multitude of “the people” from the former 
Russian empire who received what followed from this Lenin’s knowledge: the 
gifts of noncapitalism. Evenki “Lenin” himself was taken by the romance of 
developmental expectations in the 1960s when he began his career and was as a 
Young Communist (Komsomol) activist (I detail this further in chapter 4).
To a large extent, he remained a “conscript of modernity” (D. Scott 2004) in 
the 1990s, as was Igor, the Katonga collective farm director, who thought about 
his own career in terms of a genuine “civilizing mission.” This was despite the 
fact that Soviet developmental order in the 1990s was in ruins, and despite the 
fact that the director’s own education and work took place during late socialism 
when these Marxist idioms were taken with cynicism and pragmatism (Yurchak 
2006). Yet, as I argue elsewhere (Ssorin-Chaikov 2016), for his generation of 
Siberian bureaucracy, the teleological temporality of Lenin’s noncapitalist de-
velopment was transformed into the “depoliticized” (Ferguson 1994)—that is, 
simply “true” temporality of “civilization as such,” “simply civilization,” or “nor-
mal civilization” (normal’naia tsivilizatsia). This is one of the instances of change 
relations between temporalities. The time of development was thought to be 
Marxist, but it turns out to be “simply civilization” (X is in fact Y: see chapter 
1). As one regional bureaucrat told me in 1995, “This is amazing [porazitepl ’no]: 
many Evenki still huddle in their chumy [conic tents]. We need to do something 
to help.” Igor, too, thought of this tsivilizatsia as a gift. He was angry about the 
waste of the combined fodder, but in this anger there is also a disappointment 
that the recipients of this gift are ungrateful: “you see, Nikolai, they just don’t 
seem to care about what we give to them.”
Disruptions (i): October
To sum up: the long-term linear developmental time can be seen as “consisting” 
in shorter and cyclical intervals of seasonal temporalities of infrastructure, and 
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the couple of decades-long temporalities of developmental projects, but also of 
their transformations. Seasonal deliveries of the combined fodder, or seasonal 
travel of children to boarding schools, were supposed to add up to progress 
eventually. I will argue now that these cyclical temporalities also had a capacity 
to disrupt and in fact modify the linearity of developmental time.
In the fall of 1994, I made several trips from the forest to Katonga, accom-
panying different people who were going back and forth. That fall—like many 
falls—was a season when various links between the forest Evenki and the vil-
lage overlap and intensify. Forest children are brought over to start their school 
year. Forest Evenki buy supplies for the upcoming hunting season. The acts of 
both taking children to school and trade are recurrent seasonal activities. But 
throughout the 1990s they were put under new pressures from the postsocialist 
market economy. The state no longer provided helicopters to collect children 
from forest camps. Trade had become private and the inflation that had several 
times diminished the value of monetary incomes had now the effect of revital-
izing barter. There were conflicts over exchange in which the market both dis-
rupted and reinforced links between the forest and the village (Ssorin-Chaikov 
2000). There were negotiations and frictions with the school over the timing 
of children’s arrival and their very availability for state education. Teachers ask, 
“Have they all come? Why some are late for the beginning of school year?”
But these frictions were also cyclical and they have, in fact, predated the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Even before this time, the children would often 
“miss” the helicopter and join their parents in October for their village trade trip. 
In turn, the parents were needed in the village for the fall collective farm meet-
ings. But there was always a point of uncertainty about the timing of Evenki 
arrival in the village. While these visits are regular, seasonal activities, in no way 
do they have fixed itineraries—even if they are linked to a fixed arrival date, for 
example, to the beginning of the school year on September 1. Departure is de-
cided on the day itself by the head of a family tent or a camp that travels. It can 
catch by surprise all who are interested in going. Hunters who may happen to be 
away that day risk missing the boat. At the end of September and early October 
that year, I waited for Vladimir to decide for a couple of weeks and in the end 
went to Katonga with another party. Departure to the village is not as sudden 
as, for example, hunters’ decisions for hunting, when you might wake up and 
see their beds empty. But it follows the same logic of reluctance to speak about 
the future. It is ngolymo gune diuloshki, Evenki for “forbidden to speak about 
what is ahead.” This “speaking,” that is, telling that we plan to leave tomorrow, 
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makes you visible for spirits (buhadyl and hargil) that may harm your fortune. 
But if hunting is an individual activity, not telling exactly when we leave for the 
village creates a temporary collective hierarchy between those who decide (e.g., 
Vladimir) and those who wait for the decision.
Disruptions (ii): Combined fodder
There is a growing body of work that discusses temporalities of Tungus nomad-
ism (Lavrillier 2005; Ssorin-Chaikov 2003; Safonova and Sántha 2013; Bran-
disauskas 2016; Ulturgasheva 2012). But the combined fodder episode, with 
which I started this chapter, reveals the rhythms of nomadism of both forest 
Evenki and collective farm directors. Let me conceptualize it as a single rhythm.
The temporality of their movement and infrastructure partially mirror each 
other. The easiest and the fastest way for Evenki to come to the village was by 
reindeer sleigh in winter, and the sleigh route was similarly beaten through the 
snow at the time when trucks have taken the farm director away from the vil-
lage and brought back the combined fodder and other cargo. Just as with truck 
routes, this sleigh traffic ground to a halt when snow started to melt in late 
April. When small forest rivers flood, movement stops not just between the 
forest and the village but also between forest camps, as these small and quiet 
rivers turn large and rough. But just as the cyclicality of Evenki forest nomadism 
could be and in fact was disruptive of the cyclicality of the developmental time, 
so was the cyclicality of the fodder deliveries and of the collective farm order.
Let me come back to Igor’s comment: “The problem is that the state col-
lectives work fine if you are there managing it. You cannot leave it, and go away 
for work or on holiday. Once you go away, all falls apart. This is like the zimniki 
[winter roads].” This comparison speaks volumes both about the temporality of 
infrastructure in the north and about a continuous physical effort that apparent-
ly needed to be applied to run it, beat it, ram it—and all that only to be repeated 
all over the next winter. The Russian word for “beating through” (probit’)—as in 
“to beat the road through the snow”—shares the verbal root “to beat” (bit’) or 
“to beat out” (vybit’)—as in “beating out the resources” such as the combined 
fodder or the fuel for the cross-country vehicle, although this “beating” is out of 
the state, and not through the snow. This physicality of effort had a particular 
temporality. Just as in the matter of the winter road, a successful provision of 
resources once does not mean that their seamless flow is to follow. The effort 
must be repeated each time.
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“We wanted to do better, but it turned out as always”
If combined fodder as help inaugurates the linear time of progress, another 
temporality makes an appearance in cyclical difficulties in getting it to Katonga. 
The director was talking to me about backwardness, about failure to move up 
the ladder of development—in other words, about the location of Evenki in the 
linear order of time. But it was also about much more than backwardness: about 
things sliding into chaos, which is not only historically stable but furthermore 
incorrigible. This was not merely sliding back in time but into another time 
altogether. He could not know a phrase that the Russian prime minister of that 
time, Victor Chernomyrdin, was yet to coin: “We wanted to do better, but it 
turned out as always,” but he meant something similar. When he made refer-
ence to winter routes that melt every spring, I thought about how Hobbesian 
was this order, which needed to be maintained by the act of will, which must be 
constantly renewed. The act of will constituted a linear temporal vector but the 
Leviathan did not seem to be able to take permanent root. It was the state of 
nature that appeared to be a temporal invariable, something permanent, if con-
stantly bubbling under such matters of director’s concern such as the combined 
fodder and the timing of arrival of the forest hunters and herders in the village.
The Soviet developmental view of time had, of course, included its own con-
cept of eternity. But this was the eternity of the end (communism) that cast 
its shadow across all preceding time. Katherine Verdery (1996) alludes to this 
quality of time that, for the Communist Party, was “culminating” to the point 
“of becoming for all time,” brilliantly captured by a Romanian joke: “What . . . 
[did] we celebrate on 8 May 1821 [May 8, 1921 being the Communist Party 
foundation date]? One hundred years until the founding of the Romanian 
Communist Party” (1996: 57). But the point of this joke is echoed by not-at-
all-joking Henri Barbusse in his Stalin panegyric, where Stalin’s figure “is raised 
full-length” not just over Europe and Asia but also “over the past and the future” 
(Barbusse 1935: 2). Boris Groys remarks of Soviet art that the socialist revolu-
tion’s claim to have sped up historical time in fact froze it: “The avant-garde and 
the subsequent Stalinist art is driven by a utopian desire to stop time, to find 
themselves on the other side of history . . . outside historical time in the ‘time-
space’ of the Golden Age” (2003: 118–19). In turn, Alexei Yurchak (2006) has 
argued that the late Soviet order had a distinct temporality of being “forever,” 
independent of its teleological end.
But this Siberian “state of nature,” a permanent chaos into which things 
“always” slide, is a different kind of always, and it makes up a different kind 
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of forever. To me, it has analogies with earlier imaginations of the temporality 
of Siberian colonial order. Consider the remarks of a mid-nineteenth-century 
Russian Orthodox commentator Nil, the Archbishop of Irkutsk. In his Siberian 
memoirs, he notes the impressive progress made by the Orthodox faith among 
the Tungus, who “like Mongolians . . . started to accept Baptism” in the early 
eighteenth century. However, this progress could not be taken for granted, and 
missions needed constant maintenance because “nobody can guarantee that 
baptized parents have baptized children.” Once missionary activities stopped 
or simply slowed down, the Tungus, “in their wandering and dispersed ways, 
were lost from sight and sank, so to speak, into the sea of forests.” The meta-
phor of the sea appears in Nil’s account as he cites Scripture in wondering if 
Siberian forests were not dissimilar to the primordial emptiness of the world 
before the Creation: “Wasn’t that the way our planet just emerged from the 
primeval ocean, and wasn’t it simply empty and void?” And then he puts this in 
the words of Ovid:
In that entire world, Nature had one appearance—
Of matter, rude and irregular,
Of ever changing, unrelated, discordant substances. (Nil 1874: 120–21, 194)
The linear time of missionary conversion here is contrasted with “matter, rude 
and irregular.” In Ovid, and in Christianity, the place of this chaos is in a linear 
temporal order. “Ever changing, unrelated, discordant substances” are those of 
the world before Creation. Unlike the Leviathan of Christianity or Soviet de-
velopment, this “primeval ocean” always has a potential to expand without con-
stant maintenance work. Both the collective farm director and Archbishop Nil 
“discover” the temporality of the state of nature in the liner time of development 
and Christian conversion. Underneath these linear vectors they see something 
else: a historically stable chaos, which tends to structurally repeat itself.
Change between temporalities
The combined fodder episode then can be seen as a material example of a 
“transtemporal hinge” (Pedersen and Nielsen 2013) where it works as a win-
dow into two different temporal ontologies. What makes it different from a 
“hinge,” however, is that the two temporalities are not equal in terms of their 
potentialities, narratives of the past, and their configurations of the present. 
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In Igor’s eyes, developmental time, and the state of affairs in which things 
are forever like winter roads that melt every spring, are statements of truth. It 
is not a matter of what is preferable (see, for example, Pedersen and Nielsen 
2013: 127–29) but of what actually happens. The regime of truth makes this 
discovery of chaos an instance of change, which I introduced in chapter 1 as 
a mode of relations between different temporalities. Temporality of the world 
was thought to be X, but is in fact not X but Y, with “X” being linear develop-
mental time and “Y” being the timelessness of the “state of nature.” The rela-
tion “X is in fact Y” (X equals Y, X = Y) works only one way: X trumps Y. Y is 
Y, but Y is not X. Discovery here is a linear movement from one temporality 
to another. It takes place on the grounds of the truth-value of each of these 
frameworks, and to maintain one of them is possible only at the expense of 
the other.
Furthermore, this inequality of time X and time Y is itself a mode of re-
latedness. The transformation from one to another is not instant. The “hinge” 
between X and Y, and a passage from one to another is itself an event or a series 
of events that entails its own temporality and its own relatedness. Let us come 
back to my conversations with the collective farm director in the aftermath of 
his encounter with Vladimir “Lenin.” This conversation happened in October; 
the combined fodder episode took place the previous March. The director did 
not have a chance to see Vladimir since the episode, and the argument took 
place as a part of the director’s sporadically run investigation into this waste. It 
was sporadic as it depended on forest hunters and herders being in the village, 
which they visited only a few times a year following the cycles of ecological, 
trade, and administrative temporalities. It was also sporadic as the director, the 
sole investigator in this inquiry, was away a lot, including for portions of that 
October (Ssorin-Chaikov 2000). Plus, Igor had to remember to address this is-
sue on meeting the hunters and herders. This depended on his mood, which in 
turn depended on other “wrongs,” which in his view the collective farmers were 
guilty of at a given moment.
That October, I was in Katonga for a few days, staying with village relatives 
of the Evenki whom I knew in the forest, and researching this period of intense 
and contentious sociality, while also trying to navigate my way to avoid the 
excessive partying that accompanied such village visits. I ended up spending 
quite a lot of time in the director’s house—he kindly offered me the chance to 
rest there and to enjoy his extensive collection of films. Katonga did not have a 
television antenna to receive and transmit the TV signal locally, and although 
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many people had television sets, they were used mostly for watching films on 
tapes that were brought from the regional center, Baikit, or from Krasnoyarsk, 
by whoever was able to travel there during these difficult times.
The day after the row between Vladimir and Igor, I spent a few hours at 
Igor’s home, watching these movies and reading while the director and his wife 
were at work. The director returned home rather early, at about 4 p.m. He asked 
if I wanted to join him for a shot of vodka and an early supper. I declined the 
drink but joined him for the meal. We set down at the kitchen table. He was 
still bursting with anger about the combined fodder. I did not have to ask him 
to turn the conversation this way. I told him that Vladimir did not deny that he 
was one of the first to sell his share, but claimed that he only sold his portion 
to get hunting supplies, that he “did not know anything about the drunks,” and 
left Katonga immediately after getting his supplies. “A likely story,” remarked 
the director. All suspects apparently gave similar stories.
There is no paper trail of his investigation, but the situation is reminiscent 
of colonial inquiries described by Ann Stoler. They lock the stable after the 
horses have already bolted. “When nothing else works and no decision can be 
reached, ‘appoint a commission’ was a favorite response of colonial authorities,” 
she quotes in a study of Dutch Java (Stoler 2010: 30). Her point is, however, 
broader. Commissions of inquiry are not merely signs of the imperial entropy 
but of productive forces of their own. Information they collect and identity 
judgments they make shape colonial situations. I take this insight further by 
noting that the investigation is also a temporality. In the case of the combined 
fodder episode, the linearity of developmental time that brought the fodder to 
collective farms and “civilization” to Siberian reindeer herders is replicated in 
the linearity of investigative time in which the director looked for the person 
who started the trade. If it was possible, even purely theoretically, to get to the 
truth about this first person, then the Katonga collective could be classed into 
more or less guilty persons—distinguishing the ones who initiated the trade 
from others who followed and those who did not participate and were there-
fore not guilty at all. This classifying order mirrors the linear organization of 
development. There are leaders and followers, initiators and respondents. This is 
a development that was led astray. This line of flight had its own linearity, with 
the combined fodder incident making it a waste rather than a progress. But this 
could be reversed if the culprits were identified. One or several guilty persons 
are impediments to development, but they do not undermine development and 
its linear time of progress as a mode of social organization.
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However, the point is that it was not merely difficult but, for all sorts of prac-
tical reasons, quite impossible for the director to identify guilty instigators. Fur-
thermore, he told me that in a way he knew that from the start. This linear tem-
porality of the investigation was not quite linear. It was simultaneously one that 
was moody, punctuated (the investigation was sporadic rather than constant), and 
bordering its own chaos. Furthermore, the time of investigation was in the end 
wasted in addition to the fodder, as the investigation was not merely impossible 
but pointless (bezsmyslennoe, “without sense”). The whole collective was guilty of 
wasting the combined fodder and, at the same time, not guilty at all because it 
was incorrigible. “All are guilty, but what can you take from them” (da vse oni vi-
novaty, no chto s nikh vziat’), as Igor put it. “What do you except,” said he specifi-
cally about Vladimir “Lenin,” adding a Russian saying, “a wolf looks back the for-
est no matter how long it is fed [skol’ volka ne kormi, on vse v les gliadit].” For the 
director, it was this that in fact transpired in the linear time of the investigation. 
It seems that it is not only the investigative time that was wasted here but also 
developmental time as well. Yet this waste of time is no waste as a signification 
of the state of nature. Failed investigation, paradoxically, succeeded in doing this. 
It made an undifferentiated mass of “children of nature” by failing to produce an 
atomized distribution of the collective into a multitude of the initiators and the 
followers that mirrors the linear distribution of stages in the time of development.
A Russian phrase “to wave the hand” (makhnut’ rukoi) is close to “waiv-
ing”—it means to give up doing something. When the director thought, “they 
just don’t seem to care about what we give to them,” he “waved the hand,” and 
gave up. He gave up his investigation, and at that point gave up development. 
During a meal in his kitchen, he said, “I don’t care then too” (mne todga tozhe vse 
ravno); this was after he came back from work at about 4 p.m. During that day 
he spent some time radio-calling forest camps. Then he worked on the collective 
farm bookkeeping and had a few conversations with his deputy for hunting. At 
that point he “did not care,” not only if the combined fodder was wasted but also 
if reindeer were lost, as they apparently were that week in one of the forest bri-
gades. He also did not care if preparation for hunting did not go in the orderly 
fashion. He “waved the hand” giving it up to the already existing semiprivate 
relations between Evenki fur hunters and semilegal fur traders (Ssorin-Chaikov 
2000). When he had his conversation with Vladimir the day before, he gave in 
to a sudden request by Vladimir to “privatize” Vladimir’s small reindeer herd—
that is, to take it out of one of the reindeer brigades and come out of the system 
of state collective farm employment.
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“Giving up” (as in “waving the hand”) and “giving in” to privatization were 
to enter into relations in which resources were given out—very much for free 
and almost as gifts—at that point in time in the early post-Soviet transition 
state. As far as the gift of development was concerned, the director felt sad, 
if not offended: “they just don’t seem to care about what we give to them [my 
emphasis].” Post-Soviet transition at that time seemed not as gift that someone 
gave out but as something that was just lying out there for free. These were social 
relations of “wild” privatization, which here as elsewhere in Russia were often 
described as “grabitization” (prikhvatizatsiia). In these social relations—which 
exist in the time of this state of nature—everything becomes this nature out 
there, almost like John Locke’s America. The difference here is between the 
land with no work on it done, in Locke’s eyes, before colonists arrived on the 
one hand, and the Soviet case where all previous work on the land was canceled 
as meaningless, and the land and its spoils became out there “free” for new en-
closures, on the other hand.
Limits of change
Johannes Fabian argues that modern time is often conveyed through abbre-
viation. He grounds this in the Renaissance techniques of memory that are 
transformed into the instruments of representation—for instance, in the work 
of Jacques-Beninge Boussuet, a court theologist of Louis XIV. For him, the 
possibility to see universal history as a “general map” of linear time in relation to 
“particular map”—that is, histories of individual country and people—relies on 
representational devices that allow us to see “the order of times” in “the sequence 
of things, “for instance, in artifacts in Cabinets of Curiosities. These are devices 
of abbreviation, which make this order apparent at a single glance. But the ef-
fectiveness of these devices is contingent on the assumption of universality—the 
universality of human history—that designates the world in its totality that is 
visible in all its parts (Fabian 1983: 4).
This is an a priori assumption; it is important for Fabian’s argument that it 
works as such. The totality of the universal history as time is posited prior to 
definition of any part, however it may be defined. As a representation of histori-
cal time, this technique is an example of B-series time (see Gell 1992) that is 
based on a clear distinction of before and after. This B-series time is the time of 
an argument of the Enlightenment philosophers of history that, according to 
Fabian, first make this a priori assumption of universal history and then class 
34 TWO LENINS
parts of the world, peoples, and artifacts within the scheme that is produced in 
this way. In terms of B-series as relationships between temporalities, universal 
history is before particular history. In this form, the argument is deductive—that 
is, it posits the general first and the particular second.
I have already compared Hobbes to the Siberian time of development and 
time of the state of nature. Indeed, both Russian imperial and Soviet “civiliz-
ing missions” in Siberia bear resemblance to the Enlightenment project. Here, 
too, the switch between the two temporalities works through abbreviation. The 
change does not happen when the combined fodder is wasted or when “Tungus 
baptized parents” fail to baptize their children. It happens when the farm direc-
tor or the Archbishop Nil talk or write about this, or the collective director acts 
on this by conducting an investigation. The abbreviation does not even have to 
operate through an articulated narrative, as in the citation from Ovid that sums 
up Nil’s narrative. It could be made visible with a hint, a shaking of shoulders, 
or a gesture of waving the hand. For Evenki “Lenin,” the term combined fodder 
sufficed; for the director, the notion of winter road that melts every spring was 
sufficient. Among (mostly Russian) regional bureaucrats of the Evenki District, 
a line from Alexander Pushkin’s rendition of Horace’s Exegi Monumentum, “the 
presently wild Tungus” (i nyne dikii, tungus), was sufficient as a means of point-
ing to the incorrigible state of nature where the Tungus belonged.
The kind of abbreviation that is at work in the Siberian context is organized 
similarly to the instruments of temporal classification that Fabian describes; 
at the same, it illustrates a different process. My point is that a translation of 
one totality (the universal narrative of progress) into another one (the state of 
nature) appears as a linear, one-way transition. But it is also interesting to note 
that both visions could be in fact achieved simultaneously. This works by mak-
ing visible cracks in individual parts of development—such as the fate of the 
combined fodder or the fate of missionary activity. But the individual parts can 
either be parts of universal linear temporality (Christian or Soviet) and of the 
place of Evenki it in, or it could be about the permanent state of nature in which 
there is no linear time at all. In fact, a means of making one of these two totali-
ties visible is through an equally a priori doubt about which these parts refer to, 
and what comes first. Shaking shoulders and saying, “what did you expect, these 
are ‘the Tungus, presently wild,’” may equally be a means of discovery of linear 
time of progress that is desired, and a discovery of the timelessness of the state 
of nature that actually takes place. Also, it is difficult to ascertain the temporal 
and causal sequence between a crack in the system—say, of the ill fate of the 
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combined fodder—and the system, that is, a particular temporality. Both totali-
ties of linear time and timelessness are a priori assumptions that are out of the 
time they describe. If so, does it really not matter what is the cause and what 
is the effect here? Do cracks have to be there first for this doubt in progress to 
appear and transition to timelessness of chaos to be discovered? These transfor-
mations of temporalities are not quite inductive. The doubt may and often does 
precede cracks; this makes them not only after the doubt but also, in fact, almost 
unnecessary. It is the doubt itself that signifies, and not the proof that follows. 
The director and the regional bureaucrats had disappointment and sadness with 
regard to the gift of development. Yet their comments also contained a certainty. 
They sort of knew it before it happened: “Of course they wasted it,” “Of course 
everybody got drunk,” “Of course it is impossible to say who started it.” This of 
course means that the doubt is already there, and that it is not really a doubt but 
a deep conviction about who the collective farmers really are.
And it is important to keep in mind that this deep conviction is simultane-
ously revealed in the statements that, first, “this is amazing how many Evenki 
still huddle in their chumy [conic tents]” and therefore “we need to do some-
thing to help,” and, second, that “we wanted to do better but it turned out as 
always.” The cracks are the same but they are reassembled differently. If so, the 
discovery (change) between temporalities is akin to a turn of a kaleidoscope 
that recombines a pattern of parts as an entirely different yet entirely coherent 
whole. In other words, the relationships I discuss here are ultimately reversible. 
It is not simply a matter of the state of nature being true while the linear time 
of development or Christian conversion is not. If anything, the state of nature 
invites Leviathan back. It is a necessary foundation for keeping development or 
missionary practices in place. In other words, it is not merely that the state of 
nature is “discovered”; so is the Leviathan.
Let me give an example. My conversation with members of regional admin-
istration about the combined fodder episode happened after my conversations 
with the collective farm director. They did respond first in a manner similar to 
the director’s; namely, that the development is pointless. “What do you expect?” 
said one of them off the record. We were standing on the porch of the ad-
ministration building after a formal interview ended; it was early spring, 1995. 
“Where are you now?” he then asked. “I am coming back to Katonga, to the 
forest [v taigu].” He again replied with the now-familiar phrase, quoted above: 
“This is amazing how many Evenki still huddle in their chumy [conic tents]. We 
need to do something to help.”
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This conversation illustrates how, on the one hand, the failure to manufac-
ture modernity works as a means of discovery of the incorrigible state of nature. 
On the other hand, this is also a rediscovery of a necessity of development. Let 
us look closer at this simultaneity. The two frameworks are there together but 
in conversations and in social relations not quite at the same time. There is cer-
tainty—“of course, they wasted it,” “what do you expect?”—that at one moment 
leads to a narrative transition to the state of nature. Here, the corresponding 
social relation is what unites the two of us, an anthropologist and a regional ad-
ministrator as if sharing blank truth about indigenous Siberia, that “we wanted 
to do better but it turned out as always” (although this is a shared opinion only 
from the point of view of the bureaucrat). At this particular point of time, “help” 
is pointless (as it was the day the director finished work at 4 p.m., came home, 
and we talked). But when the conversation turns to my travel to this so-called 
state of nature, what comes forward is the idiom of such travel. From the point 
of view of this regional bureaucrat and his inspections (of which he did many, 
particularly counting state reindeer), and from the point of view of Soviet and 
Russian ethnographic travel, this is the state traveling to the wilderness with 
the purpose of delivering help, development, and the ethnographic description 
of what was there before. At this point in time, the kaleidoscope turns and the 
pattern of the incorrigible state of nature is reassembled as the linear time of 
development and state ethnography. Our social relations now, literally in the 
next sentence of our conversation, were to become those of purposeful fellow 
state travelers, in which it did not matter that at that point I was coming to 
Katonga from Stanford University and he was coming from Russian regional 
administration.
Both temporalities have a temporary appearance, which orders the collec-
tive farm of combined fodder and people in a particular assemblage. The state 
of nature suddenly flashes and next, in a particular rhythm, the figure of the 
bureaucrat as an embodiment of the time of development materializes equally 
suddenly, like Koroviev in Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita. This happens when 
Vladimir “Lenin” entertained the possibility of quitting the collective farm but 
opted instead to stay within it, or when the director felt it to be necessary to 
appear to be doing something about the waste of the fodder. The Archbishop 
Nil’s “matter, rude and irregular” and the order trade places. In the first instance, 
the state of nature is discovered in the failures of development; in the second 
instance, development is reinstituted. In other words, what we see here is a sub-
stitution, or an operation of exchange. The exchange happens between temporal 
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frameworks that structure the notions of permanent chaos and linear develop-
ment. But substitutions happen within these frameworks, too. The linear time of 
Christian missions in Siberia is not the same as the linear time of socialist mod-
ernization. In each of these notions of linear time, the state of nature is also dif-
ferent. Exchange between them is also their change. At this point, let me turn to 
my example of Armand Hammer’s gift to Vladimir Lenin-the-Soviet-Leader.

chapter 3
An American in Moscow
In the summer of 1921, Armand Hammer (1898–1990), later a powerful busi-
ness magnate who ran Occidental Petroleum in 1957–90 and founded the 
Armand Hammer Museum of Art, Los Angeles, was a 23-year-old graduate of 
Columbia Medical School, waiting to start his residency at Bellevue Hospital in 
New York. He was to wait six months between his graduation in June and the 
beginning of his residency in January 1922. While he waited, he responded to 
what he took to be a pressing matter, one that was unfolding overseas. In Rus-
sia’s Volga river region, an eight-week-long severe drought had “fields burned 
barren” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 88), which destroyed the future harvest 
and forced hundreds of thousands of peasants to besiege Volga cities where, 
in addition to hunger, an epidemic of typhus broke out. Hammer, who had 
been combining his medical studies with work for his family company, Allied 
Drugs, decided to join in an international humanitarian effort to alleviate the 
famine. He brought $60,000 worth of surgical equipment and pharmaceutical 
chemicals to Soviet Russia in hopes of donating them to set up a field hospital 
in the hunger-stricken region. When he arrived in Moscow, however, he had to 
wait again—first, for his equipment to arrive from Riga where it was delayed by 
customs, and second, for the Soviet Commissariat of Health to receive him and 
grant permission to work in a field hospital.
He spent his time between the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs where he 
needed to register his passport, and the Commissariat for Health where he 
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made his donation, which was gratefully received, but where he discovered that 
a relevant official who could authorize his field hospital plan was apparently 
away for about a month. Time was running short. Hammer was frustrated by 
this delay (almost to the point of abandoning the idea altogether and returning 
to the United States), but was then invited to spend a month on a train trip to 
the Urals. The trip was organized for a group of foreign visitors to assess the 
situation in this industrial area, which was also affected by famine. He jumped 
at the opportunity, but had to wait again for another three days; he showed up at 
the railway station every night only to learn that the departure had been “post-
poned till tomorrow” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 106). On the fourth day, he 
telephoned the station and received a firm confirmation that train would leave 
that night at 5 p.m. But when he went there, there was no one who knew when 
the train was to leave or from where. He eventually found his way by following 
other passengers—whom he heard speaking English—to a platform where a 
train finally departed at 11 p.m.
The train slowly pushed through the hunger-ridden terrain of the Volga area 
toward Ekaterinburg and still farther east. The full effects of the drought were 
to be felt later in autumn, when food from the previous season would really be 
spent, with no grain harvest to replace it. When the train halted for a few hours 
at a whistle-stop east of Ekaterinburg, Hammer and other passengers went for 
walk toward a nearby village and passed a small hut where an old man was 
making a coffin for himself. “I am all alone, you understand, and I have food for 
three more weeks only, and then I must die. But before that I will have made 
my coffin and will lie in it to await death so that I shall not be buried like a 
dog in the bare ground” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 111). It was striking for 
Hammer that this was happening in the Urals, where “lay the greatest treasures 
of the world—the richest mines of platinum, emeralds, asbestos, copper and 
almost every known mineral—yet the people were unable to utilize them even 
to provide themselves with the barest necessities of life and were starving to 
death” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 111). In fact, he found out that storages 
in Ekaterinburg and other places were full of these riches. He asked why these 
valuables were not exported in order to purchase grain. The reply was that this 
would be useless. The European blockade had just been lifted and it would take 
too long to sell these valuables to do anything for the starving people.
It was then that he was struck with a thought. “I can arrange it for you,” he 
said to his Soviet hosts, suggesting that he could accomplish this quickly via 
his company in New York, Allied Drugs. “Is there anyone around here with 
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authority to make a contract?” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 109). The Ekater-
inburg Soviet meeting was called. Hammer was told that one million bushels 
of wheat were needed as a minimum to alleviate hunger. He knew that in the 
United States that year there was a very good harvest, and wheat was traded for 
a dollar per bushel. But once the price went below a dollar, farmers preferred to 
burn wheat rather than sell it. Hammer told the Ekaterinburg Soviet that he 
could use a million dollars to purchase a million bushels of wheat on credit and 
ship it to Russia on the condition that in return, every ship would take the Ural 
valuables. He immediately telegraphed Allied Drugs to get the deal going. The 
deal included a 5 percent commission for Hammer for each of the two parts of 
it—for the purchase of grain and sale of valuables. He stresses in his memoirs, 
however, that at that time he was only thinking about hunger relief and not at 
all about profit, but he needed the commission to reassure his American part-
ners that he was serious and that they could send grain to Russia without fear 
of financial loss, and in doing so “help the Russians to save the Ural population 
from starving” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 109).
Given time
Hammer’s trip was entangled in the combined temporality of urgency and de-
lays. The trip took time, and more than Hammer expected. But Hammer used 
this time. He capitalized on the crisis that he saw as well as on the waiting time 
that he had to spend—from waiting for a hospital residency in New York to 
delays in the bureaucratic time of the early Soviet state to the slowness of time 
that characterized the emerging Soviet foreign trade. It is the latter’s slow time 
that Hammer offered to speed up. And his decision seems to have come just 
as quickly as it did when he seized the opportunity to take the trip from the 
United States to Russia, and from Moscow to the Urals.
But this trip’s crucial episode, the deal to swap grain for the Ural valuables, 
did not just take time, however instant; it also gave time: Hammer offered to 
speed up the time that it would take to set up the trade, which would be loo 
long to do the job—that is, to alleviate hunger. But this given time—the offer to 
speed the time of hunger relief—is quite complex. First, the time that Hammer 
gave by speeding up this process is time he was able to take—that is, the credit 
that Hammer was able to take in his family company. Credit is a form of time, 
the delay in its repayment that enabled him to make the purchase faster. Second, 
this given time underpinned the market value of American grain. Hammer did 
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not just get the grain, he also did so at a particular moment in time when the 
grain was at its lowest price given the oversupply. If drought had Russia’s “fields 
burned barren,” US farmers were meanwhile burning their grain to prevent its 
price from going further down. Third (and this is the most important for me 
here), the market value of grain at that moment in time became another kind of 
value, a gift value, in Hammer’s given time.
What kind of value? It is timely, as it seems an instant solution to the 
problem of hunger. It is not the timeliness of trade but of hunger alleviation, a 
moral act of giving life. During Hammer’s meeting with Lenin later in 1921, 
Lenin said, struggling to stop a tear in his eye, that for the grain he wished 
to “add my humble thanks on behalf of my government” to the “gratitude of 
these agonized people” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 116). After this meeting, 
Lenin wrote a favorable note about him to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. The note introduced Hammer, described this deal to supply 
grain in exchange for the Ural valuables with “only” a 5 percent commission. 
Lenin added that the first thing Armand Hammer did after he arrived in 
Russia was to “gift surgical equipment worth of $60,000 to Semashko,” the 
People’s Commissar for Healthcare (Lenin 1981, vol. 53: 257). Years later, 
a Kremlin Museum tour guide described Hammer as the “American busi-
nessman who delivered the first shipment of wheat flour to the starving peo-
ple of Russia” (Bruk 1964: 9). In other words, Soviet documents closely link 
this grain supply with the gift of surgical equipment, adding to their register 
the personal gift to Lenin of the Eritis sicut deus figurine (Kharitonova 1980: 
97–98). In doing so, they put this act of giving time and giving grain into the 
language of the gift.
The value in question is not just a market but also gift value of grain or 
monetary value of surgical equipment. Both market and gift time values form 
interrelated “regimes of value” (Appadurai 1986). They are interrelated because 
the differences between them are linked when a commodity (grain) becomes a 
gift, even if this transformation is not the same for all parties involved. Grain 
became a gift for the Soviet side but, as I demonstrate below, not necessarily for 
Hammer. But from the point of view of the anthropology of value (Appadurai 
1986; Graeber 2001), this is not a problem in itself. Meanings of exchange—for 
example, if this is a gift or commodity exchange—could be themselves subjects 
to exchange (Ssorin-Chaikov 2000).
But both gift or commodity exchanges have their own temporalities. The 
timeliness of Hammer’s act is interesting. The supply of grain that he arranged 
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in August 1921 of course did not instantly arrive in the Urals. In fact, this did 
not happen as speedily as promised but over winter, after it arrived in Petro-
grad in December 1921 (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 132). Furthermore, its 
delivery to famine-struck regions was hampered by the same kind of delays as 
Hammer’s own trip to Moscow and the Urals. But despite these delays, this gift 
of time immediately generated what I would call this action’s gift effects. Dur-
ing train stops later that August, “the American who sent a telegram to New 
York ordering grain for the Urals” was met with huge enthusiasm and applause. 
He was invited to make public speeches. And Lenin, after he found out about 
the deal, telegraphed the head of the expedition, Ludvig Martens, to bring the 
group back to Moscow. When Hammer returned, he was invited to a meeting 
(Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 109–14).
It is in these events that the credit that Hammer took became a gift to So-
viet Russia. The gift of credit gave time to nongift and nonmarket temporalities 
that he saw and described—the temporalities of endless delays and after-war 
chaos. But this gift of credit here included gift credit that Hammer received 
by giving this gift. This time is a gift effect of his act that came earlier than 
the arrival of the gift itself—that is, the grain. This gift also gave time to itself. 
It worked as a gift not merely despite but also, in August 1921, before its own 
subsequent delays.
Let’s sum up. First, the matter that was being given is time. Second, this 
time was simultaneously many different times. It was the time of the gift, but 
also the time of credit, the time of the market in the United States, and the 
time of possible Soviet futures. (Note that the US grain market was a classic 
site for the invention of trade in futures, as its prices were set before harvest 
[Zaloom 2006]). But this identity of different times also happened in the con-
text of multiple temporalities of the time of crisis, visible in the industrial and 
infrastructural chaos in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War, and the eco-
logical time of peasant agriculture, caught by drought. Other factors to consider 
are the ecological and market time of American farming, the personal time of 
the beginning of Hammer’s own business, and something I will detail later in 
this chapter—the emerging market time of the Soviet New Economic Policies, 
which was also instituted in 1921, modifying the Soviet “red guard assault of 
the capital” and encouraging substantial elements of market economy within 
Soviet society.
It may seem that the difference between slowness and speed is just a matter 
of tempo. Surely, there are different rhythms that can be put side by side within 
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a frame that, as Henri Lefebvre suggests, makes an event or a location analyti-
cally similar to a page of a music score. The question is if this “rhythmanalysis” 
(Lefebvre 2004) is an analysis of different rhythms of the same time. I argue 
that there are not just multiple rhythms but multiple temporalities that are vis-
ible in this tempo. In Hammer’s trip and in this grain episode, it is through 
this given time that we can see a temporal multiplicity, which is as diverse and 
complex as I outlined in the previous chapter. This temporal multiplicity takes 
place at a different time—in the wake of the Soviet project rather than in its 
aftermath. But in this chapter, I also use it analytically for a different purpose. 
This chapter does not focus on the question of which of the different temporal 
frameworks in fact underpins the events. Instead, it is about how these different 
temporalities operate together, and as resources for each other. If the previous 
chapter focused on relations of change between temporalities, here I illustrate 
relations of exchange between them.
By exchange I mean that the event of credit (a form of market time) that 
Hammer takes becomes an event within the Soviet time frame, and that this be-
coming is a matter of given time and gift time. The Soviet state, in its historicity 
(the time of crisis) and its language of help and gift, takes Hammer’s time. This, 
in turn, becomes an event within the time frame of Hammer’s business. Lenin 
does not simply offer him an opportunity to do business in Soviet Russia, but 
also gives him emergency powers to cut through the delay-ridden bureaucratic 
system. This possibility of speedy action is also a form of time given, by Lenin, 
to Hammer’s emerging business. Giving here is allowing; taking is using. Each 
temporality draws on others, but each does so without erasing or assimilating 
the other.
Let me go back to the analogy with Marx’ conceptualization of exchange 
that I introduced in chapter 1. If grain is exchanged for iron, there is something 
common in both. In the moment of exchange, these two things are equivalent to 
one another. But at the same time they are not equivalent, because if they were, 
there would be no need for exchange. Equivalence here is only a way to express 
difference, which is not erased but maintained in this relation of identity. Marx 
famously went on to question this identity expressed in exchange value. He 
suggests that this difference is in the labor value of these goods, which was, for 
him, time: labor time. It is grain-making labor time that is exchanged for iron-
making labor time, and at the moment of exchange, the two are both identical 
and different. They are identical as abstract labor. But they are different in terms 
of use values, since labor as skill is different for each commodity. What we see 
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in Hammer’s grain deal and other episodes that follow in this chapter are ex-
changes between market time, gift time, and state time. They appear identical at 
the moment of exchange, but only to express difference.
The situation with which I have started, in which the market value of grain 
at a given moment in time becomes the gift value of Hammer’s given time, 
highlights a very different kind of relation within this temporal multiplicity in 
comparison to what I described in the previous chapter. Here, gift time equals 
market time in relations of exchange, which works very differently from a one-
time change into another. In change, the temporality of a given practice was 
thought to be X, but is in fact not X but Y. In X —> Y, X is Y, but Y is not X 
(in mathematical terms, it is not “commutative”). In contrast, in exchange, X = 
Y and Y = X. There is no linear progress from one meaning of time to the other, 
but trade and accumulation on both sides. Change is a relation of unbridgeable 
difference; exchange is a relation of identity. But this identity is also a matter 
of time in two senses: X = Y and Y = X, first, at the moment of exchange, and 
second, they are not necessarily to be given in the same moment. It is temporal 
delay and remedy thereof in this case that is constitutive of equivalence and 
their exchange value. This means that X = Y and Y = X is itself time. If X and Y 
were really the same, there would be no need of exchange.
I have introduced this chapter with the example of the Hammer’s gift of 
grain and his gift of time. But the rest on the chapter focuses on another of 
Hammer’s gifts, the sculpture Eritis sicut deus (see fig. 1, p. xiv). My concern in 
discussing this gift will be the identity and difference between or among the 
time of the market, the time of the gift, and the time of the state—the situation 
of the X =/≠ Y and Y =/≠ X—in which X = Y and Y = X only at the moment 
of exchange. I will proceed by asking what exactly is this moment of exchange. 
In chapter 1, I used Alfred Gell (1992) to introduce these formal relationships 
as sequences of events. But, as Mark Hodges perceptively noted, one of the 
problems with this perspective, which originates in the analytical philosophy of 
time, is that events have fuzzy boundaries. “When does an ‘event’ begin?” is a 
crucial question here (Hodges 2008: 405). I will show that there are two com-
peting chronologies of this gift, which are important for understanding when 
the event of Hammer’s visit of Russia began, exactly when he gave the Eritis 
sicut deus sculpture, what it was in sequence of events of his visit, and what are 
the relations between gift and market time. Therefore, another correlation that 




Time has been central to the conceptualization of the gift. But this conceptu-
alization was driven by a specter of the market—that is, by the question of to 
what extent the explanation of the gift reduces it to the market-like logic of 
economic exchange. Marcel Mauss argues that gifts create obligations to re-
ciprocate, and the gift imposes an obligatory time limit to reciprocate as itself 
a form of reciprocity—the “guarantee” that it will happen (Mauss 2016: 114). 
Pierre Bourdieu does not question this “surety,” but argues that if this time limit 
is understood mechanically, then it transforms gift into market. Setting up a 
precise moment of time after which it is too late to reciprocate makes the gift 
into credit. This moment would remain invisible, however, if we reciprocate at 
the “right moment,” which does not have a precise temporal location. Credit is 
made visible when we are late, which leaves the receiving party to think that 
countergift is there just because of this obligation. Obligation is also visible 
when we are too early. If the gift is immediately reciprocated, this amounts to a 
rejection of the initial gift: “Overmuch eagerness to discharge one’s obligation,” 
says Bourdieu, quoting La Rochefoucauld, “is a form of ingratitude”: “To betray 
one’s haste to be free of an obligation one has incurred, and thus to reveal too 
overtly one’s desire to pay off services rendered or gifts received, to be quits, is to 
denounce the initial gift retrospectively as motivated by the intention of oblig-
ing one” (Bourdieu 1991: 105).
The art of gift giving is thus the art of timing the gift, when it is reciprocated 
neither too early nor too late, so that the economism of reciprocity does not 
become explicit. But, as Jacques Derrida argues, even trying to make reciprocity 
not explicit actually installs it. For him, the very same temporality that Mauss’ 
gift creates also destroys it. It is this “temporalization,” that is, this anticipa-
tion, memory, retention, and protention, and the immanence of the future that 
reduces the gift to the return: “The simple identification of the passage of a gift 
as such, that is, of an identifiable thing among some identifiable ‘ones,’ would be 
nothing other than the destruction of the gift. It is as if, between the event of 
the institution of gift as such and its destruction, the difference were destined to 
be constantly annulled. At the limit, the gift as gift ought not to appear as gift: 
either to the donee or to the donor” (Derrida 1992: 14).
But this line of gift theory proceeds on assumptions that first, there exists 
such a thing as the gift “as such”; second, that the time of this gift is singular; 
and third, that this time can be understood either by analogy with the time of 
the market or by contrast with it. My argument in this chapter will be that all 
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this is not the case. The episode with which I started this chapter centers on the 
event of one of Hammer’s gifts. But before I continue with the other events of 
his Russian trip and the gift of Eritis sicut deus, some remarks on the narrative 
about these events need to be made.
Narrative time
Hammer’s own memoirs are the source for the travel episodes that I recount 
here. They describe the very beginning of his multimillionaire wealth. He writes 
that this Russian trip was a turning point for a medical student’s decision to 
become a businessman. This could be seen as a transformative event or rupture 
in a sense explicated by Alain Badiou (2005). In Ekaterinburg, Hammer was 
admittedly still thinking about humanitarianism, and about his medical career 
in the long run; it was Lenin, whom Hammer met in October, who convinced 
him to turn to business. After that meeting, from the first trade deal to ship 
grain to Russia and a first concession, hashed out with Lenin, to develop asbes-
tos mining in the Urals, Hammer’s wealth grew as he became involved in the 
manufacturing of pencils in the Soviet Union for world-wide sale later in the 
1920s, the export of nationalized art from Russian collections, alcohol trading 
in the United States during the Depression, and subsequently the oil business.
What exactly, then, is gift time in Hammer’s autobiographical narrative of 
his wealth? This question is important, as it is this gift of time where the narra-
tive of his wealth really starts. We see this narrative rooted in virtues of humani-
tarianism and in the speed of his own thinking and business intuition—in gifts 
that he gives and in the gift that he has. But this is a retrospective narrative of 
his business success, written much later, in the 1980s, and very much in defense 
of the morality of his wealth. Relations with the Soviet Union of course bring a 
particular twist to this story of wealth, but as narrative it is not exceptional in its 
genre. This is what I would call capital’s mythical origin time; it is a story that 
capital tells about itself in a form of a capitalist’s autobiography.
This mythical origin time is morally ambiguous no matter whether such 
stories are told by nineteenth-century robber barons or twentieth-first-century 
information technology millionaires. Hammer’s humanitarian motivation can 
be, and indeed was, questioned from the very start. In the United States, he 
was suspected of being a communist, particularly as he came from a communist 
family and later channeled Soviet funding for the Comintern and the US Com-
munist Party. J. Edgar Hoover systematically spied on him from the time of his 
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1921 trip (Blumay and Edwards 1992; Epstein 1996; Weinberg 1992). In the 
Soviet Union, Hammer was officially praised as a great “friend” but he became 
increasingly controversial as his role in Soviet trade of art that was confiscated 
from the Hermitage and other Russian collections in the late 1920s and 1930s 
became publicly known. In post–Soviet Russia, impressions of him became 
compromised as directly benefiting from selling Hermitage and other Russian 
“art for tractors” (Odom and Salmond 2009).
But, of course, it is unsurprising that the narrative of theft appears as the flip 
side of the narrative of gift in capital’s mythical origin time. This other side has, 
however, a complex history that includes none other than the very narrative of 
“primitive accumulation” in Marx’ Capital, which became foundational for the 
Soviet order. Perhaps in other circumstances, Hammer’s business could have be-
come part of this story, as primitive accumulation is not simply morally ambigu-
ous but also not completely capitalist. It conforms the narrative of the history of 
capital as continuously dispossessive and extortionate (see, for example, Harvey 
2005; Graeber 2011; Sassen 2014), resourcing capitalism’s nonmarket outside. 
(Indeed, for Marx, the period of “primitive accumulation” was this nonmarket 
outside, as capitalist market economy did not yet exist during this period.)
These multiple recursions of the time of the gift and capital are further com-
plicated by the fact that Hammer’s gift of time and his other gifts, including his 
personal gift to Lenin, were reassembled into another gift economy altogether. 
With all one’s heart, the catalog of gifts to Lenin in the Museum of Lenin’s 
Kremlin Flat, spells this out:
On October 22, 1921, Lenin received Armand Hammer, a representative of an 
allied American corporation producing medicines and chemical products, to dis-
cuss the leasing of the first concessions in the Soviet republic and the delivery 
of one million poods of wheat on favourable terms to the famine-stricken Volga 
area and the Urals.
 In Lenin’s study there is a small bronze monkey presented to Lenin by 
Hammer in memory of the meeting.
 Gifts to Lenin from foreign representatives show the affection and respect 
of the working people of various countries for the creator of the world’s first so-
cialist state and for the leader of the world communist movement. Some of them 
tell us about the sources of business connections of the young Soviet republic 
with representatives of the countries which had a wish to cooperate with the 
Land of the Soviets. (Kharitonova 1980: 97–98)
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Note that American farmers do not appear in this narrative as selling grain for 
a market price at that time when it hits its lowest because the supply is high. 
The so-called favorable terms of the grain supply imply more than humanitarian 
reasons: international solidarity in response not merely to the crisis but also to 
the Soviet gift of new time—to the new dawn of history that the Soviet order 
claimed to be.
Chronological time
In short, as there are multiple gifts contained in Hammer’s gift of time in late 
summer of 1921, when he “got an idea” that his quick credit could save lives, 
there are also multiple times in his gift to Lenin. If gift time is here a pivot in rela-
tions of exchange between different temporalities, then a “small bronze monkey,” 
Hugo Wolfgang Rheinhold’s Eritis sicut deus, is a pivot of this pivot. This is be-
cause Eritis sicut deus does not merely convey different meanings of time, which 
I introduced in chapter 1—the Christian, Darwinist, and Marxist “you will be as 
gods.” It also, as it happens, presents a timing problem, as there exist two com-
peting chronologies as to when this gift was given. The Museum of Lenin’s Flat 
in the Kremlin lists October 22, 1921, as the gift date, and it also indicates this 
as the time of single meeting of Lenin and Hammer (Kunetskaia and Mashta-
kova 1979: 151; Shubina 2006: 213). Historians of Soviet-American relations 
and Hammer’s biographers, however, usually mention two meetings (Weinberg 
1992: 49; Gillette 1981; Epstein 1996), in the autumn of 1921 and in spring of 
1922; Eritis sicut deus was given to Lenin during the second meeting. These dates 
are based on Hammer’s own memoirs. Paradoxically, in his 1965 interview to the 
Soviet Life magazine, Hammer also speaks of a single visit (Bruk 1964).
This slippage in chronology indicates different ways in which the gift time of 
Hammer’s visit works as a point of exchange relations between temporalities of 
the emerging Soviet state. There are at least three different ways to understand 
these relationships, which I consider in sections below. I will tell—or, rather, 
retell—three stories of the same events of August–October 1921, from different 
points of view. I will be interested in a relationship between a singularity and 
multiplicity: a singularity of “gift” in gift event, the singularity of “event” in gift 
event, and in multiplicity of these gifts and events. I argue that the decomposi-
tion of this singularity into multiple parts (Strathern 1991) does not merely 
indicate the composite nature of the gift time but also exchanges the gift time 
with another matter altogether: it places it into commodity time and state time.
50 TWO LENINS
Hammer’s gift
In 1964, the president of Occidental Petroleum, Armand Hammer, visited the 
USSR as part of a delegation of US businessmen to discuss possibilities of trade. 
At the trade conference in Moscow, Soviet Novosti Press Agency correspond-
ent Mikhail Bruk was waiting in the hotel lobby looking for opportunities to 
glean any information about what might have been going on behind the closed 
doors. He wondered if Hammer, listed on the program, was “the son of the fa-
mous Hammer who met and talked with Lenin half a century ago.” At a coffee 
break, he approached Hammer with this question and was “nonplussed” (Bruk 
1964: 9) to find out that the American businessman was not Hammer’s son or 
relative, but Hammer himself.
They agreed to an interview in which Hammer told the story of his visit. 
But Hammer did this through another story. Another “funny thing,” another 
misrecognition, had apparently happened to him just the previous day. A tour 
guide had taken him and other Americans, after their meeting with the then 
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, to the Museum of Lenin’s Flat in the Kremlin. 
During the tour, the guide pointed to a small statue of a bronze monkey and 
described that this was a gift from an “American businessman who delivered the 
first shipment of wheat flour to the starving people of Russia.”
“I believe his name is Hammer,” she said, “but I am sure he must be dead by 
now.” Hammer exclaimed, “I am very much alive!” The guide asked him to tell the 
story of this meeting, and it is this story that Hammer repeats to Mikhail Bruk:
I was 23 then and a medical doctor. But business always appealed to me more 
than medicine, and I came to Soviet Russia back in 1921 to see what business 
prospects there were in your country. The primary aim of my trip to Moscow was 
to negotiate a concession from the Soviet Government, probably somewhere in 
the Urals. Somebody told me that Lenin was very fond of objets d’art. And so I 
decided, in case I should meet him, to present him with some kind of antique. In 
London I came across a bronze monkey in an antique shop. It struck my fancy 
and I bought it and brought it with me to Moscow. I also brought with me a set 
of equipment for a hospital that was to be built in your country and tuned it over 
to Mr. Nikolai Semashko, then People’s Commissar for Health, who offered me 
a trip to the Urals while the equipment is being installed. (Bruk 1964: 9)
This story significantly diverges from the one that Hammer gave in his mem-
oirs, which he subsequently published. We see here that his interests were in 
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business and not humanitarianism, although the latter is the story that the tour 
guide told to the visitors of Lenin’s flat.
There is a singular date of this meeting. There is a composite singularity 
of the gift of the bronze statue, the medical equipment, “the first shipment 
of wheat flour to the starving people of Russia,” and Hammer’s business pro-
posals. All are given as one. There is even a narrative singularity of this story 
in the Soviet English-language Soviet Life magazine, published under the title 
“He talked to Lenin.” It is concise, just one-page long, a picture-like text ac-
companied by a photo of Hammer holding the statue in the center of group of 
American businessmen. There is also a singularity of focus in composition of 
this photo. “American business leaders in Lenin’s Kremlin study,” as it is entitled 
(see fig. 3), all look at the statue, which is in Hammer’s hands while it is only 
Hammer who looks at the camera. The singularity of the gift and the giver is 
the mirror of the singularity of the absent receiver. If the recipient were there, all 
eyes would be on him. But now, at this singular moment, the center is Hammer: 
“He talked to Lenin.”
Figure 3. “American business leaders in Lenin’s Kremlin study,” 1964. 
Soviet Life Magazine.
This singularity, composite as it is, centers nonetheless on a single meeting date: 
October 22, 1921. I have already mentioned that this chronological singularity 
is disputed, but it is important that it is fixed in this way in this particular story 
as well as in other Soviet documents. This event’s singularity works for two re-
lated temporalities. First, there is museum time, which is about preserving such 
singularities for eternity. To tell this story, Hammer sits down with the tour 
guide “at the very same desk” and “in the same room”; Hammer emphasizes that 
it has been preserved in exactly the way it was when Lenin was there last. That 
time is the event and eternity of this museum time: the clock hands in Lenin’s 
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study show 8:15. This was the time in the evening of December 12, 1922, when 
he agreed to doctor’s advice to move from the Kremlin to Gorki, a countryside 
estate near Moscow, from where he never returned to the Kremlin to work 
before his death in 1924. The museum preserves, in the frame of this singular-
ity, both the time of Lenin’s work and life, which includes the routine time of 
his meetings with the government and party colleagues and the unique times 
of individual visits, of which science fiction writer H. G. Wells’ visit is often 
mentioned as the most iconic.
Second, this singularity formats the meaning of the gift. Hammer is careful 
to put this meaning not in his own words but in those of Soviet recipients. It 
is the tour guide who describes him as the “American businessman who de-
livered the first shipment of wheat flour to the starving people of Russia.” In 
the same interview, he mentions that a car driver who chauffeured him to see 
Soviet politician Anostas Mikoyan, whom Hammer knew from the 1920s, told 
him on the way back to the hotel: “Mr. Hammer, I just found out that you 
are the well-known pencil manufacturer. Soon after the October Revolution 
in Russia you taught us how to make pencils so that we, the illiterate people of 
Russian, learn to write. And now we make sputniks and rockets that we send 
to the moon.” He is asked if he agrees with H. G. Wells, who described Lenin 
as “the Kremlin dreamer.” Hammer states that the car driver’s words, “now we 
make sputniks and rockets that we send to the moon” are the best answer to 
that question. “Some 30 years ago I gave H. G. Wells, whom I knew quite well, 
the first automatic pencil made by our factory. Pity he is dead now. Otherwise 
I would tell him that he underestimated Lenin and your country” (Bruk 1964: 
9). In the Soviet narrative, which we see Hammer using here, even help such 
as wheat flour to save Russia from hunger or pencils made in to teach Russians 
to write were merely generous responses to something else. That “something 
else” is what really released Russia’s potential—the power of communist ideas, 
embodied in the figure of the “Kremlin’s dreamer.” His gifts are countergifts of 
“affection and respect of the working people of various countries for the crea-
tor of the world’s first socialist state and for the leader of the world communist 
movement” (Kharitonova 1980: 98).
In the narrative that these gifts tell, “the Kremlin dreamer” does not refer 
to living in fantasies like H. G. Wells’ science fiction, but to his agency in mak-
ing dreams a reality. This dreamer’s action is a gift of time—of drawing a line 
between a B-series (Gell 1992) distinction of “before” and “after,” dreams and 
reality. This is the gift that the Museum of Lenin’s Kremlin Flat celebrates. This 
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temporality, as with all the temporality I discuss in this chapter, is place-specific. 
This is “chronotope” in Mikhail Bakhtin’s original meaning of the term, that is, 
the unity of time and space specific to a particular narrative (Bakhtin 1975)—
here, the narrative of the 1964 interview or the narrative of the catalog of the 
Museum of Lenin’s Kremlin Flat. This Kremlin museum, and not just its cata-
log, tells the story of a place in which the new world as new time was conceived. 
The revolutionary action to overthrow the Provisional Government—the one 
that ruled Russia between February and October 1917, that is, between the 
February Revolution that led to the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, and the 
Bolshevik taking power—took place in Petrograd (St. Petersburg). It is marked 
there by Lenin’s monument, where he spoke from the armored car at the Bal-
tic Railway Station, having arrived from exile, and the memorial plaque at the 
Smol’nyi Institute, the revolutionary headquarters that he chaired. In contrast, 
Lenin’s flat in the Kremlin is a monument to Lenin’s thought; its full name is 
“The Museum of Lenin’s Flat and Study [my emphasis].” It shows where the So-
viet power and government materialized from thought to reality, and where the 
reality of world history, hitherto marked by exploitation and injustice, is begin-
ning to be transformed into a Soviet “dreamworld” (Buck-Morss 2000). Lenin’s 
library there, which includes many gifted books, includes a copy of The glow 
in the abyss by Henri Barbusse (1920), signed “to Lenin who first wrote down 
the great unwritten laws, with great admiration,” and a copy of Ivan Kasatkin’s 
Forest true stories (1919) with a dedication, “To Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov (Lenin), 
Who mightily moved hard forest reality into dream [tale]” (see figs. 4 and 5).
This dreamworld perspective operates in retrospective commemorative time, 
which goes into production after Lenin’s death in 1924 (Dickerman 2001; Tu-
markin 1987; Yurchak 2015). This particular museum form of commemorative 
time reaches completion when, in 1955, the Museum of Lenin’s Kremlin Flat is 
created, and the Kremlin as a museum opens to the public. Gifts that are on dis-
play there—books and objects from various visitors—are about the singularity 
of the event of the beginning of the Soviet order. From this point of view, pre-
cise dates of these gifts and gift events are not as important—as they demarcate 
broader and singular distinctions of before and after. The Eritis sicut deus figurine 
depicts the substitution of the world after Darwin with the world after Marx.
Here, the singularity of the meeting between Hammer and Lenin stands 
for this singularity of this epic change. The historic division in its totality as the 
beginning of the new world metonymically absorbs other events, to the point 
of events that are relevant to the time of narration rather than the time that is 
54 TWO LENINS
Figure 4. “To Lenin who first wrote down the great unwritten laws, with great admira-
tion.” Dedication of Henri Barbusse of his Le lueur dans l ’abime [The glow in the abyss] 
(Paris 1920), as a gift to V. I. Lenin. Courtesy of the Museum of Lenin’s Flat and Study, 
Gorki Leninskie.
Figure 5. “To Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov (Lenin), Who mightily moved hard forest reality 
into dream [tale].” Dedication of Ivan Kasatkin of his Forest true stories (Moscow 1919), 
as a gift to V. I. Lenin. Courtesy of the Museum of Lenin’s Flat and Study, Gorki Leninskie.
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narrated. “I tell him [Lenin],” Hammer describes in 1964 of his 1921 meeting, 
‘“This is an illustration of Darwin’s theory.” “No,” Lenin replies, “This is clearly 
an allegory. The artist wants to convey that, if peoples of the world do not learn 
to live in peace, with the development of new forms of arms, only monkeys will 
survive to play with man’s skulls.” In chapter 1, I discussed this gift’s aesthetics 
in terms of the Darwinian and Marxist upturning of Christian creationist nar-
ratives. But here Lenin seems to be outside the logics that I draw out: Lenin 
laughed but added seriously, “coexistence [rather than war] is essential, particu-
larly between Soviet Russia and the United States” (Bruk 1964: 9).
Yet this meaning falls in a place in the museum time. In this description, 
Lenin’s reading of the meaning of the gift as an allegory of the dangers of an 
arms race sits more easily with the realities of the 1960s than the 1920s. Donna 
Haraway (1989) remarked on the ease in which Darwinist primatology was 
being used allegorically to think about the Cold War in the 1960s. Indeed, it 
is this Khrushchev’s “thaw” in the Cold War, not Lenin’s New Economic Poli-
cies, that has enabled Hammer’s and other US businessmen’s visit of the USSR. 
The “coexistence . . . particularly between Soviet Russia and the United States” 
evokes “peaceful coexistence” (mirnoe sosushchestvovanie) and “discharging” or 
easing of tensions (razriadka napriazhennosti)—in other words, the vocabulary 
of the nuclear arms race and of diplomatic exchanges between the United States 
and the USSR after the Cuban crisis. Hammer’s point (in 1964) is that Lenin 
could foresee such dangerous developments; the dreamworld that transpired in 
the 1920s contained, in gift form, configurations of the future. It is as if in the 
Wilsonian détente Lenin could see the coming of the Cold War world order. 
Realities of the 1960s are in this perspective within the singularity of the begin-
ning of the bipolar world of “the short twentieth century” (Hobsbawm 1995) 
as a periodization of competition of socialist and capitalist mass utopias from 
1914 to 1991.
Lenin’s gift
Let me now turn to the second chronology of these gift events. It includes two 
meetings of Hammer and Lenin. This chronology is based on Hammer’s 1987 
memoirs. After the deal to swap grain for valuables was made, in early Autumn 
1921, the trip continued until the train was stopped by the news that Lenin 
wished to have a conversation with Ludvig Martens, a professional revolution-
ary and mining engineer who coordinated the trip. As there was no telephone 
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connection available, this conversation took the form of an exchange of tel-
egrams in real time. Martens invited Hammer and another American to the 
railway station telegraph with him, and after a long exchange between Martens 
and Lenin about the situation in the Urals, Hammer was surprised to see his 
name on the ticker-tape: “What is this we hear from the Ekaterinburg ROSTA 
[Russian Telegraph Agency] about a young American chartering grain ships 
for the relief famine in the Urals?” “It is correct,” replied Martens: “Dr. Armand 
Hammer has instructed his associates in New York to send grain immediately 
to Petrograd on the understanding, which has been approved by the Ekaterin-
burg Soviet, that a return cargo of furs and other goods would be taken back 
to cover the costs of grain shipment.” Lenin asked, “Do you personally approve 
this?” “Yes, I highly recommend this,” Martens replied, smiling at Hammer. 
“Very good,” Lenin concluded the exchange, “I will order the Foreign Trade 
Monopoly Department to confirm the transaction. Please return to Moscow 
immediately” (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 111).
In Moscow, Hammer was invited to a meeting with Lenin. It was after 
this meeting that Lenin wrote the favorable note about him to the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, which I have mentioned in the opening 
of this chapter. The note introduced Armand Hammer as a son “of American 
millionaire [ Julius] Hammer” who was at that time in prison, allegedly for as-
sisting an illegal abortion, “but in fact for his Communist views.” Then Lenin 
went on to describe a deal to supply grain in exchange for the Ural valuables 
with “only 5 percent commission.” Furthermore, added Lenin, the first thing 
Hammer did after he arrived in Russia was to “gift surgical equipment worth 
of $60,000 to Semashko,” the People’s Commissar for Healthcare (Lenin 
1981: 257). To oversee the deal, Hammer returned to Russia in 1922. This 
time, he requested an audience with Lenin and gave him the gift of Eritis 
sicut deus, which he had purchased in a London antique shop (Hammer and 
Lyndon 1987: 139).
The meanings of this exchange in the context of the idioms of Communism 
and its international support can be found in Lenin’s note when he mentions 
Hammer’s communist background and that the commission is “only” 5 percent. 
But, as I argued above, this idiom is contingent on the singularity of the gift 
event, and of the single meeting of Lenin and Hammer. The question is this: 
does adding another event—the second meeting in 1922—and the attribution 
of the event of gifting Eritis sicut deus to this second meeting still add up to the 
same picture? I argue that this dissembling of the binary of before and after into 
57AN AMERICAN IN MOSCOW
a more detailed chronology complicates the meaning of this gift-event so that 
it can be reassembled in more than one way.
Hammer’s memoirs not only introduce the second meeting but also change 
the meaning of this gift exchange in his account of the first meeting. In this 
regard, his 1987 account is very different from the story he gave in 1964. In his 
1987 memoirs, he describes how he arrived in the Kremlin in October 1921 via 
Trinity Gates, how he had to temporarily leave his passport there in exchange 
for a single entry pass, how crowded the entry to Lenin’s office was. He was 
taken to Lenin’s study, away from the crowd. He noted numerous books, news-
papers, and magazines, including a copy of Scientific American, which Lenin 
showed to him, when he led the conversation to the topic of American pro-
gress: “Look here,” Lenin told Hammer, “this is what your people have done. 
This is what progress means: buildings, inventions, machines, development of 
mechanical aid to human hands.” Lenin compared Russia’s new historic time to 
America at the “pioneer age”: “We need the knowledge and the spirit that made 
America what she is today”; the United States and Russia complement one 
another as Russia is a “backward” country with undeveloped natural resources, 
and America could find here a market for machines and eventually for industrial 
commodities (Hammer and Lyndon 1987: 116).
For the grain that will be delivered to alleviate famine, Lenin said, “To the 
gratitude of these agonized people, I add my humble thanks on behalf of my 
government.” After a pause of silence, when Hammer thinks Lenin struggled to 
stop a tear in his eye, he added: “What we really need . . . is American capital and 
technical aid to get our wheels turning once more. . . . New Economic Policy de-
mands a fresh development of our economic possibilities. We hope to accelerate 
this process by a system of industrial and commercial concessions to foreigners. 
It will give great opportunities to the United States. Have you thought of that at 
all?” Hammer replied that one of his travel companions, a mining engineer, tried 
to interest him in asbestos mines in Alepayevsk, in the Urals, but added that he 
did not wish to take up more of Lenin’s time with his personal matters. “No at 
all,” said Lenin in response, “this is not the point. Someone must break the ice. 
Why don’t you take this asbestos concession yourself ?”
Hammer was astonished. He understood this, he writes, as “a historic op-
portunity Lenin was offering me.” In his account of this Russian trip, he stressed 
time and time again that until that point he thought about his visit purely in 
humanitarian terms. This was a turning point, almost a gift-event—an event of 
Lenin’s gift of a business offer—in which humanitarianism became business, 
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although Hammer acknowledges that the turning point of this turning point was 
his earlier brilliant idea of taking credit to supply grain in exchange for the 
valuables, which opened the door for this opportunity. He replied to Lenin that, 
given the slowness of ways in which such things are done in Soviet Russia, even 
preliminary negotiations might take months. To this, Lenin said that he under-
stood that bureaucracy was one of “our curses” and offered to set up a commis-
sion of two people, one from the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, and the 
other from the All-Russian Emergency Committee (the CheKa, which is the 
precursor to the KGB) to oversee the project. “You may rest assured that they 
will act promptly. It shall be done at once.” Hammer notes that he witnessed 
“the embryo” of the Soviet Concessions Committee (1987: 117–18), which sub-
sequently put the temporality of foreign business in Russia at a very different 
rhythm than Soviet Russia’s own industry and bureaucracy.
Hammer gives the gift of time when he takes credit to ship the grain, which 
is here matched not merely with Lenin’s business offer but also with Lenin’s 
gift of time, which is to be saved in setting up and running this concession. Yet 
Lenin’s gift of time does not reciprocate Hammer’s gift of time. It follows it. It 
is given after Lenin expresses his “humble thanks” on behalf on the government 
for Hammer’s gift, in addition “to the gratitude of these agonized people.” Lenin 
finishes with the gratitude, closes this topic, and goes to business. But Lenin’s 
given time in his business offer is not a giving of market time—as it was in the 
case of grain—but of state time. This is the offer of speedy and resolute state 
support for this project by merger of an institution of class warfare and class 
control, Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate (RABKRIN, Raboche-Krestianskaia 
Inspektsiia), and the terror power of the Soviet security services. This is empa-
thetically a giving of time: Hammer can rest assured all will be done promptly, 
“at once.” There is a popular but unconfirmed story, also attributed to Hammer, 
that at that meeting he also received a note from Lenin that stated, “Whoever 
presents this should be let in to see me at any time—V. I. Ulianov-Lenin, 1921” 
(Zhirnov 2000; my emphasis). According to this story, he used this document 
once during a visit to Moscow’s Red Square when he claimed to have wished 
to see Lenin’s Mausoleum at night. The astonished guard, having recognized 
Lenin’s signature, let him in.
What is the meaning of the gift of the Eritis sicut deus sculpture, then, if 
it was not given at this meeting in 1921 but at the next one in 1922, that is, 
if Hammer purchased this statue after he returned to New York to forge the 
development of these new business links, and when he embarked on his second 
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trip to Soviet Russia in the spring of 1922? This meaning is not in the frame 
of a singular gift-event that separates the before and after in the foundational 
metanarrative of the Soviet time. It is an event in a line of events that start with 
Hammer’s gift of surgical equipment, continues with the offer of American 
grain, and with Lenin’s business offer. Its frame, then, is not so much a met-
anarrative as a microhistorcial division of several befores and afters. This is a 
temporality of the beginning of business relations, with their own cycles of reci-
procity, which are quite different from the reciprocity of Maussian gift theory. 
It implies a pragmatic political and business time in which the Eritis sicut deus 
gift expresses Hammer’s gratitude to Lenin for his business offer, and cements 
their personal relations as a guarantor of Hammer’s business’ state of exception 
in Soviet Russia.
This temporality is, however, not merely that of historical, matter-of-fact 
temporal order that Alfred Gell associates with B-series, “just a row of events 
strung together, like the beads on a necklace” (Gell 1992: 151). These micro-
historical divisions of before and after, into which we see the metanarrative of 
Soviet before and after divided, also add up to other time frames more akin to 
an A-series, with perceptually different notions of past, present, and future.
Given that this business starts with gifts of the surgical equipment and the 
gift of time during Hammer’s trip to the Urals, and then, already as business, is 
cemented with Eritis sicut deus, this is a complex transformation of gift into busi-
ness. This change is a distinct story that is embedded in perceptually different 
notions of past, present, and future for both Hammer and Lenin, although in 
different ways. Given Lenin’s open admiration of “American progress,” which is 
visible not only in what he says to Hammer and the copies of Scientific American 
in his Kremlin office but also in his well-known appreciation of the US industrial 
organization, such as Fordism, which Lenin sought to emulate, then it becomes 
increasingly ambiguous who, in these Soviet-American exchanges, gives gifts to 
whom. In light of these exchanges, it is clear that Eritis sicut deus is not just a gift 
of gratitude for Russia’s gift to the world: the gift of the Revolution. Is this merely 
a gift of Hammer’s personal gratitude to Lenin in response to this business offer? 
Or is it a token of the American gift of modernity to Russia, of which other parts 
include the American hunger relief to the Volga river area and Western conces-
sions that Hammer wants to set up and that are to jump-start Russia’s industri-
alization and modernization after the chaos and devastation of the Civil War?
No matter who gives these gifts to whom, however, this is a gift of pro-
gress, or what I call “the gift of modernity.” This is not a Maussian gift that 
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reproduces sociality. It is the disruptive gift of “time-forward” that Lenin ar-
ticulates both when he is trying to convince his foreign visitors, such as H. G. 
Wells, that he is building an entirely new world, and when he sells Hammer 
a vision of Soviet Russia as once again in America’s “pioneer age,” opening 
up a land of opportunities. However, the contrast with Mauss is not simply 
of the cyclical time of reciprocity versus linear or spiral, dialectical time of 
progress, which Lenin wished to achieve with the help of Hammer and other 
business concessionaires, and market relations of the New Economic Policies. 
Lenin’s thinking is much closer to nineteenth-century ideas of progress than 
Mauss’ at the time of his writing on the gift. The gift was written in the context 
of Mauss’ disillusionment with modernity and its progress that was a result 
of the First World War. But it also followed the fin de siècle and the early 
twentieth-century cultural mood of archaism and nostalgia, decay and deca-
dence (M. Anderson 1992; Noll and Segal 1994; Fournier 2006; Hart 2014), in 
which the Darwinian aesthetics of Eritis sicut deus (circa 1893) was also quite 
exceptional,1 if not simply backward.
The temporary, the urgent, and the emerging: The new time
“A few words on Lenin’s impetuosity,” writes Ludvig Martens (1875–1948) of 
his meetings and correspondence with Lenin, “his handwritten notes and letters 
replete with words such as ‘urgently,’ ‘super-urgently’ [arkhispeshno], ‘very ur-
gently,’ often underlined two or three times” (1958: 148). These are his remarks 
on Lenin’s exchanges with Hammer:
In front of me there is a note, dated November 17, 1921, in which I let Lenin 
know that the first ship with the grain, as agreed with the American conces-
sionaires, is leaving New York. . . . Lenin writes back on it that I should let Peter 
[Petrograd] and Foreign Trade [Commissariat] know immediately as without 
triple checks on this nothing will be ready and we end up falling on our face 
[oskandalimsia]. This note was accompanied by Lenin’s characteristic “urgent.” 
(Martens 1958: 148)
Martens knew Lenin through networks of St. Petersburg Marxist coteries from 
1894 when Martens was a student at St. Petersburg Technological Institute. 
1. I thank Peter Holquist for pointing this out to me.
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He joined Lenin’s “Union for the Liberation of the Working Class” in 1895, 
was arrested the next year, and after three-years imprisonment was expelled 
to Germany, where he competed his engineering degree. He immigrated in 
1906 to Britain and to the United States in 1916, before he returned to Russia 
in 1917. In 1919, he went back to the United States as a head of the Russian 
Soviet Government Bureau in New York, where he met Hammer. His profes-
sional engineering experience, that twice took him to the United States, made 
him a valuable cadre for planning Soviet industrialization. But as historian of 
the US communist movement Theodore Draper puts it, it also epitomizes a 
paradox of mutual gifts of communism between Russia and America, namely 
that while the “material basis of the Russian Revolution was in America; . . . 
the political fulfillment of the American economy was in Russia” (2003: 266).
Some of Lenin’s own thinking about the American economy is reflected in 
his correspondence with Martens. But notes exchanged about Hammer reveal 
a temporality of Soviet construction that is more complex than merely a com-
bination of futures—the Russian political future and the American economic 
future. There is an all-pervasive temporality of urgency that is highlighted by 
Lenin’s distinct rhythm of work on paper, his inpatient underlining, and in his 
emergency powers that he is always quick to use—giving Hammer state-of-
emergency business help is but one instance of this. It is not, or not just yet “an 
arrhythmia of unpunctuated and irregular now-frenetic, now-idle work” time 
(Verdery 1996: 57). Rather, it is similar to a Hobbesian temporality, which I 
outlined in chapter 2. The very acknowledgement, by Lenin, that “without triple 
checks on this nothing will be ready” evokes a Hobbesian social order, described 
by Durkheim as “maintained by the act of will that must be constantly renewed” 
(Durkheim 1960: 136). In America—where Hammer’s grain is shipped from—
it seems from this point of view that nothing needs to be triple-checked. There, 
“the economy” (Mitchell 1998) seems to be a true social automaton. On the 
contrary, the combination of delays and urgency that are ubiquitous from rail-
roads to Commissariats are more than a temporary state of the aftermath of 
the Civil War. This is the routine state of bureaucratic time that both Hammer 
and Lenin identify in their conversation. Hammer fears it might impede busi-
ness; Lenin agrees that this is “one of our curses” and offers a special arrange-
ment to cut through these delays. In other words, this order combines the slow 
time—with the glimpses of Hobbesian disorder—and the rhythms of quick and 
forceful interventions.
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One of the problems of “the act of will that must be constantly renewed” is 
not merely that it tends to become routine, precisely because it must be constantly 
renewed. It is also difficult to identify the time of its beginning. There is a theo-
retical and philosophical issue of the first will, and there is an ethnographic and 
historical issue of who claims this role of first, if not key, agent. This is also a tem-
poral reasoning—of before and after—linking time to agency. I take Carol Green-
house’s point that time is about culturally specific formulation or “distribution of 
agency”—that is, with broad, varied, and contested meanings that people attach 
to questions of possibility, causation, and relevance (1996: 82–83). In a particular 
instance of this chapter’s material, the question of agency is a composite ques-
tion. First, there is the locus of the will—of when and who exactly had a gift of a 
“brilliant idea” to set up Western concessions in Soviet Russia (in this aspect, the 
issue of agency is that of ethnocentrically Western modern subjects like Hammer, 
Martens, and Lenin). Second, there are Marxist notions of historical causality 
and inevitability where it is history that has agency, rather than an individual 
subject (although here not agency but hegemony is an indigenous Marxist term).
Let’s start with the first one. This is what Martens says about exchanges 
between Hammer, Lenin, and himself:
The above-mentioned American concessionaires were the first ones to receive an 
industrial concession from us. [During our trip to the Urals] I was able to inter-
est one American company in Alapaevsk asbestos deposits in the Urals. One of 
the conditions of this concession was the delivery of one million poods of bread 
to the Urals as soon as possible. (Martens 1958: 148)
The picture of exchanges with Hammer changes again! The whole trip, includ-
ing the Urals leg, now appears as a part of the Soviet business plan. Hammer’s 
insights, his quick reactions, and gifts of time now appear as expected and de-
sired responses in situations that were carefully framed. The intended outcomes 
were important economically as well as politically. Martens adds,
On this issue Vladimir Ilyitch [Lenin] wrote me on October 19, 1921, that, if 
concessionaire Hammer’s plan is serious, we need to put it in precise juridical 
form of contract or concession. Even if fictional, he [Lenin] wrote, this is a con-
cession nonetheless. It is important for us to show and print [in the newspapers] 
that the Americans went for concessions—this is politically important. (Martens 
1958: 148)
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The temporality of these interventions is not of a plan or road map, with clear 
milestones and goals, but of opportunities that were to be created and seized. 
There are potentialities for which one needs to stay alert but that are by no 
means planned. These opportunities are gifts of time in a sense of Jacques Der-
rida’s gift (1992)—that is, something that was not intended to be given, let 
alone given as gift. These gifts are the time of urgency, the time of “as soon as 
possible,” the time of this creative uncertainly and of agentive, creative action.
Let me turn to the second meaning of agency here. In this temporality of 
urgency and improvisation, from the point of the revolutionary outside of the 
existing order of things—the capitalist world order—there is nothing sponta-
neous that has not been already framed by a Marxist metahistory (cf. White 
1973). This metanarrative posits communist future as a temporal horizon that, 
in turn, creates specific meanings for all things that happened as hitherto his-
tory. It has an “iron logic” and absolute clarity of Leninist “revolutionary legal-
ity” (Burbank 1995).
Martens’ ability to get the interest of an American company was partially 
due to his time he spent setting up the Russian Soviet Government Bureau 
in New York. This Bureau was to act as an informal embassy in the United 
States, as an instance of exactly this iron logic. Soviet Russia was widely seen 
as a pariah state that had executed its monarch, defaulted on its previous gov-
ernment’s debt obligations, and acted internationally in a charismatic time of 
expectation of world revolution. Very few states diplomatically recognized the 
Soviet Union before 1934. In 1919–21, the Russian Soviet Government Bureau 
was concerned with establishing trade links with the United States, and poten-
tially with diplomatic relations. But important as trade links and recognition 
were, in the United States, the Bureau saw its chief mission as liaising with 
and strengthening American Communists. The Bureau ended up treating this 
foreign territory as part of the Soviet “jurisdiction,” where trade and diplomacy 
were in the end “foolish objectives,” and only “the spread of proletarian revolu-
tion mattered” (Draper 2003: 162). This “jurisdiction” is the future; that is, it is 
potentially the Soviet territory in view of imminent changes in the whole world, 
the World Communist Revolution. But the revolutionary legality of this is seen 
in a different way by the United States. The New York Police raided the Bureau 
in 1919. It became the subject of hearings by the US Senate. In 1921, Martens 
was deported (Raihberg and Shapik 1966).
It was in this context that Martens met Julius Hammer, Communist-mind-
ed American businessman, an immigrant from Odessa, and his son Armand. As 
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Martens was leaving New York, he invited a group of American businessmen 
to Russia. This group included Armand Hammer. In Moscow, Martens invited 
Hammer to the Urals, and when Hammer saw the light and offered the supply 
of grain, Martens recommended Hammer’s plan to Lenin. These events show 
not merely a sequence of befores and afters that take the narrative of exchanges 
between Hammer and Soviet government back several years. They also con-
dense relations that were at the same time diplomatic and personal, driven by 
communist ideas and business interests, and in doing so they complicated the 
relations of exchange in which Hammer’s gifts were part. These relations were 
fundamentally temporary, but constitutive both of new Soviet order and of dif-
ferent temporalities.
First, these business deals and diplomacy are temporary because the world 
revolution was forthcoming, whereupon the whole of humanity could join 
Russia in “being as gods,” as the motto of Hammer’s gift, Eritis sicut deus, put 
this. Draper argues that this disregard of diplomacy, which seems paradoxical if 
one of the goals of this mission was the establishment of diplomatic relations, 
makes sense in a particular temporal orientation of Martens and his colleagues. 
If World Revolution happens, there is no need for diplomacy and trade; if it 
does not, diplomacy and trade would not help the Russian Revolution to sur-
vive (Draper 2003: 162–63). This also explains the ease with which the Soviet 
government traded art from the Hermitage and other Russian collections. As 
Commissar of Foreign Trade Anostas Mokoyan told Hammer in 1928, “we 
need the money”; he also added jokingly that, “of course one day you have a 
revolution in your country, and we’ll take pictures back, so we are really only 
lending them to you” (Walker 1974: 236).
Second, they are temporary because they are responses to emergency situa-
tions—such as hunger and general post–Civil War devastation and chaos. Third, 
they are also temporary, as they are themselves in flux of historical change. 
They make new time, including important changes to the notion of “Soviet 
new time”— Soviet modernity as time. Between the establishment of the 
Russian Soviet Government Bureau in 1919, Marten’s deportation in 1921, and 
Hammer’s visit to Russia the same year, the ideology of world revolution gave 
way to ideas about building communism “in a separate country.” The internal 
version of World Revolution was War Communism. This was a radical way to 
exercise noncapitalism through the state by nationalization of industrial enter-
prises and banks, including the confiscation of private accounts, tax-like requisi-
tion of agricultural “surplus” (that is, everything that exceeded a bare minimum) 
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from peasants for redistribution among the rest of the population, labor duty 
imposed on “nonlaboring classes,” and other attempts at the introduction of 
nonmonetary economy. War Communism, however, stumbled during the Civil 
War over the issue of requisition of agricultural surplus, which led to a change 
of this policy. But this did not prevent peasant rebellions at the end of the Civil 
War and if not more serious mutiny of Baltic Navy sailors in Kronstadt (1921). 
Lenin, a master of tactics, quickly substituted the radical assault on capitalism, 
which he advocated in The state and revolution (1917), with gradualism of the 
“New Economic Policies” (NEP) and temporary tolerance of “elements” of capi-
talism, including Western concessions (Gillette 1981).
This turn was in Lenin’s famous words, “serious and for a long time [vseriez 
i nadolgo],” although he equally famously complicated this temporality by add-
ing that this “long time” was “of course not forever” (Lenin 1970c: 311). In 
his speech at the 10th Party Conference in May 1921, he very interestingly 
identifies this shift in terms that oppose the long-term Marxist logic to “expe-
dients”—that is, to the temporary as a matter of the short-term—which is the 
“philistine” trick of the petty bourgeoisie:
The [new economic] policy is a long-term one and is being adopted in earnest. 
We must get this well into our heads and remember it, because, owing to the gos-
sip habit, rumors are being spread that we are indulging in a policy of expedients, 
that is to say, politics in quotation marks—political trickery—and that what is 
being done is only for the present day. That is not true. We are taking class rela-
tionships into account and have our eyes on what the proletariat must do to lead 
the peasantry in the direction of communism in spite of everything. Of course, 
we have to retreat; but we must take it very seriously and look at it from the 
standpoint of class forces. To regard it as a trick is to imitate the philistines, the 
petty bourgeoisie, who are alive and kicking [and] not only outside the Commu-
nist Party. But I would not go along with Comrade Osinsky in his estimate of the 
period. He said “seriously and for a long time” meant 25 years. I am not that pes-
simistic; I shall refrain from estimating the period, but I think his figure is a bit 
too pessimistic. We shall be lucky to project our policy for some 5 or 10 years, because 
we usually fail to do so even for 5 weeks. (Lenin 1970d: 329–30; emphasis added)
Of course, the longevity had proved not to be the case. But between the time of 
retreat of military communism under these new policies and the renewed “red 
guard attack on the capital,” which started in the late 1920s, different political 
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options enter Marxist temporality. Gradualism means a revision of the immi-
nence of world revolution, but it entrenches the state of permanent confron-
tation (rather than “peaceful coexistence”)—Antonio Gramsci’s “hegemony” 
as war of attrition between classes and between socialist and capitalist world 
camps. Within Soviet Russia, gradualism meant that the dictatorship of pro-
letariat could entertain a possibility of Chayanov’s peasant utopia, and then 
dismiss it. This maneuvering within the new time includes the “Stalinist turn”—
the declaration that the temporary retreat is over and time has come for another 
speed-up of historical time.
Time: Change and exchange
All this at once forms a context for Hammer’s 1921 trip and for his personal gift 
to Lenin, Eritis sicut deus. Let me now sum up how this and other gifts—the 
surgical equipment worth $60,000, the very “sudden idea” to exchange grain for 
valuables and start an asbestos concession—exists simultaneously in different 
temporalities.
There is the “new time” of rapid historical changes in Soviet Russia. This is 
the turbulent temporality of war and policy turns, in which, as Lenin puts it, 
“we shall be lucky to project our policy for some 5 or 10 years, because we usu-
ally fail to do so even for 5 weeks.” War Communism, World Revolution, New 
Economic Policies, let alone the subsequent turns of the 1920s and 1930s—all 
these are modalities of the “new,” and changing instances of the “new Soviet 
order.” But each of these turns assumes different temporalities of state socialism 
and world socialism, with different goals and different understandings of the 
present. The expectation of World Revolution is a different temporality than the 
pragmatics of politics and economics of Soviet construction. This line of quick 
historical changes is also a line of change between them, which similar to what I 
described in chapter 2. We see a sequence of truth claims about the state of the 
world, the state of future, and the meanings of the present.
These modalities of new time—and radical difference between them—are, 
however, practically invisible in the modality of the new time that I have dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. That has to do with a singularity of the historic 
break from before to after that the Museum of Lenin’s Kremlin Flat articulates. 
As I argued, this is historically a much later construct of time when the Kremlin 
opens for the public in 1955, part of the Soviet metanarrative temporal self-
identification but also part of Lenin’s commemorative time. By then, the Soviet 
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narrative of early Soviet history is settled so that its different turns—each having 
its own before and after—figure uncontroversially in the overall transition from 
before to after that the Museum and Soviet history books make a singularity.
But in the early 1920s, each of those shifts, with its own different temporal 
configurations, was a contingency that could have easily led to different kinds 
of subsequent histories. If Lenin thought they were lucky “to project our policy 
for some 5 or 10 years, because we usually fail to do so even for 5 weeks,” the 
reverse was also possible: something designed to be short-lived could turn out 
to be a long-term project. The Soviet saying, “there is nothing more permanent 
than the temporary” is highly illuminating of the social life of the Soviet state, 
as I have argued elsewhere (Ssorin-Chaikov 2003).
In this chapter, I focused on just one instance of these changes: the emer-
gence of New Economic Policies and Lenin’s turn to foreign concessions. In 
case of Hammer, this change was enabled by exchange between temporalities. 
These are the temporalities of the gift, the temporalities of the market, and 
the temporalities of the Soviet state. Exchanges between the gift and market 
time are exemplified by Hammer’s gift of time—that is, his idea of purchasing 
grain on credit. Exchanges between the state and market time are exemplified 
by Lenin’s offer of the state time—of the help of Soviet security apparatus to 
cut through the bureaucratic delays—as part of the business offer to Hammer. 
This control and security apparatus was essential for the state organization in 
its many domains, and in particular, for the state “seizure of time” (Verdery 
1996) from its ordinary citizens. But in this instance, state time becomes itself a 
resource for market time of such foreign concessions within the Soviet Union. 
In turn, this state time and the gift time of Hammer’s grain offer are exchanged 
into temporality of Hammer’s business. This exchange enables the longer-term 
temporality of his wealth. It does so regardless of whether we identify the events 
of these exchanges analytically as the temporality of noncapitalist resourcing of 
noncapitalist outside of the market that starts up his big money (a version of the 
“primitive accumulation”) or agree with Hammer that this is one of the gifts of 
humanitarianism that merely “turns out” to have business effects. (Recall that 
Lenin’s offer of help of emergency powers comes in as help to ensure a speedy 
delivery of Hammer’s grain.) There are different temporalities of capital’s origin 
that also exist in relations of exchange with each other.
What does difference in chronology mean for these exchanges? As we have 
seen, this difference matters for understanding the timing but also the charac-
ter of reciprocity of Hammer’s gift of the Eritis sicut deus sculpture. The single 
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meeting version makes it a countergift for Lenin’s gift of Revolution; the two 
meetings makes it a countergift for Lenin’s business offer.
This leads to the question of the relations that we see being set up. To what 
extent are there gift or business relations? Interestingly, it only seems that this 
difference of interpretation is a matter the Soviet versus American perspec-
tives on these exchanges. As we have seen, Lenin and Martens have no qualms 
in identifying this exchange as business from the start. For Lenin, this is true 
from the first meeting with Hammer in October 1921. For Martens, this was 
so even earlier—from his invitation of Hammer and other US businessmen to 
visit Russia, which he made as he was expelled from New York. The difference 
between business and gift perspectives parallels changes that exist between the 
early 1920s and the subsequent Soviet system. It is this later Soviet order of 
time that retrospectively fixes the temporary character of NEP by making it into 
a market means to a nonmarket end.
But in the context of the early 1920s, both business and gift relations con-
stitute and undo the binary divisions of before versus after as well as the Soviet 
society versus the capitalist West. They interlink, make use of, and simultaneously 
distinguish the temporality of capitalist business, the temporality of gift and 
the temporality of the emerging Soviet state. And all these are characterized 
by accelerations in which giving time—the gift of modernity as the gift of new 
time—is constituted by trying to take as little time as possible. But business and 
the state, and not gift, have drawn much of research attention here. The gift of 
time prompts a question of how it can be theorized as a gift in the Soviet con-
text, and not just as time. I address this question in chapter 5.
chapter 4
Time for the field diary
Interlude
Nikolai stepped toward the door of the tent, and stumbled over the dog, Iaponets 
(“Japanese”). The dog was asleep, and didn’t move at all or make any noise. Iaponets! 
I called it in my thoughts. Clever dog. Nikolai looked at old Nikolai and the girls. 
Everyone was asleep. What is the time? He felt in his pocket for his wristwatch but 
it was not there. But there were four pieces of matches of different lengths. One match 
was for “Mukhachev,” another match was for “the boat.” What were the other two? He 
reached for his coat behind his reindeer skin bed and lifted it quietly, feeling the weight 
of the notebook and the watch. When he turned to the door again, he again stepped on 
the dog; it murmured something in its sleep but not loudly, and it did not wake up.
Nikolai pulled the tent cover down behind him. It was 7:50 a.m. The morning 
was grey. Only one log was smoking on the campfire. Overnight the fire has eaten up 
the much of the three logs, and slowly died in a grey spot of ashes; the remainder of the 
logs pointed in different directions. More smoke was coming out of the metal stovepipe 
of the other tent in the camp. The pup that was tied to that tent had stretched his leash 
and was facing the tent; it gave Nikolai only a quick glance. Lenin’s tent was clearly 
awake. Why do they never fix the campfire if they are up before everyone else? Nikolai 
lifted the logs one by one, moved them toward the center of the fireplace, and dropped 
them so that they flapped each other. Only one was barely glimmering, and the fire did 
not restart. I sat down on one of the logs and took out the notebook. Ok. 1. Mukhachev; 2. 
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The boat. Yes, Lenin took down the boat from cache [labaz]. What were the other two? 
I know what they are. I know what they are. He penciled these two points down, then 
put the pencil down and looked at a very brief entry from yesterday:
April 27 [1994], Wednesday.
1. thunderstorm in April.
2. Dima and Larisa’s reaction to Mukhachev (Old Nikolai threatens to set fire to 
trapper’s huts).
3. Shamans in 1938.
The diary’s entry actually elaborated these points after this list. This was not always 
the case. These broken matches served as reminders of conversations, to not forget to 
write about them. I turned a few pages. They were full of such lists: three or four points 
to remember, often left as they were, while the diary’s narrative turned to something 
else. “Everyday hierarchies in Evenki forest camp” was a paper title I thought it would 
be good to write, back in early April. I closed the notebook, put it in my pocket, and 
walked to Lenin’s tent. I pulled the tent cover, smelling dough that Lenin’s wife, Na-
dezhda, was whipping up in a pan to make bread. Lenin and one of his sons, Arsen, 
were sitting on the other side of the tent with mugs of tea. “Nikolai, come in, have 
some tea,” he said, “I am going to the [geodesic] tower today. Would you like to come 
along?”
***
James Joyce’s Ulysses was the only novel I had with me during my fieldwork in 
Katonga in 1993–95. In the forest, I was traveling light. I had only a backpack 
that I was prepared to carry myself when I walked to another camp or the 
village, without the help of reindeer or sleigh. In writing my field diary, as in 
the opening paragraphs above, a couple of times I tried to imitate Joyce’s style, 
mixing third- and first-person narrative. In this particular instance, I did not go 
much further. The notes that I took that morning were prompted by a match-
stick that I had snapped and stored in my pocket as a reminder to later write 
down “topic 1”: “Lenin: no camp fire.” I wanted to remember to think about 
why Vladimir’s tent never fixed the campfire if they were up before me and 
my camp companions (old Nikolai and his granddaughters). I used matches to 
generate such reminders for myself, as the ethnographic notebook was a killer 
of ethnographic conversations. I had on countless occasions learned this the 
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hard way—my field notes for one episode indicate this text: “When I took the 
notebook out, Dima stumbled in the middle of the sentence, and said, ‘Why? 
Write this down later’”; “The notebook killed the conversation again”; “Why did 
I try to write this down as an interview? When will it be now that we come to 
this topic?” In the forest, I did not use a voice recorder most of the time as forest 
camps have no electricity, and I could not carry around the sufficient supply of 
batteries. But the social effect of voice recorder was even more disruptive when 
I taped quite a large corpus of interviews in the village.
This was despite the fact that people knew from the start that I was there 
“to write things down about Evenki life.” They did not object to this, and vir-
tually no one refused to talk to me, or to have me around. I was explicit that 
I was interested in the present as well as in the recent Soviet past, rather than 
the traditional culture, a research concern of Soviet-style ethnography with 
which Evenki were quite familiar. The difference took some time to explain, 
but eventually it was accepted. However, my explanations always lagged behind 
their decision to have an anthropologist around. The temporality of explana-
tions is different from temporality of decisions; research consent is not a matter 
of appointment but of complex givens—of temporalities that are established 
through the histories of anthropological presence. Permission or nonpermission 
was most of the time given to me before I had a chance to thoroughly explain 
my reasons. When I first came to Katonga in the summer of 1989, I went to 
the forest with hunters and reindeer herders who came to the village to buy 
supplies. People who did not want to take me back with them simply pretended 
they did not hear or understand my request when I approached them. The first 
person that did agree did so also immediately: “Excellent! You will tell us all 
about Moscow, and if you have met Gorbachev.”
I travelled with him to his forest camp where I was passed to another host, 
an elder who was a decorated World War II veteran and a respected reindeer 
herder, and whose name was, like mine, Nikolai. When he agreed to host me, it 
also happened faster than I could anticipate or explain. Before offering tea, he 
said, “drop your things over there, this will be your bed.” Then he put my pres-
ence in terms of the obligations to help ethnographers as those who themselves 
partake in “the help that the state provides to the small peoples of the North” 
(pomosch gosudarstva malym narodam severa). In saying this to me, he gave me 
back the narrative of ethnography as an instrument of twentieth-century devel-
opmental time (see chapter 2). In 1989, he told me, “you are here to ask, and we 
have an obligation [obiazanost’] to answer”; he repeated that in 1994. But this 
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too preceded whatever I had to say about the purposes of my visit. The tempo of 
his reply had instantly made me feel obligated (cf. Bourdieu 1991), despite the 
fact that this was put in terms of Evenki obligations in response to the Soviet 
and Russian gift of modernity. This quick act masterfully produced relations of 
hospitality out of a responsible response to a call of research duty, if we think 
about this in Soviet terms, or a contractual agreement of sorts envisioned by 
Human Subject Protocols, if we think about this in terms of social science re-
search in the United States.
Yet there was an irony to this mastery. As I quickly learned, to agree to have 
an ethnographer around is not the same thing as having time to answer this 
ethnographer’s questions. A match in my pocket, broken for a topic to remem-
ber, was about that too. Vladimir “Lenin” was among the people who welcomed 
and hosted me from the start, but he also exemplified the temporal complexity 
of my research exchanges. We did talk a lot, but most of the time those conver-
sations took place at the time of his own choosing: “I wanted to rest and read, 
but Vladimir wants to talk,” I recorded a few times. At times, Vladimir and 
other Evenki felt compelled to tell a long story, and have a long conversation. 
But more often, the reply to my questions would be simply, “tymanne,” which is 
Evenki for “tomorrow.”
Chronotope
In the present chapter, I approach my field diary as a chronotope (Bakhtin 1975). 
As a diary, it is structured by dates, by repetitions and elaborations of themes 
and structures. It is “full of . . . lists of three and four points” that could none-
theless be paths that lead astray: “points to remember that are often left as they 
were, while the diary’s narrative turned to something else.” Apart from the mul-
tiple temporalities of the present and such incomplete memories, it is full of 
incomplete futures: “‘Everyday hierarchies in Evenki forest camp’ was a paper 
title I thought it would be good to write, back in early April.” But when I had 
it out, this notebook marked the presence of the state. Vladimir “Lenin” and old 
Nikolai were aware that Evenki, like other Siberian indigenous peoples, were 
systematically studied, and that the state had accumulated considerable archives 
on them that included substantial ethnographic materials. Whether I wanted 
it or not, it was the state time of the field notebook time that made my inter-
locutors uncomfortable talking during formal interviews, and that shaped both 
the form and the content of the on-the-record conversations. My conversations 
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with my Evenki interlocutors froze in a way that was familiar to me from the 
moment I saw how Evenki talked to the collective farm director (chapter 2). At 
that moment, I as ethnographer was interpolating my interlocutors into being 
state subjects—and I was myself interpolated as one. This in turn affected the 
internal temporality of my field note writing. But my notebook also acted as 
a material object in the temporality of its external ethnographic context. This 
agency of writing, on the one hand, underscores construction of a research fact 
(Latour and Woolgar 1986)—abbreviations, edits, and memories that under-
score whatever I later take as a description. On the other hand, it reveals “rela-
tionships of power and histories of encounter,” which “make anthropology itself 
already a part of . . . subjects of study” (Marcus and Myers 1995: 2). Diary as a 
narrative and as material artifact makes time, to use the Mikhail Bakhtin’s words, 
“palpable and visible” while space is “intensified and sucked into the movement 
of time, plot, history” (Bakhtin 1975: 235), and, we can add, an anthropological 
argument. The argument in this chapter is that this notebook marks the state in 
a form of time, and that the state time exists in complex relations of exchange 
with research time.
I will elaborate on this by looking at the time I was given “to ask questions,” 
at when I was able to have my notebook out and write, and what this writing 
meant in terms of microsocial space around me. I will explore these tempo-
ralities of my presence among Evenki and the temporalities of my notebook 
as inscribing the presence of the state. I will do so from the point of view that 
research (ethnography) is itself time rather than something that simply happens 
in time, to borrow Nancy Munn’s formulation (1983: 280). But by adding re-
search time to the multiple temporalities that I explore in this book, I do not as-
sume that it is as another “one” among “many” that I explore. To be sure, research 
time is composite, as there are different discrete temporalities of conversations 
and interactions, and an enduring time of participation in everyday life. There 
is institutional time of the academy, including funding time and writing time 
in and after research. But ethnography is also a Bergsonian duration, in which 
the flow of experiences and records, while rooted in long-term fieldwork, spans 
beyond individual fieldwork locations and is continuous across projects. In this 
chapter, I focus on the relationship between research time and state time by 
linking two kinds of materials. The first materials are my ethnographic notes 
and experiences in Siberia, which I have already introduced; the second ma-
terials, to be explored in the second part of this chapter, are research materials 
associated with an exhibition of gifts to Soviet leaders, which art historian Olga 
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Sosnina and I curated in Moscow in 2006 and where the Eritis sicut deus figu-
rine that Lenin-the-Soviet-leader received from Armand Hammer was shown, 
along with more than 500 other gifts.
The reason I will move to this second project later in this chapter is that 
I turned to thinking about the temporality of my Siberian ethnography only 
after I moved on to the gifts to Soviet leaders. From this point of view, even the 
account of my first fieldwork in Katonga in 1989 that I outlined above is not a 
“live” recording of arrival but a retrospection in which the second project also 
has a presence. But if in my Siberian ethnography the time of my notebook was 
an instance of the Soviet state and its legacies in the 1990s, then the project 
on gifts to Soviet leaders and its research archive became an instance of the 
postsocialist state in the making: in the ways in which this project blurred in 
radical ways the distinction between research time and the time of public pres-
entation of research results as well as between this project’s academic, popular, 
and state audience, and between the relations that this research time described, 
performed, and created.
In the conclusion of his famous essay, “The time and the chronotope of the 
modern novel,” Mikhail Bakhtin observes that fiction’s textual chronotope—
“the chronotope of the depicted world”—extends beyond text and enters the 
worlds of these depictions’ author, performer, listener, and reader, and that “these 
worlds are also chronotopic.” It is there that he acknowledges that chronotopes 
are multiple. Each “major chronotope” may contain an unlimited number of 
“minor” ones, to the point that each motif is a chronotope of its own kind. In 
my case, this would be the motif of a broken match, a marker of memory, held in 
unsteady place to be retrieved, maybe, into narrative, later. Chronotopes may in-
clude each other, coexist, and be interwoven so that their interlocking is outside 
a given single chronotope (Bakhtin 1975: 400–401). In this chapter, I ask what 
changes if the concept of chronotope is applied, not to literature, but research? 
What if Bakhtin’s author is not a writer but a scholar? In this case, what would 
be “the chronotope of the depicted world,” and what are the chronotopic rela-
tions of this depicted world with “these depictions’ author, performer, listener, 
and reader”?
Slowness
The flip side of ethnography as a Bergsonian duration is what George Marcus 
(2003) describes as the “unbearable slowness of being an anthropologist now.” 
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He draws attention to duration as having speed, and refers to a chronic belated-
ness of ethnography in relation to the pace of changes in societies that we study. 
In turn, Paul Rabinow’s anthropology of the contemporary makes a research 
tool out this problem. Chronic belatedness makes ethnography a chronicle of 
“what is taking place without deducing it beforehand”; furthermore, this is an 
“accompaniment” of a particular time when “no single sensibility—modernist or 
otherwise—dominates, overarches, or underlies current affairs” (Rabinow 2008: 
3, 78; Rabinow 2011). The argument is that changes can no longer be framed 
in terms of teleology of transitions: from modernity to postmodernity or from 
state socialism to neoliberalism. As Tobias Rees puts this, “By turning toward 
the study of the ‘here and now’—rather than of the ‘far-away’ and ‘timeless’—
anthropologists experience profound temporal turbulences precisely because 
they can no longer make assumptions about what is necessary for their method 
to produce rich ethnographic data—a temporally stable scene and subject of 
study” (Rees 2008: 7).
The previous state of affairs—the “temporally stable scene and subject of 
study”—as research temporality has been constituted by the overlap of the 
Western calendar year that organizes the academic graduate or sabbatical field-
work (a year at least in the field), and the conceptual construction of societal or 
cultural reproduction cycles in societies that are being explored. What comes 
under question now is precisely this temporality of reproduction. An assump-
tion of cyclical time that is thought to dominate “traditional” societies under 
study is contrasted with linear time of Western society and anthropology that 
include their own cyclicality, but of a “geometrical” sort (Leach 1961: 126) that 
neatly adds up to a chronological linear. Cultural differences are then high-
lighted through the incongruence of this geometry of Western temporal vision 
of cyclicality versus the fluidity of social rhythms under study.
The anthropology of the contemporary is marked by a double departure 
from this vision. First, it is a departure of anthropology from non-Western or 
traditional societies to modernity that is characterized by such geometrical time. 
Second, it is a departure of modernity itself from this geometrical time to “flex-
ible” timescapes (see, for example, Adam 1998; Harvey 1989). Global flows of 
persons, things, technologies, and ideas challenge not just fieldwork conditions 
but the very constitution of the field itself as a location (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997a, 1997b; Marcus 1995) and time (Dalsgaard and Nielsen 2013) that con-
sistently resists geometrical spatial and temporal scales. Anthropology’s com-
ing “home” from the study of “far-way” and “timeless” (Rees 2008) happens to 
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coincide with modernity’s line of flight (“modernity at large,” see Appadurai 
1996) into various forms of the contemporary.
One question about this transformation is this: if the point of departure is 
marked by the assumptions of “traditional” cyclical time versus “modern” linear 
time, this move itself is not contingent on the assumption of linear time. This 
double transformation is easily described as a shift, a “time’s arrow” (Hodges 
2008), or the “straight time” (Boellstorff 2007). But even if this transformation 
could be described in terms of a liner vector, does it mean that the time of this 
transformation is singular? If we arrive at a temporality that resists geometry, is 
this temporality applicable to the temporality of this transformation?
If, however, this temporality in not singular, then what exactly is the “un-
bearable slowness” of anthropology? Belatedness pervades any kind of field-
work—given the waiting time for a good moment to ask (which is so often 
a failure), of the sense of being late to ask and to see, and to fail to remember 
what one has seen and asked about, when finally having time to write this down. 
What exactly is speed and slowness here? We can think of this in terms of the 
paradox of speed: if we move in the same speed with the objects that we study 
this is actually, by a physical frame-of-reference definition, stillness. It is, then, 
only a relative slowness that allows us to see the speed of anything. Let me think 
through this slowness below, where I slow down ethnographically to a single 
day—April 28, 1994—but then approach this day as a chronotope of research 
time that spans forward to the present (to my more contemporary research and 
the present time of writing this book) and across some different temporalities 
that I chart. In doing so, I take inspiration from Joyce’s description of a single 
day and Alexander Sokurov’s camera gaze in his Russian ark, a film that depicts 
the history of the Hermitage Museum in a hour-and-a-half-long single shot. 
But before I do that, let me introduce the time of the ethnographic notebook a 
little bit more.
Time of the notebook (i)
A day in the forest camp has its own routine cyclicality, which changes through-
out the year; seasonal variation and weather can make a lot of difference. When 
I was in the forest camp, people did not wake up very early, or very quickly. But 
once a fire had been set in a tent’s stove, roughly between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m.—by 
the wife of the tent’s head (bye, the tent’s “man”) if he had one, or by whomever 
was up first—its warmth served as a signal to all to get out of bed. After a quick 
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tea, preparations were made for the day’s work. If there were travel plans, like 
Vladimir’s plans that morning, reindeer had to be caught, saddled, or harnessed. 
This might take some time, as the reindeer herd could be far from the camp, 
even if they are attracted to camp by smokes that are set to drive away the mos-
quitos in summer, or attracted by salt in winter. If setting the camp smoke as 
well as the tent fire marks the beginning of the day, catching reindeer and the 
second tea midmorning, which is the main meal that all tent inhabitants have 
at the same time, marks the beginning of the work (rabochii den’, “work day”). 
This work day is a translation of social rhythms of the forest camps into the time 
of collective farms and urban Russia—that is, into temporalities that are based 
on the divisions of work and leisure, and work time and home time. In Evenki, 
to work (khavaldiami) is to do everything except for eating and sleeping, from 
cooking at home to hunting and reindeer herding.
Although I occupied a recognized role of someone who is there “to ask 
questions,” it was expected that I to take part in the day’s work to the best of 
my abilities. This involved no hunting in my case; instead, I was tasked with 
some reindeer herding (like rounding up reindeer when they are needed to be 
brought to the camp), and lots of fetching firewood and water, sawing and cut-
ting logs for the tent stove, and participating in the construction of reindeer 
fences (which is important seasonal work in spring and late summer) or their 
frequent inspection. During the day in the camp, people are busy or simply 
gone, and have no time for conversations. If I stayed in the camp after the sec-
ond tea time, I was left in one part of the gendered forest chronotope: women 
were left behind in the camp, and had to find time for my questions in the mid-
dle of bread baking, laundry, making clothes or winter boots, etc. When I was 
gone with men, I was in the other part of this chronotope. But it was during 
that work time in the camp or in the forest that I developed my arts of memory, 
with the system of reminders by matches that I broke differently as markers of 
different topics. The best conversations I had were during work breaks for tea 
or smoking, for instance, during the construction of reindeer fences, which was 
done by the adult men of the camp. On these occasions, all men were at ease, 
throwing questions back and forth, and talking at the same time. In contrast, 
during evening time, when we were back at camp and most of day’s work was 
done, the social space centered on the figure of the male head of the household. 
In this evening time, I found it difficult in the tent to ask anyone else but him, 
or invite someone else out for a conversation. During this time, when I did 
what I was supposed to do as ethnographer—that is, “to ask”—I resumed this 
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head-centered social space in a slightly ritualized role of the guest, with my 
questions and, this time, a notebook out. This is a crossing point of daily tempo-
ralities of gender and age authority, and that of the state, as represented here by 
my presence and my notebook.
Jean Briggs, in her celebrated book on Inuit social and emotional landscapes, 
speaks of “a tent of one’s own” as a place of reflection and retreat where she could 
give in to her own emotions among people who were “never in anger” (Briggs 
1970). During my fieldwork in the forest, I did not have such a tent of my own. 
I shared a tent with my hosts, staying in the back, right of the tent’s entry and 
its stove. The left side belonging to the tent’s head and was his family space. This 
was a crowded space, but the social skills with which people interacted—com-
parable with the scenario that Briggs describes—never made me feel like this 
space cramped. I frequently thought these taiga Evenki would make ideal space-
ship crews. But it was my fieldwork notebook that marked my private space as 
private time. When I had it out not to ask questions but to write, this was a sign 
that I don’t want any conversations, questions, or jokes.
The time of the notebook was for me a way to fence myself off. In this form, 
the notebook had the capacity of an agent not merely to mark my identity as an 
outsider but also to mark my presence as an instance of a state time. This state 
time had daily fluctuations. When I was fetching firewood, or rounding the rein-
deer, or cutting larches for a reindeer fence that we dashed through the thickets 
and glades of taiga, I was not completely outside this state time, but the state 
time itself morphed into work time. In other words, the time that was initially 
given to me as ethnographer as an obligation and in return for modernity as new 
time (see chapter 5) is then itself changed into something different. Clifford 
Geertz (1973), in his ethnography of the Balinese cockfight, describes how the 
ice was broken between him and the participants in this illegal activity when they 
together ran away from the police. During my own fieldwork, I had many similar 
moments of solidarity with my interlocutors through similar complicity. But the 
state time of my presence had a capacity of being dissolved in ways that were 
similar to this as well as being reestablished. State time resumed as such when I 
had my notebook out in the evening, or even when I asked a question—for ex-
ample, during a break in fence construction: “But you are supposed to be paid for 
this work by the collective farm, aren’t you?” However informal our conversation 
could be before this question, it would have a strong interpolating affect.
In 1988 and 1989, my trips were official research trips from the Institute of 
Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, with travel documents that needed 
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to be stamped in local soviets that had a duty to accommodate the researcher 
and help to set up the project. But I did not need these state travel documents 
to go to the forest, and I left them behind in the village. In 1993, when I re-
turned to Katonga, I did so not as a researcher from Moscow but as a PhD 
student from Stanford University. This time I did not have Russian state docu-
ments with me, but I also did not need them in the new post-Soviet context. 
The state route in was still important (and remains so today) for archival work, 
where access is given on the basis of institutional support letters. But while these 
documents marked my entry into the field, their necessity as artifacts remained 
stored away at the gates of this project. By the time I left Katonga in 1989, forest 
Evenki introduced me to others as someone who “nomadized with them” (koche-
val s nami). This joint experience marked my ethnographic identity through a 
different notion of time—despite the fact that my notebook continued to be an 
instance of the Russian state time in the late 1980s and even during subsequent 
work in 1993–95. Even then, from Vladimir’s and old Nikolai’s point of view 
I was there on “business of state importance” (delo gosudarstvennoi vazhnosti), 
despite that I was institutionally an American anthropologist.
Nails
Vladimir and his tent joined with us two days ago to continue something they 
started earlier: building a boat. They were working on it over the last two years; 
the wood for it needed to dry on a cache (dylkon) they had in this area. Vladimir 
already spotted a good aspen for this boat a few years back, and he planned his 
late spring camps in this area so that he could work on the boat. The day before, 
I saw them taking down this boat’s base—very skillfully dug from this aspen 
trunk—from the cache.
After he arrived, Vladimir explained that he saw such boats being made 
when he was very young, “after the war” (World War II), but since that time 
they were not built. From the late 1960s onward, it was possible to borrow 
inflatable rubber boats in the collective farm or purchase them the village shop. 
But in post-Soviet years Vladimir could not afford such a boat, and he decided 
to build one. And this was no birch-bark canoe (berestianka) that Evenki built 
until the early 1950s, but a modified dugout that Vladimir saw made by Finnish 
exiles from Karelia that, together with the Germans, were brought to Katonga 
during the war. “They were brought here on a barge they have hauled up the 
river, and just dumped there for the winter, together with the barges but with 
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no food.” A lot of them died, but some were adopted by Evenki and lived in 
this area until the mid-1950s; it was then that young Vladimir saw their boat-
making skills.
Building such a boat was a gamble, as Vladimir and his son, Arsen, did not 
have much experience in doing this. But this was a necessary gamble—new 
market prices for such commodities as boats had risen sharply after 1991, in 
the conditions of a considerable demonetization of the economy. This gamble 
had its own temporality, as they needed to dry the wood to make planks, and 
they knew that a year for this task would probably be not enough. And then 
there were a number of problems that appeared over the course of construction 
that they had not considered from the start. One of these issues was that they 
did not have tar to caulk the boat once it was assembled. Arsen suggested using 
pine resin to make tar, and this seemed like a good idea. Another issue, and a 
more immediate difficulty, was that they needed nails to make the boat’s top 
into a solid frame that would hold it together. When I came to Vladimir’s tent 
one morning, which I described at the beginning of this chapter, I caught the 
end of discussion on this issue. The previous day, they failed to fix the frame 
with ropes that they had made from reindeer skin. Vladimir thought of an old 
geodesic tower, erected not far from the camp in the 1970s. It was made of 
wood, and we could get some nails from it. He offered the opportunity for me 
to accompany him.
That morning, after a reindeer was caught and saddled, Vladimir and I set 
off for this tower. Vladimir rode his reindeer, and I walked behind him. It was 
late spring, and we took a reindeer sleigh route that was a beaten track that was 
ice-solid underground but covered by water from melting snow. But at least 
it was not as soggy as everything else this time of year. It took us about two 
hours to get to the tower, and during the few stops that we made, Vladimir 
told me about how he took part in building such towers in the 1970s, working 
with geodesists who demarcated the forest space with these towers and detailed 
maps. Geodesists hired collective farm reindeer and Evenki guides to take them 
around. He told me how he preferred this work to reindeer herding. “I am a 
modern Evenki” (Ia—sovremennyi Evenk). This was not the first time he said 
this. In the evening, when I wrote this down, I went through my notebook look-
ing at other occasions when he repeated this locution. These include the times 
when he told me that he visited Moscow in the late 1960s, when he told me that 
he liked to study, and also a day before our trip when he and Arsen took down 
the boat. “We are modern Evenki,” he explained at that time, “because we look 
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for opportunities that modern life brings us.” He referred to the skill of making 
Finnish boats, which counted as modern despite he observed this boat making 
“after the war.”
We approached the tower. We saw that the construction included a shed at 
its bottom—a half-ruined foundation under a roof. It was in the inner side of 
the roof that we found nails that were not rusted and therefore could be used. 
But there was a problem, as we had only axes and no pliers to take them out. 
Axes and knives are the main tools that Vladimir and other Evenki have in the 
forest. They use axes very skillfully to make practically everything they need, 
and that was the main tool to manufacture the boat base and the planks. But 
now when we tried to split the wood to take the nails out, we failed; the roof 
was reinforced with iron staples that we needed to take out, too. We struggled 
for some time and realized that the only way we could get to the nails was if we 
were to burn the shed. We managed to break the shed’s roof off the tower, set 
the fire, and put the roof in. Then we had some time to wait until it was burned 
enough so that we could get the nails. By the fire, Vladimir continued to tell 
me about his memories of work with the geodesists until we both paused at a 
thought that crossed our minds simultaneously. The tower is still operational. Is 
it legal to take part of it down? “Nikolai,” asked Vladimir, “will you write down 
that this is just a shed [we are burning down], and not the tower?” “Sure,” I 
replied, “and, besides, I did this together with you.”
If my notebook was a state artifact in the forest, it was not the only state ar-
tifact around. Geodesic towers, just as the combined fodder (see chapter 2), were 
part of the state infrastructure that marked the state as modernity and develop-
ment. These, together with abandoned oil exploration derricks east of this area 
as well as old trading bases and storages of leftover fuel, became a resource—al-
most an object of subsistence gathering, utilized often in an unexpected ways. 
The topography of this Soviet debris (Ssorin-Chaikov 2016)—of these projects 
of modernity-as-time that were ruined and lived as a “second hand time,” to use 
a formulation from the novel by Svetlana Alexievich (2013)—had a particular 
temporality of memory. One needed to remember where these things were, and 
what they were. Arsen’s knowledge in this regard did not entirely overlap with 
Vladimir’s knowledge; the latter traveled extensively with geodesists and geolo-
gists as a “modern Evenki.” Vladimir knowledge also included memories of how 
exiled Finns had survived, and how they built dugouts. In other parts of Siberia, 
these were memories of gulag barracks that were used to enlarge indigenous set-
tlements and collective farms (Ulturgasheva 2012). This memory was complex 
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and often ambiguous in relation to identity, but the leftovers of their presence 
added to the state landscape that now could be utilized. Thus, it was not just a 
narrative of the past but also a resource in the uncertain present and the even 
more uncertain future.
If the temporality of daily rhythms, seasonal migrations, and trade is cyclical, 
like coming to the same area in spring to continue working on the boat, this sec-
ondhand time of state infrastructure is that of memory of singular past events. 
For example, Vladimir recalled his trips with geodesists that were regular but 
had a finality of the work that needed to be done only once, that now enabled 
our trip to get the nails from the shed, which we could burn only once—and 
which was in effect a minor metonym for the transformative event of the end of 
the Soviet era as our initial worry of wrongdoing quickly changed into indiffer-
ence: the state that erected this tower was no longer there to look after it. But 
as a result of the long-term temporality of my fieldwork, I came to realize that 
the contrast between the cyclical time of Evenki ecology and economy and the 
event-time of transformations (Badiou 2005) was not necessarily the best way 
to describe what was taking place. This contrast is not useful because both are 
complex assemblages of repetition and difference (Deleuze 2004). Cyclicality 
was each time improvised to a great degree: knowledge of good pastures and 
hunting grounds is similarly a chronotope of the events of past travel, while 
event-time of engagement with the state infrastructure was based on a number 
of practical and narrative repetitions. Vladimir told me many times that to do 
things such as making a dugout boat and fetch nails from Soviet-era tower was 
“to live like our grand-dads” (Rus. po dedovski), like “before” (Ev. amaski)—that 
is, to be self-reliant. This was in no contradiction, in his eyes, to telling me on 
other occasions that taking advantage of these ruins was a marker of being 
“modern Evenki.” It is also clearly possible to describe this improvisation of 
Finnish boat building in actor-network terms of agency (Callon 1986) of axes 
and fire, which is not merely a symmetrical network space of people and objects 
but also a temporality of the already existing materiality. Axe-as-a-tool leads to 
fire-as-a-tool to produce nails. For Vladimir, this is both “modern” and “grand-
dads” because it is making use of circumstances that are not fixed by an endpoint 
event—by the fact of whether the boat was made in the end or not. Ironically, 
while this is quite far from the contexts that Rabinow had in mind when he 
formulated the agenda for the anthropology of the contemporary (Rabinow 
2008), it is precisely the temporality that he envisions: of “now” without the 
completion.
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Lenin
We have just finished the soup. A few pieces of moose meat are still out on 
the wooden tray on the tent’s floor, and our bowls still have some broth with 
macaroni. “Well,” says Vladimir, taking out his knife and cleaning the tray into 
a empty soup pan, “this is for the dogs.” Arsen, my tent companion (nicknamed 
Churchill), and I pass our bowls to Nadezhda. There is a disappointment in 
the air as this is a good time for a smoke, but we were out of the village for too 
long, and cigarettes are over. In the form of these commodities, modernity is 
time too, and not just new time but also the time of supplies that run out. The 
notebook is an interesting product of a similar situation, that is, of me running 
out of the batteries for the voice recorder. As is the case with Vladimir’s skills, 
the notebook (and its state time) is both “modern” and “grand-dads.” I clean 
my hands with a towel, which I then stick behind the tent’s pole, and take my 
notebook out. While I do this, Vladimir produces a pack of cigarettes from 
behind his bed. “Emergency supplies [neprikosnovennyi zapas],” he laughs and 
passes them around. “I was telling you,” he turns to me, “we used to travel much 
more. I studied in Igarka [town in the north of Krasnoyarsk province], and this 
was on a Komsomol travel ticket [komsomol’skaia putevka].” I am reminded that 
on other occasions he told me that on such an order of Komsomol travel ticket 
he was sent to Moscow in 1967. This is when he visited the Kremlin, and the 
Lenin Museum. Vladimir and others finish smoking and make it clear they are 
going to bed. It was a long day. Churchill and I walk back to old Nikolai’s tent, 
where he prepares two of his granddaughters to sleep, although this is normally 
Churchill’s duty while their parents are away.
“Did you have tea at Vladimir’s?” asks old Nikolai. I nod. “Did you ask 
him questions [rassprashival]?” “Yes,” I reply, “about his time as a student.” Old 
Nikolai is always uneasy that in the forest camp it is not only of him that I ask 
questions. It is fine if I spend the day with Vladimir obtaining the nails for the 
boat. It is less fine if I have an evening meal in his tent after we return. But in 
this competitive ownership over the daily time of an anthropologist, it is more 
or less fine if I inquire about Vladimir’s personal and biographical details, while 
old Nikolai wants to be the sole authority on “the Evenki old ways” (raneshneie). 
This is another construction of the anthropological time. If he recognizes that 
my presence in the forest is a “business of state importance,” and if he is to fulfill 
his obligation to answer, it should be only he who is called to this duty. “Yes,” 
he goes on, “everybody knows this story. I have told you when he came back 
[from Moscow], we were laughing: ‘To study, to study, and to study,’” he imitates 
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Vladimir imitating Lenin after this trip to Moscow. (The phrase originates in 
Lenin’s 1923 articles in the newspaper, Pravda: “Our task in the renewal of our 
state apparatus is, first, to study, second, to study, and, third, to study, and then 
to check that our science does not become a dead letter or a fashionable word 
[as it often does, let us confess], but really came into out flesh and blood and 
became an element in our composition” [Lenin 1970b: 391]). The triple slogan 
“to study, to study, and to study” became a Soviet cliché, and was repeated on 
posters and in schools from Moscow to the Evenki District. Old Nikolai imi-
tated Vladimir quoting these words, including an attempt at Vladimir’s voice 
and hand gestures: “Words, hammered in copper [chekannye med’iu slova].” Old 
Nikolai says this solemnly. “You know,” he adds, “this was so funny we called 
Vladimir as ‘Lenin’ ever since: ‘To teach, to teach, and to teach.’ What was it 
[Lenin’s phrase], ‘to teach’ [uchit’] or ‘to study’ [uchitsia], Nikolai?”
Churchill laughed, and I did as well, although old Nikolai had indeed told 
me this story several times already. Vladimir’s nickname was “Lenin,” because 
his wife was called Nadezhda, because of a characteristic hand gesticulation that 
was reminiscent of Lenin (or at least of his image in Soviet movies), and also 
because of this Moscow trip. Such conversations are fragments of these narra-
tives, which I found, however, never told as whole stories. These are half-told 
and even part-told stories, where the whole is given by abbreviation. The whole 
point of Vladimir’s story was, for example, that “we used to travel much more.” 
This was a commentary on travels of the past that are no longer possible. By 
this he was not referring to forest nomadism or even his work with geodesists 
but to travel outside the collective farm and the district that was made possible 
by Soviet reforms. The travel he referred to was a matter of Soviet distribu-
tive economy (Verdery 1991)—for instance, Young Communist (Komsomol) 
“travel tickets” that were organizational recruitment, which was a form of order; 
or quotas for “young pioneer camps” for holidays in the south of Krasnoyarsk 
province where quite a number of Katonga Evenki recalled going in the 1970s 
or his trip to Moscow.
There were the gifts of modernity that opened up the Soviet space for travel 
and career possibilities, real for some and imagined for all. This was a story 
of Soviet development that from this Siberian perspective seemed to be an 
endless, if not global space. But in 1994, the point of this story was a rapid 
and forceful contraction of this space. This was the story not of the old ways 
but the new emplacement of these Evenki at the time of “wild capitalism” of 
the 1990s, when Russia quickly integrated into the global market and became 
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one of the sites of import of a global commodity of the gift of development: 
the neoliberal reforms. In the course of these changes, outside travel became 
a commodified space well beyond the reach of these collective-farm herders 
and hunters. On mass, people stopped traveling far, and not just to Krasno-
yarsk but also to regional centers like Tura and Baikit. Local seasonal travel of 
school children from boarding school to forest camps became slow; it was no 
longer done in less then an hour by helicopter but instead in two or three days 
by reindeer. While new configurations of post-Soviet economy channel new 
commodities across the post-Soviet space, and while these included in northern 
Siberia not just consumables, clothes, and hunting and fishing equipment, but 
also tourist possibilities, the very same market flows created new barriers and 
new bounded localities. This space as an “anthropological location” (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997a) is simultaneously, and in very differentiating ways, unbound 
and bounded (cf. Rogers 2010).
The socialist realism of memory
Thank you for the Exhibition. Today I visited my happy childhood. I do not want 
to leave but keep watching and watching, and recall all that was good under the 
Soviet power.
. . .
Once I walked out of the museum to the street, I became very sad, very sad that 
this all does not exist any more. Only now I understand that what is most im-
portant in life is not money but relations between human beings. (Visitors’ book, 
Gifts to Soviet leaders; Ssorin-Chaikov 2006b)
In the 1990s, I thought about my Siberian research material primarily through 
the lens of paradoxes of globalization. I approached new territorialization and 
new subsistence economies as the flip side of the opening of the former Soviet 
space. The neoliberal logic of global political economy became opportunity for 
some and crisis for others (cf. Ssorin-Chaikov 2003). My newer research on gift 
giving to Soviet leaders, and particularly the 2006 exhibition of these gifts, gave 
me another angle to look at the same material.
Gifts to Soviet leaders is a project that looks at the vast and complex economy 
of official gifts that the heads of the Soviet Union attracted from Soviet sub-
jects and international readers and movements. These gifts ranged from military 
uniforms from Red Army units, china from porcelain factories, and towels from 
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peasant women, to industrial artifacts such as models of nuclear missiles and 
pieces of Trans-Siberian railroad. This kind of gifting was as important as a way 
to navigate Soviet identities and ideologies, as were other forms of noncom-
modified exchange in socialist “redistributive economies.” Research into these 
practices of exchange was to be my next long-term project. But it was a product 
of a very differently structured research time, and it created a very different re-
search archive. I started it when I moved to a full-time university job. I carried 
it out not as long-term participant observation but through a series of relatively 
short research intervals during breaks in the academic year. I started to publish 
on it and cocurated an exhibition before I had research completed.
Furthermore, this project is itself not one research but two projects. Because 
of the resonance these publications and the exhibition held in Russia, I extend-
ed it from the Soviet past to the post-Soviet present, focusing on reactions to 
it as a form of cultural memory, post-Soviet identity politics, and a modality of 
relations between museums and the state. In this context, the exhibition became 
a research tool, and its book of visitors’ comments became a public ethnographic 
notebook of this project.
It is interesting that if this exhibition was about what was given to the lead-
ers—and it included Hammer’s gift of the sculpture, Eritis sicut deus—many 
responses were about what they received from the state. Comments of the ex-
hibition visitors have drawn my attention to the idiom of gift in narratives of 
loss. This idiom is similar in these otherwise very different contexts. In Katonga, 
many of my informants, including old Nikolai and Vladimir “Lenin,” talked of 
career, work, and travel opportunities, and also “help” (pomosch) and “develop-
ment” (razvitie) as something given to them in the past. Exhibition visitors 
remarked that in Soviet times “the state gave us the opportunity to implement 
Lenin’s slogan, ‘Study, study and, one more time, study,’” while “now education 
and healthcare are not free.” “The Soviet times were the fairest in the social 
respect”; “people started receiving jobs,” while “now there is unemployment in 
the country”; and “we received free education,” “we received stipends and free 
lunches” (emphasis added):
I am 76 years old. Before the Revolution, my grandfather was a street cleaner, 
and my grandmother was a laundress. My mother was a bookkeeper. [But] I had 
a long and fulfilling life. I am a second generation Leningrader. [I lived through 
the] Leningrad blockade [of the Second World War], was wounded, and evacu-
ated to Kuban’.
87TIME FOR THE FIELD DIARY
 The Exhibition has shown all that the Soviet power gave to my generation. 
I started my working life at the age of 14, and finished at 60 when I retired. I 
have two higher education degrees, and I received both without leaving produc-
tion work. I started my career as a plumber apprentice, and finished as a project 
construction engineer. This all thanks to the Soviet power.
 This is a wonderful Exhibition! Having walked through it, I [feel] as if [I] 
walked again through my entire life that I consider to be a happy one.
 Thank you very much!
 This is a good exhibition.
 [It is] as if [I] returned to my childhood. It was not all that bad . . . (Visi-
tors’ book, Gifts to Soviet leaders; Ssorin-Chaikov 2006b)
As I conceptualized both Soviet gifts and these post-Soviet memories, I found 
it useful to describe from the point of view of the socialist realism of Soviet 
art that depicted reality from the point of the view of the progressive future. 
Soviet-era gifts articulated this future in an idiom of gratitude that appeared 
after the Revolution of 1917 (see chapter 3 and chapter 5) but culminated in 
the 1930–50s. These gifts thanked the state, the Party, and Stalin “for our happy 
childhood” and “happy life.” If Soviet documents stressed the role of the Party 
and its leaders as “leading” and “guiding” the country to communist happiness, 
they nonetheless stayed clear from describing their role as “bearing gifts.” It was 
these gifts of gratitude, by calling themselves countergifts, that postulated so-
cialism as a gift to which they were responses (Ssorin-Chaikov 2006a). In other 
words, they articulated a teleological temporality of the imminent future in the 
language of retrospective temporality of countergifts.
What is interesting about the postsocialist commentary of exhibition visitors 
is that the commentary followed a similar retrospective logic of gift, albeit in a 
post-Soviet retrospection. This could be described as a socialist realism of memory 
in which the future-oriented socialist temporality was given through a temporal-
ity of loss or of taking away (Ssorin-Chaikov 2013). If Sosnina and I, as curators, 
used Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope to design the exhibition space as the Soviet-
era gifts’ “new world” (with new as in time and world as in space [Ssorin-Chaikov 
2006b]), the post-Soviet public articulated postsocialism as a chronotope that 
marked its different spaces from museum to everyday life by a temporal point of 
departure from Soviet socialism (Sosnina and Ssorin-Chaikov 2009).
What I suggest here is, first, extending the idiom of gift giving in narratives 
of loss to places like Katonga. This draws attention to the temporalities of Soviet 
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help (chapter 2), and to the ways in which the remnants of Soviet projects, like 
the geodesic tower, were treated as merely givens, that is, as resources out there 
to be used. Second, this idiom also brings home that the sense of incomplete-
ness, the emergent, the open-endedness that is applicable to the postsocialist 
period in Katonga, which the anthropology of the contemporary invites us to 
chronicle as an “accompaniment of time” (Rabinow 2011), needs to be com-
plemented by a chronicle of completeness as a construct regardless if it is the 
history of the future or the memory of the past. Let me now think through the 
contrast between my Siberian ethnography and the project on gifts to Soviet 
leaders in terms of relations between temporalities of research and the tempo-
ralities that this research charts.
The time of the notebook (ii)
The temporality of my ethnographic record of the day of April 28, 1994 (de-
scribed above), is first of all a retrospection based on the diary entry that I wrote 
on the evening of that day. Second, this fieldwork time took conceptual shape 
after I completed work in local and regional archives—after I was able to see my 
main ethnographic informants, such as old Nikolai, acting and speaking at So-
viet meetings, and after I found Katonga Evenki being quoted in earlier ethno-
graphic materials, dating back to the 1920s or even early 1900s. It was only over 
time that the degree and the form of the presence of the ethnographic gaze in 
Evenki social life became apparent. This, in turn, inspired me to think conceptu-
ally about the notes I took during fieldwork as actions that were independent of 
exactly what I wrote down. But just as Evenki invited me to their forest camp 
and agreed to have ethnographic conversations with me before I had a chance 
to properly explain what I was doing there, from the start of my fieldwork I also 
had an intuitive sense of the state effects of my presence.
Morten Pedersen and Morten Nielsen describe such a hunch as “a transtem-
poral hinge,” that brings together phenomena that are “otherwise distributed 
across time” but remain invisible unless the modulations of time that “consti-
tute a fieldwork space are given analytical attention” (2013: 129). Pedersen and 
Nielsen are concerned with the imminence of something significant about to 
take place but that has not yet happened. On the contrary, my hunch of the 
state time as equivalent to my field notebook time had to do with the historici-
zation of my presence. When I first came to the Siberian north in 1988–89—
then a graduate student at the Institute of Ethnography, Russian Academy of 
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Science—I was already interested in the contemporary (sovremennost’) and state 
institutions like collective farms. This was not, however, a clearly articulated 
research agenda but indeed just a hunch that I had difficulties explaining, not 
only to my informants but also at the Institute. It was only during my fieldwork 
of the 1990s that I developed this as a project about the legacies of the Russian 
and Soviet state and state knowledge practices.
If this Siberian ethnography started as a project about the present that took 
conceptual shape through historicization, the temporality of the gifts to Soviet 
leaders project operates as the converse. It started as a historical project that 
eventually developed to be also about the post-Soviet present. Let me consider 
one of the turning points in this transformation of this gift project, which also 
illustrates how this visitors’ book became the afterimage of the state.
One visitors’ book commentator found “the modesty of the gifts [on display] 
from the material perspective” to be striking, “particularly in contrast with what 
was stolen from Slizka!” The safe of Vice-Speaker of the Russian Parliament, 
Liubov’ Slizka, had been robbed earlier in 2006. The safe allegedly contained 
diamonds and other gifts worth about $500,000. “Everything exhibited here [at 
the exhibition Gifts to Soviet leaders] is a reflection of genuine feelings of respect 
for the leaders. But for what services the contemporary leader Slizka received 
her gold and diamonds! Shame! She, the scrounger, needs to be not robbed but 
executed by firing squad!” The commenter noted “the rule” that the Soviet lead-
ers followed when they received gifts, regardless of whether the gifts are modest 
or precious. They “submitted the received gifts [to the state]—this is an inter-
national rule.” In contrast, “Slizka, who was robbed of gifts and offerings to an 
official person on the sum of half-million dollars, was able to hide all this, and 
still remains in her present post so that she can collect new bribes.”
This story appeared in several visitors’ comments, and the mood—if not 
always the tone—of this commentary was widespread throughout the response 
book. This visitor concluded: “It is shame to live like this in a country where 
everything is stolen and where people live behind iron [fortified] doors and 
die at the rate of one million people a year.” The exhibition thus has become 
not merely a site of memory but also of commentary on the present. It is these 
comments that visitors found “striking” and even “educational”; some of them 
added, after expressing thanks for the exhibition, that they “particularly liked 
the visitors’ response book.” In saying so, the visitors performed an important 
transformation. They put the visitors’ book on a par with the exhibition display. 
They transformed the response book, and in a way the audience itself, into a 
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peculiar artifact that can be viewed and studied like an exhibited object, into 
a post-Soviet artifact—that is, as simultaneously artwork and ethnographic 
notebook.
A response book is a standard exhibition feature. But its genre borders on a 
“complaint book” (zhalobnaia kniga), a ubiquitous institution in both Soviet and 
post-Soviet public contexts such as shops, restaurants, transport stations, et cet-
era. Just as in Siberian ethnography, such responses become part of a landscape 
of correspondence with “the power,” which also includes letters to “authorities” 
from the Party to newspaper and journal editors. My identity in Siberia as an 
ethnographer visiting “on business of state importance” prompted requests to 
duly “write down” complains from old Nikolai, Vladimir, and many others. But 
while in this Siberian project I did not deploy this identity performatively, Sos-
nina and I did so when we experimented with the visitors’ response book. There, 
we posted a note with our contact details and invited “complaints and sugges-
tions” (zhaloby i predlozhenia) in the idiom of a standard Soviet complaint book, 
but we also invited reflections, comments, criticism, and memories.
This is turn made me think that the project’s other materials are also reac-
tions—including the very decision of the Kremlin Museum to hold this exhibi-
tion (which was, and still is, exceptional for a museum that normally focuses on 
the Tsarist period). These were also other actions and reactions to be considered: 
about ten museums united to form a partnership under the umbrella of the Krem-
lin Museum as the principle institution; the municipality of Moscow municipal-
ity “gave” the exhibition a hall for this project rent-free; and the leading Russian 
investment consortium, the AFK Systemy, acted as the key exhibition sponsor.
Before the exhibition materialized, it had been a research text (Sosnina and 
Ssorin-Chaikov 2001). When we wrote the exhibition proposal, we also took 
into account what the museum or sponsors were expecting in order to put for-
ward a convincing case. This illustrates under-researched “social life” (Appadurai 
1986) of the research project as a temporality that is as much a response as a 
proposal, and something received as much as something given. Then there were 
complex negotiations with artists whom we commissioned to design the exhibi-
tion space and with other museums for object loans; there were also managerial 
negotiations and clarifications. All these decisions, negotiations, reactions, and 
counterreactions contained views of Soviet socialism; all turned out to be analo-
gous with the exchange of opinion in the exhibition visitors’ book and the me-
dia; and all parties involved were working out their own postsocialism through 
these reactions and decisions.
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Further, because our research and exhibition was on gift relations with the 
state, we could not help but notice that by submitting the exhibition proposal to 
the Kremlin Museum and by helping its Public Relations Office to contact poten-
tial exhibition sponsors, we were giving gifts and eliciting gifts. This made us sensi-
tive to how this exhibition mimicked its topic—the gift—and how our research 
conceptualization of the Soviet-era gifts mimicked this post-Soviet context. This 
mimesis came across to us very strongly when the administration of the Kremlin 
Museum decided to gift a copy of the exhibition catalog to President Vladimir 
Putin for his 55th birthday in 2007. This gift was also a reaction to our project, al-
beit unanticipated by us. But this was just one striking instance in which we found 
the logic of the gift that we explored meandering out of our research and coming 
full circle into complex gift relations with the state in which we were involved 
as both researchers and curators. Artistic and research creativity is gift (both in a 
sense of talent and as a product of creativity); museums create public gifts of their 
exhibitions and collections; the state often is the most prominent patron (gift 
giver) for these; yet, most state exhibitions today are made possible also by gener-
ous support of private sponsors (see Cummings and Lewandowska 2007; and 
Maraniello, Risaliti, and Somain 2001 on exhibition experiments on this theme).
Knowledge as chronotope
James Clifford opens his essay, “On ethnographic authority” (1983), with a 
description of the 1724 frontispiece of Joseph-François Lafitau’s Moeurs des 
sauvages amériquains. The ethnographer is depicted as a young woman at the 
writing table, on which there are artifacts from the New World and from clas-
sical Greece and Egypt. The ethnographer
is accompanied by two cherubs who assist in the task of comparison and by the 
bearded figure of Time who points toward a tableau representing the ultimate 
source of the truths issuing from the writer’s pen. The image toward which 
the young woman lifts her gaze is a bank of clouds where Adam, Eve, and 
the serpent appear. Above them stand the redeemed man and woman of the 
Apocalypse on either side of a radiant triangle bearing the Hebrew script for 
Yahweh. (Clifford 1983: 118)
Clifford’s goal in this essay is to situate something very different from Lafitau: 
the Malinowskian ethnographic authority of long-term participant observation, 
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where the emphasis on gaze and observation has displaced participation. He 
links Lafitau with a Geertzean view of culture as a text. Clifford argues, “dif-
ferent secular versions of Lafitau’s crowded scriptorial workshop are emerging” 
(Clifford 1983: 120), with alternative textual strategies that challenge “a deep 
Western identification of any text’s order with the intention of a single author.” 
This, he adds, “was less strong” at the time of Lafitau (Clifford 1983: 140). In 
the Russian and Soviet context, the subject of Clifford’s critique—the prac-
tice of long-term participant observation, where the emphasis on observation 
has displaced the politics of participation—had marginal institutional presence. 
Where I was doing research, it was writing rather than observation, textual-
ity rather than gaze, and the author who “transcribes rather than originates” 
(Clifford 1983: 118) that marked as much the interpretive authority of scholar 
as it did the state authority of ethnographic notebook, the book of responses and 
other texts that accompanied the two projects that I discussed in this chapter.
I have argued that these notebooks are not merely texts but also material 
objects that have agency and temporality in a complex space. I have conceptu-
alized this ethnographic space as a site of exchange rather than discourse or a 
network of people and things—and, in particular, of exchanges of the time of 
research and state time. But while ethnography appears here as “secular versions 
of Lafitau’s” young woman assisted by a “figure of Time,” it is, however, not so 
much “the bearded figure of Time” of antiquity but instead modernity as time. 
The now-old regime of “new times” of Soviet modernity marked the role of 
ethnographer in Siberia and the relations of hospitality and obligations toward 
an anthropologist. The new “new times” of post-Soviet modernity was at stake 
in exchanges in a relational sequence of givers and recipients at—and of—the 
exhibition of gifts to Soviet leaders. In both cases, modernity as time is not 
something merely “out there” to be explored, in relation to which researchers are 
merely academic outsiders. Here, Bakhtin’s “chronotope of the depicted world” 
indeed extends beyond text and enters the worlds of the “author, performer, 
listener, and reader” of these depictions.
But it does so not through the objectivity of science, in which the Bakhtin-
ian “author” is not a creative writer but a reader of external reality. In such a 
case, the real world as an object of research description is presumed to exist 
independently from scholarly activity. As a result of such depiction, there would 
be, ideally, a match between the world and the depicted world. In the cases I 
have considered here, the depicted world enters the worlds of its “author, per-
former, listener, and reader” in a constructivist perspective on knowledge. But 
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in following this perspective, I do not suggest acknowledging that something 
is constructed makes it untrue. The aim of the anthropology of science is no 
more to falsify this form of knowledge than the aim of the anthropology of 
religion is the falsification of religion (cf. Latour 1993). When Donna Haraway 
reminds us that fact is in its Latin root from facere, “to do,” “to manufacture,” “to 
make”—the implication of which is that fact shares its origin with what seems 
to be its complete opposite, fiction (1989: 4–5)—her point is not to state that 
fact is in fact fiction, but to ask how facts are themselves manufactured and 
what is manufactured by facts in science and contexts beyond science. Bruno 
Latour notes that facts in science are like skyscrapers, nuclear plants, sculptures, 
or automobiles. He goes on to say, “Even more so than in art, architecture, and 
engineering,” science combines “complete artificiality and complete objectivity 
moving in parallel” (2005: 89). Thus, he argues for a “symmetrical anthropology” 
in which research laboratories and their facts could be documented in the same 
way as buildings, computer chips, and locomotives—as “constructions” that “de-
scribe the striking phenomenon of artificiality and reality marching in step” 
(Latour 2005: 90).
But as “marching” implies, new constructs and new objective facts are mark-
ers of time. In cases that I have discussed in this chapter—my own ethnography, 
Siberian collectives, exhibitions—facts of the past, complaints, nostalgia, and 
aspirations of the post-Soviet public, and the configurations of the gift in mu-
seum sponsorship and the state are symmetrical as simultaneously constructions 
and depictions of socialism and postsocialism. But there is also an inversion in 
temporal symmetry of description and construction. The objectivist chronotope 
of knowledge combines a spatial connotation of the objective “outside” in rela-
tion to reality that is being explored with a temporal one: the description is also 
after the world, which comes, so to speak, first. A constructivist chronotope has 
the reality after itself. Taken in this form, constructivism is not merely Cartesian 
(Ingold 1992) but creationist. Of course, the very point of the anthropology 
of knowledge is to resituate the knowing subject “inside” the knowable world, 
rather than being after or before it. But in this perspective, this chronotope of 
constructivism appears not as something that explains but as something that it-
self needs explaining. Taken as architectural constructivism or Soviet construc-




We, non-Russian aliens [inorodsty], the Tungus, illiterate but feeling deeply, 
deeply honor the Soviet power. We, the aliens of the Third Clan Soviet Meeting 
bring our “thank-you” to the Soviet power for the help that was provided to us.
. . .
We all desire that the town is built in the mouth of the Tura river. The land is 
good here—hunting of squirrels will be good . . .
We all are glad about the town, our life will be easier. Commodities will be 
cheaper [which is good as] we all have gotten poorer in recent years.
We wish to have a hospital, to cure the sick people.
We need a veterinary, to cure the sick reindeer.
We need school, to teach the natives [tuzemtsy] so that they themselves become 
literate and learned. We will be sending children to school. However many years 
it takes, let them study. (Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Krasnoyarskogo Kraia [State 
Archive of Krasnoyarsk Region], fond [deposit] 1845, opis’ [description] 1, delo 
[file] 22, list [page] 3)
This is an excerpt from a meeting resolution of the Ilimpea “Clan Soviet,” one 
of the institutions of indigenous governance that came into being in Siberian 
north not long after 1917. The meeting took place on February 9, 1926, in 
Chirinda, a trading post to the north of the area where the Evenki “Lenin” 
was from, and two years after the Soviet leader Lenin died. This resolution 
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registered an overwhelmingly positive response to the new Soviet governmental 
campaign to construct a “culture base” (kul’tbaza) on the Nizhnaia Tunguska, 
the “Lower Tungus” river in the northern part of the Yenisei river basin. Here as 
well as across Siberia, the Soviet government was planning to set up a network 
of outposts where socialist trade (“cheaper commodities”) would signal hope 
for an “easier life” among the exploited, and where schools, hospitals, veterinary 
science, and hygiene—all that in the language of that time was called culture 
(hence the “culture base”)—would be given to the so-called backward and the 
nonmodern. This was the beginning of the construction of the new time—a state 
order that identified itself with the epochal novelty. This is an instance of what 
I have analyzed in this book as the “Soviet gifts of modernity.”
Gift theory is a useful lens for conceptualizing such forms of rule (cf. Grant 
2009). It draws attention to the paternalistic giving that comes hand in hand 
with taking control over territory, population, and resources. In the Siberian in-
digenous case, the giving of Soviet modernization that started with such culture 
base projects was continuous on a new scale and with new intensity with the 
imperial giving of Enlightenment and protection, and with the “pacification” 
(zamirenie) under the Tsar’s “exalted hand,” which was imposed on indigenous 
fur hunters together with the fur tribute when Russia conquered this region 
in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Ssorin-Chaikov 2000, 2017; 
Konev 2017; Sirina and Davydov 2017). However, in this chapter I will take 
this Siberian example not back in time to historicize this kind of giving in the 
Russian empire but forward to temporalize it within the context of Soviet mo-
dernity—that is, to address how this idiom of giving explicitly takes a form of 
time. Two interlinked issues are addressed below.
Gift time has been an important part of virtually all of the temporalities that 
I have explored in this book, such as linear time of progress, cyclical time of 
exchange, and the time that seems beyond time—that is, timelessness. Gift time 
has been one of the key contexts in which I approached temporal multiplicity 
through relations of change and exchange in the temporalities that I researched 
(chapter 2 and chapter 3) and in my own research time (chapter 4). But if above 
I used gift time to discuss these different modalities of time, now—first—is the 
time to ask what kind of gift this is.
If gift theory has been illuminating of the forms of rule that work through 
this kind of giving, second, what concerns me here is the converse: how might 
a focus on this rule advance gift theory? How, if at all, does this context modify 
this theory’s key assumptions? The concept of gift that I will propose is not 
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Maussian, although it has a partial affinity with it (Strathern 1991). The Soviet 
help with which I started above was conceived at the same time as Marcel 
Mauss’ The gift; both were socialist projects. Almost at the same time when 
Mauss published The gift, he gave a critical sociological assessment of Bolshe-
vism (Mauss 1992), but this critique came within a shared conceptual space. 
This is particularly visible in the concluding sections of The gift, where Mauss 
argues that “the state itself, representing the community,” had now recognized 
that the worker who had “given his life and labor to the collectivity” is in a po-
sition in which the societal “debt to him” is “not completely discharged . . . by 
the payment of a salary.” This is both a description of, and an argument for, an 
emergent “state socialism” (socialisme d’Etat), inspired by this principle of debt 
(Mauss 2016: 180).
For Mauss, this principle of debt is not modern but archaic: “to give to each 
other without sacrificing themselves to the other” is something that “tomorrow, 
in our so-called civilized world, classes and nations and individuals . . . will have 
to learn” from “the clan” and “the tribe” (Mauss 2016: 198). This vision of the 
future-as-a-return was shared across socialist thought. Karl Marx quoted Lewis 
Henry Morgan’s Ancient society (1878: 561–62) when he argued, “‘the new sys-
tem’ to which modern society is tending ‘will be a revival, in a superior form, 
of an archaic social type’” (Marx 1984: 107). He penned this when he corre-
sponded with Russian socialist Vera Zasulich, who was concerned with legacies 
of the “archaic” peasant commune in socialist politics. Marx’ point was that, “We 
should not, then, be too frightened by the word ‘archaic’” (Marx 1984: 107). This 
correspondence was published in Soviet Russia in the 1920s, and became highly 
relevant for Siberian indigenous policies. The design of clan soviets, for instance, 
was aimed at achieving scientific communism by rooting it in “primitive com-
munism” (Ssorin-Chaikov 2003: 45–72) of indigenous hunters and herders.
But this was a return that needed to be instigated among Siberian primitive 
communists by an external agency such as so-called Soviet help—just as peasant 
socialism of Zasulich needed to be approved by Marx. Communism itself may 
have been both ancient and modern, but explicit political knowledge about it 
was a kind of modern truth that was affirmed by this link between knowledge 
as something that one has and something that one gives. Whoever was capable 
of giving this knowledge and this help, and this knowledge as help, was the one 
truly capable of having gained it in the first place. Mauss’ gift theory stopped 
short of situating itself as a modality of giving, although it was clearly a part of 
contemporary “society [that] wants to rediscover the social cell,” seeking out 
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“the sentiments of charity, of ‘social service,’ of solidarity” (Mauss 2016: 181). 
Furthermore, Mauss bracketed these remarks as conclusions that are “moral” 
rather than “sociological.” Empirically, modernity was beyond his project. As 
Jonathan Parry (1986: 458) points out, Mauss demonstrated that the archaic 
gift is the source of modern contract, but he did not address the question of 
what might from this point of view be the modern gift. This gap was subse-
quently filled by anthropological research into gift giving in various modern 
contexts, from new reproductive technologies to corporate gifts and corporate 
social responsibility, philanthropy, humanitarianism, and development (see, for 
example, Cross 2014; Dolan and Rajak 2016; Konrad 2005; Mosse and Lewis 
2005; Bornstein 2009; Ong 2006; Stirrat and Henkel 1997; Fassin 2012). What 
I add here is socialism as a modality of modern gift. But I am also interested in 
conceptualizing modernity as circulating in gift form.
Exploring socialist modernity in this perspective presents an additional and 
interesting challenge. Just as the modern gift is a gap in Mauss (2016), there is 
no gift theory in the work of Marx, Engels, or Lenin, who were all concerned 
with commodity relations and redistribution. In what follows below, I argue, 
first, that the gift language in the state socialist context is not of Marxist theory 
but of the “Marxist vernacular” that was improvised by countergifts of gratitude. 
Second, I submit that there is nonetheless a conceptual link between this ver-
nacular and the Marxist theory. This link is, however, not in the theory of giving, 
but in the theory of taking—of alienation and requisition, and, above all, of tak-
ing power. Third, it is in this theory of taking that I will, in turn, highlight a link 
with the concept of the gift. But this will be not Mauss’ gift but that of Hobbes.
Gift and time
For Mauss, gifts create obligations to reciprocate, and the time of these obliga-
tions is the first thing that the giver receives back. Before any actual countergifts, 
the potential obligation of reciprocity appears as a “guarantee” that they will too 
(Mauss 2016: 114). The gift that is given imposes this certainly as “a time limit” 
(Mauss 2016: 114). But if, in the case of Mauss’ gift, time is given back before 
countergifts are made, in the example with which I started this chapter, time is 
given before anything else is given. Mauss’ gift is a form of the future, and so is 
the Soviet help at the 1926 clan soviet meeting. When this meeting registers the 
“thank-you for the help provided to us,” there is no town, no school, no hospital, 
no veterinary station to be thankful for. There are no “cheaper commodities.” 
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The future culture base is not yet called Tura—as it will be once it is founded 
and becomes in the 1930s an administrative center of ethnic autonomy for the 
“small-numbered nationality” (malochislennyi narod), which in 1926 are also not 
yet officially called Evenki. In the 1920s, documents, including such statements 
of gratitude, still follow the categories of the Russian Empire. Evenki are still 
called—and call themselves in such Soviet meetings—“Tungus,” which is an 
older colonial name, and still often more generically as tuzemtsy (“natives”) and 
inorodsty (“non-Russian aliens”). There exist local Soviet institutions, such as 
clan soviets, but often only on paper and only at times when Soviet instructors 
visit this area.
This beginning of the new time is a road that is yet to be taken. It is a no-
madic route for a “big trip” (bol ’shoi argish) to socialism, as the Soviet reformer 
and writer Mikhail Osharov (1935) subsequently put this; he was both a witness 
and the instigator of these clan soviet meetings in the mid-1920s. It is a road 
map with “years that equal to centuries,” to use the title of the 1984 book by the 
Evenki politician and historian Vasilii Nikolaievich Uvachan. Such meetings 
were foundational events in the Soviet narrative of speeding up history.
This is a narrative of time, but what is the time of this narrative (cf. Ricoeur 
1984)? Osharov and Uvachan speak of a leap forward, but long after the event. 
Both give retrospective accounts, literary and historical accounts, respectively. 
In contrast, the time of the narrative of gratitude at the 1926 meeting (the 
“thank-you for the help provided to us”) is prospective—it comes before the 
help is actually provided. Soviet documentation of such meetings often notes 
that they take place on a “forest glade” (Ssorin-Chaikov 2003: 47), as if empty 
for construction. This help is not the gift of modernity yet but a promise of this 
gift. What happens on February 9, 1926, does not yet “equal to centuries.” It is 
new time only as a promise of new times. This is, so to speak, a credit that the 
gift givers take in advance: a gift credit or “promissory notes” that empires “mete 
out,” as Ann Stoler (2010: 193) puts this in another context. As such, this gift 
is, on the one hand, the future in the temporality of credit. It is a promise to 
pay back in time—that is, to deliver what is promised: schools, hygiene, cheap-
er commodities, etc. On the other hand, the future is here not merely these 
promised things, but new time itself. Giving new time will potentially mean 
that the recipients of this gift cease being backward and nonmodern tuzemtsy 
(“natives”) and inorodsty (“non-Russian aliens”). But this new time interpolates 
this temporal distinction quite independently from the things that it prom-
ises—furthermore, instantly. Louis Althusser describes how modern ideology 
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transforms the individuals into subjects in a similar way: “by that very precise 
operation . . . which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace 
everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’” (Althusser 2001: 118).
In other words, this gift time exists in a double time: it is a form of credit 
time and a form of new time. But this double time is not a double beat within 
the same time but a collision of two different temporalities. And it is the sec-
ond (new time) that makes the first (credit time) a strange one. This advance, 
this promise, this gift credit of the gift of modernity interpolates recipients into 
debt rather than the donors. Nothing is there yet in 1926, but the Soviet meet-
ings duly record gratitude for the gift of modernity that is duly expressed by its 
nonmodern recipients.
In contrast with Mauss, this gift of modernity imposes reciprocity on the 
receivers before the gift is actually made. This gift is also about rupture and not 
continuity, with which Mauss was concerned. Is this gift then Maussian at all? 
This is a pertinent question, as the comparative literature on modern gifts and 
on developmental modernity in particular, with which this chapter has a visible 
affinity, takes Mauss as a conceptual foundation. For instance, political scientist 
Tomohisa Hattori (2003) has applied Mauss to the gift logic of international 
developmental aid. He argues that this aid produces a hegemonic developmen-
tal hierarchy by drawing on Mauss’ thesis that the gift “renders the person who 
has accepted it inferior” (Mauss 2016: 178). Developmental hierarchy is created 
at the point when receivers consent to receiving assistance and, through this, they 
to consent their “backward” identity. Central to the power relations at play here 
is “the mechanism of consent,” which Hattori sees in formal financial aid agree-
ments between states or between states and international financial institutions. 
But as an analytical category, “consent” is linked in his analysis with the Marxist 
concept of hegemony that accounts for forms of domination that do not rely 
just on force. Hattori gives a Marxist reading of consent through the Maussian 
notion of contract.
This reading propels gift theory, which was originally developed to explore 
“stateless societies,” to the territory of political thought concerned with the state 
and international relations. But within the anthropology of the gift, there is a 
reverse yet symmetrical move: to read Mauss in the context of political theory. 
Marshall Sahlins argues that the Maussian gift is analogous to the Hobbesian 
contract. The archaic gift is a “way of achieving the peace that in civil society 
is secured by the State” (Sahlins 1972: 169). By way of Sahlins and Hattori, 
we see, first, what Maussian argument takes from political theory, and, second, 
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what it brings back to it. But while this line of argument works well as a way 
to situate Mauss, for me it does not work as a way to understand the gifts in 
question. If anything, it shows exactly how Mauss is not applicable to the Soviet 
gift of modernity. Consent is here only a virtue made of necessity. The town, the 
school, the hospital, etc., of the Nizhnaia Tunguska culture base, are not gifts 
that its recipients are at liberty to refuse. In Siberia, as across the former Russian 
imperial space, expressions of gratitude do take place, but gratitude is not the 
same thing as consent to accept gifts. I see gratitude as form of a countergift. 
But in this instance, gratitude is a cover, and even the one that does not quite 
cover that this gift proceeds not merely before, but also no matter if, it is ac-
cepted. This gift is in fact a statement of the indisputability of the mark that 
the revolutionary state makes on its territory. It begins with an installation of 
a very real fear of wealth requisition. It comes with a specter of taking as much 
as it comes with the promise of better life. In 1926, Nizhnaia Tunguska River 
was outside areas where revolutionary requisitions had already taken place. This 
specter of taking was the unknown where various possibilities flashed. But what 
was there as a matter of surety, as solid as it is in Mauss, is that the given time, 
the new time, will be different. In this sense, too, this (gift) is time.
But if the Soviet gift of modernity is not a Maussian gift, perhaps it is not a 
gift at all? My argument below is that it is. In contrast with Maussian gift, it is 
akin not to a Hobbesian contract but to a Hobbesian gift—a unilateral imposi-
tion of sovereignty. In this sense, this gift is not the opposite of war but a means 
of war. As a war by other means, the gift in question is a form of conquest. It is 
an apparatus of capture.
Gift as war
These prestations and counterprestations are entered into somewhat more vol-
untarily, by way of presents and gifts (cadeaux), although ultimately they are 
strictly compulsory, on pain of private or public war.
. . .
To refuse to give—to neglect to invite, as to refuse to take—is equivalent to de-
claring war; it is to refuse alliance and communion. (Mauss 2016: 62, 75)
Marshall Sahlins argues that the “war” that Mauss flags in these formulations is 
Hobbes’ “Warre.” He submits that Mauss, like Hobbes, debates from an origi-
nal condition of disorder that makes legitimate an order that is established by 
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the gift: “Essai sur le don is a kind of social contract for the primitives” (Sahlins 
1972: 169). This original disorder, the Hobbesian war of all against all, is more 
of a theoretical than a historical temporality in the analytics of something else. 
Neither Mauss’ nor Hobbes’ argument is about understanding the “primitive” 
warfare (cf. Clastres 2010). It is not about the historicity of this original state of 
nature but about order and peace that comes as its negation. If “Warre” did not 
exist, it had to be invented, that is, “imagined because all appearance is designed 
to repress it” (Sahlins 1972: 173). One might call this the temporality of social 
theory that postulates the past as a foundation of the analytics of the present. It 
is “a hidden substructure that in outward behavior is disguised and transfigured 
into its opposite,” namely, “the consent at the base of organized society” (Sahlins 
1972: 169).
In the case of the Hobbesian state, this consent, the social contract, takes the 
form of the voluntary transfer of rights to sovereign power. In the case of Maus-
sian gift, this consent appears as a system of reciprocal obligations. “The gift is 
alliance, solidarity, communion—in brief, peace” (Sahlins 1972: 169). Further-
more, gift seems to be a kind of contract that is more equal and genuine. There 
is no Leviathan, no third party “standing over and above the separate interests of 
those who contract.” There is no submission to it, and the potential terror from 
it. This gift “is no sacrifice of equality and never of liberty” (Sahlins 1972: 170).
Sahlins’ analogy between Mauss and Hobbes serves a critical purpose. It 
is drawn against Mauss’ universalism, manifested in the economic notions of 
contract and return. Sahlins’ case in point is Mauss’ interpretation of the Maori 
hau, a spiritual power in things that are passed around as gifts and force the 
person who receives them to reciprocate. After an exegesis of this concept in 
Maori ethnography, Sahlins observes a contrast. While the Maori sage who 
gave the concept of hau to an early twentieth-century observer, who then be-
came Mauss’ crucial source, tried “to explain a religious concept by an economic 
principle,” Mauss understood this the other way around and “thereupon pro-
ceeded to develop the economic principle by the religious concept” (Sahlins 
1972: 157). The religious concept here is the one akin to a powerful wind that 
forces gifts to be passed along, and gift wealth not being accumulated in a 
single place but continuously dispersed throughout the social body. The impli-
cation of this is two very different lines of inquiry. One is the exploration of 
the meanings of the hau and other concepts that are at work in societies that 
are explored by Mauss’ gift theory. Here, Mauss’ gift theory turns out to be for 
Sahlins not necessarily the best way to understand Mauss’ own ethnographic 
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material. The other line of inquiry concerns the meaning of contract, economy, 
and reciprocity that are at work in Mauss’ gift theory itself. It is the latter that 
takes Sahlins from Mauss back to Hobbes in showing that the gift theory has 
a genealogy in the social contract theory. He argues that however problematic 
this theory is as a window into non-European cultural categories such as hau, 
it is important as a mirror reflecting the working of Euro-American cultural 
categories.
But this reading is selective. It assumes a genealogy of the concept of gift in 
Hobbes’ discussion of contract. But Hobbes’ categories include that of the gift. 
It is here that the contrast is illuminating. If, for Sahlins, the Maussian gift “is 
a kind of social contract for the primitives,” for Hobbes himself a gift is em-
phatically not a contract. The gift enters the discussion of the Leviathan when 
Hobbes defines it as a transfer of rights that are not mutual but unilateral:
When the transferring of right, is not mutual; but one of the parties transferreth, 
in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; 
or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his 
mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not 
contract, but gift, free gift, grace: which words signify one and the same 
thing. (Hobbes [1651] 1998: 89)
This definition signals economism too, as it is about the return—whether in 
terms of friendship, reputation, or even “reward in heaven.” But it is ultimately 
about earthly power, as Hobbes sees “perpetual and restless desire of power after 
power that ceaseth only in death” ([1651] 1998: 66) as a universal human condi-
tion. This desire is dangerous and destructive, and can lead to the state of war of 
all against all, unless the sovereign power (the state) puts an external limit to it. 
But getting power as the return is not necessarily contractual (“mutual”). There 
are two fundamental ways of doing so. Contract as a mutual and voluntary 
transfer of rights is one. The other is not mutual but a unilateral imposition of 
will of one party to another:
The attaining to this soveraigne power is by two ways. One, by natural force; as 
when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his 
government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by war subdueth his 
enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other is when 
men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, 
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voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter 
may be called a politicall commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution; and 
the former, a commonwealth by acquisition. (Hobbes [1651] 1998: 115)
Note that this contrast between contract and force extends to the family. Fam-
ily as a form of government is not a Rousseau-esque natural contract that natu-
ralizes patriarchy (see Pateman 1988). It is a result of a natural force that is akin 
to war. Tellingly, for Hobbes it is a contract that may be gift if it is a promise 
that turns out to be empty. If this is “words alone,” “if they be of the time to 
come, and contain a bare promise,” it is then “a Free-gift and therefore not 
obligatory.”
Obligation
Hobbesian categories need clarification. First, that fact that the gift is “free” on 
behalf of the giver does not mean that it is altruistic. The gift is free for Hobbes 
because it comes out of free will of the giver who is not bound by an obligation 
to give. Second, the gift generates an “obligation” of gratitude on behalf of the 
receiver. But this receiver’s obligation is not contractual. Here is an important 
categorical difference between obligation in a sense of Mauss and Sahlins, on 
the one hand, and Hobbes on the other hand. For Hobbes, contract is a result 
of free will, the right that “consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear” (Hobbes 
[1651] 1998: 86). Gratitude is a result of the free gift, but this is a result of 
dependency or causality, and thus is itself not free: “Gratitude depends on Ante-
cedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift.” It is obligatory as in natural 
law that is, for Hobbes, obligation but not liberty.
In turn, this natural law (lex naturalis) is for Hobbes “a precept, or general 
rule, found out by Reason,” that forbids “man” to do what is “destructive of his 
life” (Hobbes [1651] 1998: 86). We follow natural law not because we are obli-
gated by a contact to do so but because it is reasonable. It is not followed out of 
free will with which we enter contract but out of force of necessity that we rec-
ognize. What is reasonable is obligatory in this sense. Gratitude is one of such 
natural laws—and a quite high one on the list of these natural laws that Hobbes 
gives: number four out of nineteen. In other words, it is second to the first three. 
The first is the law of seeking peace (the first and “fundamental law of nature”). 
The second is the law to limit one’s rights and desires in the interests of peace. 
The third is the law of justice that follows the second law of limiting one’s rights. 
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The natural law of justice is there so that whatever covenants are made to have 
the desired peace—what is actually put in place—are not “mere gifts,” that is, 
“empty words.” Then follows, as number four, the natural law of gratitude. It 
is in this place in relation to what is most fundamental, but also as a matter of 
analogy. Gratitude depends on antecedent grace as “justice dependeth on an-
tecedent covenant” (Hobbes [1651] 1998: 100). At this point of Hobbes’ text, 
grace, or the free gift (in passages I have quoted above) is already discussed in 
the section of the second natural law. The free gift, I argue, could be seen as one 
of means to limit one’s rights by creating the state.
In other words, gratitude is not natural as in human nature—just as altru-
ism is not a natural property of grace that precedes it. It is natural in a sense 
that it is reasonable. Naturally, “a man which receiveth Benefit from another 
of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause 
to repent him of his good will” (Hobbes [1651] 1998: 100). To paraphrase 
Mauss, a gift is voluntary, but the reciprocity that follows is obligatory. It is 
an unreciprocated gift that is a threat of war. This is insubordination: a war in 
response to gift as conquest. Grace is originally given in order to gain whatever 
is good for the giver. It is free and naturally selfish. But if the desired good is 
not achieved—if the giver is frustrated that that goal is not reached—then the 
state of war persists:
For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himselfe; because gift is volun-
tary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which 
if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, 
or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to 
another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war; which is 
contrary to the first and fundamentall law of nature, which commandeth men to 
seek peace. The breach of this law, is called ingratitude; and hath the same rela-
tion to grace, that injustice hath to obligation by covenant. (Hobbes [1651] 1998: 
100; emphasis added)
Ingratitude
In chapter 2, I examined a case of the disappearance of a load of combined fod-
der. The fodder is itself an instance of the help that I describe here as the gift 
of modernity. I looked at how the linear time of progress as an idiom of this 
gift was disrupted, first, by cyclical infrastructural difficulties in getting it to 
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Katonga, and, second, by the particular event in focus: its wasteful expenditure 
in a series of drinking parties. I discussed how the collective farm director talked 
to me about Evenki backwardness and also about much more than backward-
ness, which for him transpired in this event: about things sliding into chaos that 
is historically stable and incorrigible. This was about not merely sliding back in 
time, but into another time altogether. I called it a Hobbesian state of nature not 
in the sense of the war of all against all, but of this state of disorder. In chapter 
2, I used this example to illustrate the relations of change between a linear 
temporality of Soviet developmental time and this Hobbesian timelessness. But 
now we can put together the full political theory of this event. If help is the 
Hobbesian gift, it is no wonder that the source of anger of this Leviathan in 
miniature—the collective director, as we can call him—was his conviction that 
Evenki, including the Evenki “Lenin,” were ungrateful “for the help provided.” 
I argued that the collective order, just as Christian conversion before that, was 
easy to impose but difficult to maintain. The ingratitude here indicated that the 
state of war persisted despite initial and rushed expressions of gratitude. But if, 
as Sahlins put this, the original state of war was a matter of imagination—it had 
to be invented if it did not exist because “all appearance is designed to repress 
it” (Sahlins 1972: 173)—the war that was after and not before this order—the 
fundamental ingratitude, the waste of development, and the waste of develop-
mental time—was a real struggle, even if consisting not in fighting but in this 
chaos. I argue elsewhere that from the time of the imposition of the fur tribute 
on the seventeenth century, pacification was an endemic problem after the con-
quest, in subsequent governance, rather than the problem to be solved by the 
initial conquest (Ssorin-Chaikov 2000, 2003). If help is a Hobbesian gift that is 
a form of conquest, ingratitude is a way to resume the war.
War as time that extends beyond wartime
Sahlins is right that there is a mirroring of Hobbes and Mauss. Gratitude or 
countergifts appear “somewhat voluntary” but are in fact “strictly compulsory, on 
pain of private or public war” (Mauss 2016: 62). It is at this point that Mauss 
introduces time as the imposed limit for reciprocation that happens at the threat 
of another potentiality: war. This is the time that is also war for Hobbes. But for 
Hobbes, war is not merely an imagined original state: for him, peace as a way 
to defer the potentiality of war is still war. War is a form of time that extends 
beyond the actual wartime:
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For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of 
time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore 
the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature 
of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lyeth not in a shower or two of 
rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together; So the nature of war, 
consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all 
the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace. (Hobbes 
[1651] 1998: 84; emphasis in original)
Thus, peace is not when war is only potentiality a threat. War as potentiality is 
war nonetheless. Peace is all other times that are not “actual fighting” and also 
not “disposition thereto.” It is the notion of peace, not war, that frames this 
discussion: the first and “fundamental law of nature” is the law of seeking peace. 
It is an end in time, and not the beginning in time, and also another, alterative 
temporality that runs through conquests, wars, contracts, gifts, and countergifts. 
This other time, which is peace, is an alternative time, a futurity, to which Hob-
bes’ observation that “during all [this] time there is no assurance to the contrary” 
is also applicable in a symmetrical way as it is to the time of war. This disposition 
is an “assurance,” as Hobbes puts this; or, in the words of Mauss, it is the “surety” 
of relatedness that comes in the form of countergifts, as what Hobbes calls 
gratitude. Thus, whatever these countergifts are as things, they are also time:
“Time” is necessary to fulfill every counterprestation. The notion of a time limit 
is therefore logically implied when it comes to paying visits, contracting mar-
riages and alliances, brokering peace, attending games and organized combat, 
celebrating rotating festivals, rendering ritual services of honor, “displaying re-
ciprocal respect,” all the things that one exchanges, at the same time as other 
more and more numerous and precious things, as these societies grow more 
wealthy. (Mauss 2016: 115)
Gift gives this time limit that is the time of peace. After countergifts are made, 
parties can call it quits, alliances end, and war is resumed. But before—and 
instead of—this imaged finality, “societies become wealthier,” as in these feasts 
of reciprocity the time limits (futures) are exchanged “at the same time as other 
more and more numerous and precious things” (Mauss 2016: 115).
Mauss (2016: 122) posits a triple unity of obligations: to give, to receive, 
and to reciprocate. But Mauss does not discuss the first or original gift. To give 
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already appears as an obligation. It is unclear how this is so if the bond that 
is presumably established by gift giving does not exist yet. Although his view 
is widely understood as illuminating how sociality is created, it is not a per-
spective on how this creation actually happens—how the social appears in the 
first instance, out of something else. Mauss posits total services or presentations 
as already existing before gifts. “We do not deal with in this text,” he plainly 
states, with giving and sharing in “its most ancient form, that of total presta-
tion” (Mauss 2016: 115). On the contrary, Hobbes is concerned with the first, 
foundational “free gift”: the gift that does not follow any “antecedent grace.” 
His free gift is the first act in particular relations, if not necessarily the first ever, 
original gift.
Gift perspectivism
Yet Hobbesian gratitude may well generate not only its own gifts but also a 
narrative of the first gift to which it is a response. For instance, gratitude may 
include a statement that the first gift is in fact a genuine charity, and not at all 
conquest. It also may put forward an alternative view of human nature—that, 
for instance, that it is altruistic, or that the total services are already in place. 
This could be in contradiction to a Hobbesian view that humans are naturally 
selfish but at the same time perfectly “reasonable” within the Hobbesian logic 
of gratitude that should not repent the giver of his good will. In other words, 
the pair of free gift and gratitude form singularities, each with their own logic 
that is folded into themselves yet equally total. Let’s call this “perspectivism” 
(Viveiros de Castro 1998) within gift relations. This perspectivism is simultane-
ously temporal and narrative (Ricoeur 1984). Gratitude is a narrative of an event 
and an event of narrative. In this exchange of free gift and gratitude there is also 
an exchange of their temporalities, a case in point in exchange relations within 
temporal multiplicity, which I discuss in this book. The first temporality unfolds 
from the first free gift to gratitude, with the latter being antecedent in the sense 
of Hobbes. This is a temporality of natural force, the “state by acquisition”; this 
is war as actuality or potentially. The other temporality is gratitude. The latter 
retrospectively constructs the gift to which it is a response, its meanings, and the 
intentions of the giver. What is given back is a whole narrative of gift relations 
that unfold from the original gift. But this is the gratitude’s narrative. Let me 
illustrate this with an example.
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Vernacular Marxism
Ural mountains. Siberian forests. In the beginning, wild Siberia was inhabited by 
stone warriors. This [being made of stone] is clearly easier for such a warrior: he 
would not be beaten by animals, or caught by heat or cold.
 The riches of Siberia were under a warrior’s mitten, in a topaz glass under 
the guard of Cashfullov1 the warrior [bogatyr’ Denezhkin] and his helper, the 
stone magpie.
 Warriors grew old. Moss began to grow on them and they themselves be-
gan to turn into mountains. Cashfullov also got senile, but he kept his watchful 
eye on the glass [with the riches of Siberia].
 [Much time passed.] Plowmen and hunters started to appear in Siberia.
 Soon those came, who started digging the ground looking for something 
that was put there for usefulness. Having heard about Cashfullov’s topaz glass, 
they asked him to lend them some money.
 “Take as much as you need,” rattled Cashfullov like thunder in distant 
mountains, “but on condition that it is spent on the good of the people.” But the 
diggers would drop their picks and spades, and grab [the riches] with envy and 
force.
 No longer they would ask the warrior to take off his mitten, [instead] they 
struggle and sweat to move it a little, get the gold, and run away. They would die 
but would not leave the [stolen] riches.
 After that, the stone magpie helper would collect the [abandoned] sacks of 
gold, pour the gold back to the glass and drop the [empty] sacks nearby.
 There were some lucky getters [who managed to get away with the gold]. 
But when was the time for them to think of the good of the people if they 
were busy filling their pockets and currying favors with the Czar? Such were the 
pretty-pretties on which the Ural riches were spent!
 Then a man appeared walking across taiga. This was a simple-looking man 
although dressed in an urban fashion. He approached the warrior, and asked if 
there isn’t anything there put for the good of the people. The warrior sparkled: 
“You are the one I am waiting for!”
 Cashfullov explained to him the meaning of the stone coins, and rattled, as 
if he was young, like thunder in distant mountains: “Listen you, the one who un-
derstands the final words of the old stone mountains: take the glass in response. 
You have cheered me up.” And [as he said this] he became a mountain.
1. I thank Catriona Kelly for suggesting this translation of Denezhkin.
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 “I will do,” said the man, “and if I won’t be in time [to fulfill the promise] 
over the course of my life, I will pass this task to use the riches for the good of 
the people to a trusted man.” He lifted the warrior’s mitten as if it was light, and 
covered the glass. And he became himself huge, and left.
 And the farther away he went, the more visible he became so that neither 
mountains nor forests can overshadow his figure from sight.
 And then the people’s country started to be built. Combines went out into 
the collective farm fields. Soviet science came all the way to the very depth of the 
Ural mountains. And the country is led along the Lenin’s path by a trusted man, 
J. V. Stalin. (Karluchenko 2006)
This text, entitled the “Warrior’s mitten,” originates in a collection of Urals fairy 
tales, The malachite casket, part-collected, part-composed by socialist activist and 
folklorist Pavel Bazhov (1879–1950). This particular version was shortened as 
a plot for a china set made at the Baranovo porcelain factory, Ukraine. Each 
paragraph of this text was inscribed on the bottom of each of the set’s pieces to 
explain the scene that was depicted on this piece (see figs. 6a–i). Lenin is the 
person who approached the warrior. In the text, he does not have to be named; 
he is depicted on the china. But he is also unnamed in the original printed ver-
sion (Bazhov 1944).
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Figure 6a–i. China set with the motifs of P. P. Bazhov’s tale, “Warrior’s mitten.” Gift 
to I. V. Stalin for his 70th birthday from the collective of the Baranovo Porcelain 
Factory, 1949. Courtesy of the Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia.
This china set was presented as a gift to Stalin in 1949, on the occasion of his 
seventieth birthday, from the Baranovo porcelain factory workers. This is a vivid 
example of the narrative construction of the original gift of socialism by the 
gift of gratitude. This gift is just one example of a mass flow of gifts on that 
occasion, from all corners of Soviet society and communist movements from 
around the world (Ssorin-Chaikov 2006a). This particular china set marks the 
time of Stalin’s anniversary, which itself marks the time of socialist modernity, 
with the gift time of Urals mythology. Bazhov modifies this story’s supposed 
folklore origins with the figure of Lenin as culture hero. Lenin, by taking the 
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gift of the riches, completes the making of both a nature and a culture. Nature is 
finally made when the stone warrior turns into a mere mountain after he passes 
the treasure to Lenin. The culture is made when the so-called usefulness of this 
wealth is realized in the country that is being built, collective farm combines 
working the fields, and scientists exploring the mountains. The porcelain version 
of this story, in turn, modifies Bazhov by adding the last line—that Stalin, the 
“trusted man,” is leading the country along Lenin’s path.
But the porcelain version also adds a visual image that also very considerably 
modifies the story, and in fact takes it from the folklorized idiom of official So-
viet culture to what I call “vernacular Marxism.” In the original published text, 
the wealth that was guarded and passed from hand to hand is the primordial 
riches of the Urals. They are called “money,” “stone money,” and “small coins 
made of various local precious stones and ore.” They have power to make things 
transparent, and signify potentiality. It was the money that gave the warrior his 
name, Cashfullov (Denezhkin). What is drawn on china is somewhat different. 
There are coins in the glass on some of the scenes, but the images of the treasure 
(the source of Lenin’s gift of socialism) include things that are hardly so primor-
dial and magical. On one of the cups we see a pile consisting of the Tsar’s crown, 
imperial two-headed eagle, icons, crosses (see fig. 6b). This is wealth of the old 
regime, the revolutionary loot.
This loot is an addition to the natural riches of Siberia, and the two together 
make the picture of these gifts strikingly similar to the scene that American 
businessman Armand Hammer depicted when he wrote his first account of his 
Russian trips of the 1920s, entitled The quest of the Romanoff treasure (Hammer 
1932). These are the Urals’ precious stones and metals that lie idle, as was the as-
bestos mine that Hammer saw and ended up using in his first Soviet concession, 
which I described in chapter 3. Additionally, there are art and antiques from the 
Hermitage and other Russian art collections, most of them former Tsar’s family 
property. Hammer was quick to get involved in the trade of this art in the West, 
which the Soviet government in the 1920s was eager to use in the same fashion 
as the Urals’ valuables: as a resource that is simply there, free for use.
The “Romanoff ’s treasure” is the wealth on which the narrative of Ham-
mer’s gifts and the narrative of the “Warrior’s mitten” china set converge (fig. 7). 
Lenin turns this into the gift of socialism. As in Mauss’ hau, the spirit of this 
gift cannot stay idle. There is already a giftness in these riches. They could be 
used “for the good of the people” by Lenin because they were put there “for 
usefulness.” The question is exactly what this giftness or usefulness is. If inside 
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Figure 7a. Book cover of Armand Hammer’s The quest of the Romanoff treasure. 
New York: W. F. Payson, 1932.
Figure 7b. A cup from china set with the motifs of P. P. Bazhov’s tale, “Warrior’s 
mitten.” Gift to I. V. Stalin for his 70th birthday from the collective of the Baranovo 
Porcelain Factory, 1949. Courtesy of the Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia.
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the “Warrior’s mitten” are the natural riches of Siberia, without the “Romanoff ’s 
treasure,” this is nature’s gift. It is already there as a gift by virtue of merely be-
ing given. If, however, the inside of the “Warrior’s mitten” is the “Romanoff ’s 
treasure,” it is then a gift by virtue of being taken. In the outset of this chapter, 
I described the Tungus “gratitude for the help provided to use” in which taking 
(requisitions) was still a potentiality. The china set actually alludes to this taking. 
This allusion speaks volumes in the Soviet context, given its requisitions, terror, 
and other forms of Hobbesian conquest. Taking makes the Hobbesian giftness 
of this treasure. But this allusion is also to the Marxist understanding of this 
taking. The gift is a return to the people who are, from this point of view, the 
treasures’ original owners. The loot is a retaking of what was taken away.
This is a straightforward Marxist perspective. Wealth is a product of labor, 
not nature before human labor: it is the creation of the working people. By vir-
tue of this labor, it is rightfully theirs. At this point, Karl Marx’ labor theory of 
value is Lockean. The difference with John Locke becomes apparent in Marx’ 
discussion of what happens after this right of ownership is socially recognized. 
For Locke, this recognition is a basis of contractual relations between owners of 
property. It is the same matter of “liberty” as in Hobbes. Property includes prod-
ucts of labor but also labor itself; contractual relations include those of sale of 
such properties. But Marx argues that this perspective overlooks that the actual 
contract conditions are never equal and free. The sale of labor has historically 
been a buyers’ market—that is, a market in which it is the buyers who determine 
the market value of labor. Throughout Capital, and in particular in chapters on 
primitive accumulation and colonialism, Marx shows that capital introduces 
slavery where “free” labor market cannot be assured, for example, by laborers 
who have no other property in possession than their labor and thus have no 
other option but “freely” selling it for a wage. One of his examples is of a certain 
Mr. Peel, who exported to Australia his factory and the workers but who upon 
arrival was immediately left with no workers as they abandoned him to become 
farmers on abundantly available land.
“Unhappy Mr. Peel,” exclaims Marx sarcastically, “who provided for every-
thing except the export of English modes of production to Swan River” (Marx 
1996: 544). But Marx’ fundamental argument is that wherever this labor market 
is free, it is so only euphemistically. Labor market is a buyers’ marker. The sale 
of labor is not Hobbesian “liberty” but Hobbesian “obligation” that follows the 
force of natural law. This force is visible not in the same overt and brutal form as 
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in slavery. This is force of what is “reasonable”: workers understand that they have 
no other choice. The free labor market is established through a threat of hunger 
(Polanyi 1944); and the material regeneration of workers’ energy and physical 
conditions is what for Marx underpins the logic of his labor theory of value. 
But I argue that if Marx’ labor theory of value has a Lockean view of property, 
this force of free labor market is a Hobbesian conquest. “What is the crime of 
robbing a bank in comparison with the crime of founding a bank,” asks Bertolt 
Brecht’s character in the Threepenny opera (1928). This revolutionary taking, the 
requisition, is Lenin’s gift of seizure, before it is put to proper use for the good 
of the people.
But in understandings of this state of war, of requisition and seizure, Marxist 
theory and Marxist vernacular are not Hobbesian because the original state is 
not war but peace. The chain of exchanges that ends with the gift of socialism 
starts with alienation of labor from workers as its true owners. But once upon 
a time, this labor was not alienated. The products of work and relations of pro-
ductions were not estranged from the worker and worker’s collectivity. Just as in 
Hobbes and Mauss, this original condition is speculative as it is posited by the 
understanding of the subsequent history of alienation and inequality. But, to 
paraphrase Hobbes, this peace is in a tract of time wherein the will to contend 
by peace is sufficiently known.
Vernacular Marxism as a gift theory
Unlike Hobbes, Marx and Lenin do not elaborate on the gift. The closest 
we get to it is Lenin’s remarks on help and assistance that the Party and the 
working class ought to provide to “the backward peoples” so that they bypass 
capitalism en route to the communist future (see chapter 2). Mauss remarks 
that “state socialism” recognizes that moral obligations to the worker “are not 
completely discharged by the payment of a salary.” For him, social insurance 
is a mark that “our ethics and our lives” still exist within the morality of gift 
(Mauss 2016: 178). But Mauss’ argument is not Marxist; it’s syndicalist. Jean 
Baudrillard attempts, in the 1970s, to merge Maussian and Marxist perspec-
tives in a view of capital giving the gift of labor to the worker before taking 
it back for a wage (Baudrillard 1993). Both Mauss and Baudrillard outline 
the space of modern gift politics. For Mauss, capitalism remains obligated to 
the workers even after the wages are paid; for Baudrillard, the workers cannot 
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return this original gift of labor and therefore cannot cancel the power of the 
capitalist, unless they do a semiotics of exploitation (Baudrillard 1993: 36–43). 
But for Marx and Lenin, capitalist hierarchies are givens, rather than gifts. 
They are givens as matters of knowledge that require praxis, including violent 
practice. But this notion that knowledge is a gift, and that the new world that 
follows this knowledge is a gift, is articulated not by Marxist theory but by a 
Marxist vernacular of gratitude. The sources of this gift theory are not Marx or 
Lenin, or even Stalin but the “masses” that are encompassed and constructed 
by the Soviet project of Hobbesian conquest. This idiom of gratitude origi-
nates under Lenin (Tumarkin 1987) but is magnified as dominant in coun-
tergifts to Soviet leaders for the gift of socialism. An important trigger here 
is Stalin’s 1935 remarks, that “life has become better, more joyous.” While, as 
Stalin stressed, this happened under the guidance of the Party, neither Sta-
lin nor other Soviet leaders have described this “leading role” as gift giving. 
What calls socialism a gift is the countergift of gratitude, thanking the leaders, 
and Stalin in particular, “for our happy life” (Ssorin-Chaikov 2006a; see also 
Brooks 2001).
The gift of socialism is this Marxist vernacular, as is the gift of knowledge. 
Lenin of the “Warrior’s mitten,” walking through the forest “dressed in an urban 
fashion,” is an iconic scholarly figure who has the gift of knowledge together 
with gifts as the Party organizer and workers’ leader. But in the “Warrior’s mit-
ten,” this knowledge is a gift of nature, “the final words of the old stone moun-
tains,” that is passed to Lenin. Bazhov’s own longer textual version of this story 
stresses that the riches are actually knowledge. They are surely “money” but more 
importantly they are signs that have the power “to show the place” where there 
is much more of it:
The glass is obviously of the warrior’s size. It is higher than human height, and 
much higher than a forty-bucket barrel. It is made of the best golden topaz and 
honed utmost thinly and clearly. The ore and precious stone money [that is in 
the glass] is seen through [it], and the power of this money is such that it shows 
the place. If the warrior takes the money, rubs it from one side, momentarily the 
place where the money’s ore or stone is from appears in sight—it is there for 
spotting and knowing with all its hills, valleys, and swamps. The warrior would 
take a look at it, in order to inspect if all is well there, and then rub another side 
of the money to illuminate another place. There, it would become as clear as a 
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drop where the ore is, and how much of it is there. The other ores and stones 
would be obscure. In order to see them, one needs to take [and rub] other money 
from the same place. (Bazhov 1944: 670)
When Lenin in this fuller version of this story inspects the inside of the war-
rior’s mitten, he is amazed “how cleverly this is thought through,” and adds: 
“If this is figured out properly, all this land could be made known in advance 
[napered]—just come and sort it according to the order [razbirai po poriadku].” 
Russian razbirat’ is simultaneously “to sort” and “to take,” and razbirai po pori-
adku has a double meaning of “sorting it according to the order” and “taking it 
one by one.”
This is more than knowledge: it is transformative truth. Once Lenin takes 
it away, “the people’s country started to be built.” Combines go out into the 
fields and Soviet science comes to the Urals. This knowledge is light—as in 
this power to see, to make mountains transparent. This idiom was widely re-
hearsed by other gifts, quite literally as Enlightenment as a vision, such as 
the 1923 gift to the 13th Communist Party Congress from the workers of 
an electric lamp factory who manufactured a light bulb with a filament in 
the form of Lenin’s figure with raised hand pointing forward (see fig. 2, p. 6). 
Furthermore, this Marxist vernacular casts meaning on gifts that were manu-
factured elsewhere and in different times but ended up in this Soviet space. 
Recall Hammer’s gift to Lenin of a sculpture that was made circa 1893: the 
ape sitting on the works of Darwin, holding compasses with the toes of one of 
its feet, and contemplating a skull that it holds with a hand (see fig. 1, p. xvi). 
The sculpture’s Latin inscription reads “You will be as gods” (Eritis sicut deus), 
which acquires a Marxist meaning by virtue of being a gift to Lenin and a part 
of the display of the Museum of the Lenin’s Flat and Study in the Kremlin 
(see chapter 3).
But it was this gift, when displayed in 2006 as a part of the exhibition of gifts 
to Soviet leaders, that triggered Hobbesian interpretations from this exhibition’s 
audience. In chapter 4, I discussed some of this audience’s responses in the book 
of comments. In contrast with those, the sculpture Eritis sicut deus was one of 
gifts that some of the visitors thought to be offensive. During interviews with 
the visitors that I conducted together with Olga Sosnina during of this exhibi-
tion, they commented that “we are not apes” and that “while Lenin thought of 
us as apes, he is himself now in the zoo.” By this, a Moscow teacher in her 50s 
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referred to numerous images of Lenin in the glass boxes of this exhibition. But 
zoo evokes the Soviet gift of modernity as an apparatus of capture. Historian 
Robert Payne conveys such a vision of the Soviet experiment in conclusion of 
his famous biography of Lenin. For Lenin, “All men are apes; they must move 
about at his [Lenin’s] bidding, or else they become skills. They must me trained 
and herded into schools, to receive the instructions of the schoolmaster. They 
must not dispute with him or with any of his ancestors, for freedom to dispute is 
not granted to them. He demands mindless obedience because, being apes they 
are mindless and deserve no better fate” (Payne 1964: 62930).
It is telling that Payne expresses this view when discussing the meaning 
of the same sculpture, Eritis sicut deus: “On Lenin’s desk in the Kremlin there 
stood, for most of the years he worked there, a strange bronze statue of an ape 
gazing with an expression of profound bewilderment and dismay at an oversize 
human skull” (Payne 1964: 626). Why, he wonders, was this “dubious orna-
ment” that would appeal only to “a bourgeois taste,” with “its very ugliness and 
vulgarity contributing to its popularity” among “middle classes,” there in the 
same Lenin’s study as were the portraits of Karl Marx and Stepan Khalturun? 
(Khalturun was an icon of radicalism in Russia after he organized a bomb ex-
plosion in the Winter Palace in an attempt to assassinate Tsar Alexander II, 
escaped the police, and was arrested and executed only subsequently, when he 
assassinated the Odessa public prosecutor). Why, Payne asks, the placement of 
this sculpture in Lenin’s study—exactly where “a deeply religious man would 
have placed a crucifix, a state of Buddha, or some other symbol that represented 
his faith?” (Payne 1964: 628).
Payne’s take on the meaning of this gift is consistent with his reading of 
Lenin’s character, which he sees as rooted in the ruthlessness of revolutionary 
underground, pragmatism of exile, and the violence of the Revolution and Civil 
War. But this meaning is in the shadow not just of Lenin’s personality but also 
of Soviet history and Soviet society, with subsequent purges, the gulag, and the 
collectivization. “Lenin had many sins,” he continues, “but the gravest was his 
supreme contempt for the human race” for it is “in the nature of science to be 
inhuman.” Lenin was perfectly prepared to regard “men . . . as statistics, or as 
trends or as obstacles standing in the path of his scientific dictatorship” (Payne 
1964: 630, 628).
The notion of “scientific dictatorship” is interesting. It suggests not merely 
Hobbesian “perpetual and restless desire of power that ceaseth only in death,” 
which so often assumed in totalitarian approach to Soviet modernity, but also 
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an ardently zealous modernism of truth. What Lenin so often called the “iron 
logic” of history, the revolutionary legality and constructivist legitimacy of build-
ing the new world, is a Hobbesian violent sovereignty of natural law. Lenin’s gift 
of modernity is that of the reasonable and thus absolutely necessary, a domain 
where there is no liberty, not because it is not liberal but because it is an obliga-




This book’s subtitle, A brief anthropology of time, refers to the book’s length, but 
also to one of its key aspects—to the time of anthropology, and in particular the 
time of reading anthropology. The act of abbreviation, putting things “in short,” 
contributes to the relations between different temporal registers that bridge the 
temporalities that anthropology studies and the temporalities of anthropology it-
self. This book is an artifact of these temporalities. One has to be “brief ” and fast, 
not merely in terms of the tempo of change in a reality that is being described 
(where, however, ethnographic writing is more likely to lag behind [Marcus 
2003]) but also in terms of confronting the challenges of academic communica-
tion in which writing is far more condensed in comparison with Malinowski-era 
monographs. Briefness here is a form of exchange between the temporalities we 
explore, the temporalities of ethnography, and the temporalities of argument.
Throughout this book, I stressed that my goal in discussing these temporali-
ties is primarily methodological. But already in the previous chapter I moved to 
some substantive conclusions. I argued that the gift time of the Soviet “gifts of 
modernity” reveals a particular logic of gift relations that are Hobbesian rather 
than Maussian. This raises a broader question: what are configurations of mo-
dernity (Western and Soviet) that are visible in relations between temporalities 
and among various agents and institutions that I explored here?
This question is important, as temporality has been one of the crucial tools 
for understanding modernity as a distinct condition, associated with mass 
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industrial production, bureaucratic procedures, forms of the state and its ideolo-
gies, techniques of the self, et cetera. This book enters quite a crowded analytical 
space where Karl Marx’ classic observation that capitalist modernity annihi-
lates space by time (Marx 2008: 539–40), rubs shoulders with E. P. Thompson’s 
(1967) analysis of the importance of time for the formation of modern disci-
pline and subjectivity, Anthony Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, David 
Harvey’s (1989) discussion of “just in time” global production, etc.—as well as 
specific discussions of temporalities of socialist modernity (e.g., Verdery 1996; 
Hanson 1997; Buck-Morss 2000; Gumerova n.d.). How is this book situated in 
this rich and diverse body of scholarship?
In brief, what I add is the suggestion to approach modernity not merely as 
a distinct condition that has a particular temporal order but, rather, as itself a 
form of time. Charles-Pierre Baudelaire ([1863] 2010: 33), who is credited with 
coining the very term modernity, defined it as a state of being that is constantly 
transient, fleeting, and contingent. But to be in such a state of modernity is 
also to be “of modern time,” to exist on history’s cutting edge. This vanguard is 
simultaneously a condition of possibility of modern systems of production, bu-
reaucracy, and discipline and, at the same time, one of its products—a commod-
ity, an identity, and the self. In this context, to think of modernity as merely a 
state or condition that has a distinctly modern temporality would be somewhat 
tautological. This would amount to stating that an order of time has an order of 
time. But this also would be essentializing modernity as something existing as 
if separately from the forms of time that it “has.” On the contrary, modernity as 
time (which is the formulation that I suggest) seems to be a case par excellence 
of Nancy Munn’s (1983: 280) acute observation that sociocultural systems do 
not simply go on in or through time but are themselves time.
My argument in this concluding chapter will be about some of the implica-
tions of the notion of modernity as time, which include, first, that this tempo-
rality is a multiplicity, and second, that it is a device that temporalizes social 
typologies. This argument has affinity with Reinhart Koselleck’s (2002) con-
ceptual history of modernity. One of his examples lies in the German-language 
context, where modernity is literally newtime (Neuzeit) and where it appears ap-
proximately at the same time as Baudelaire’s modernité. It is not merely a “new 
time” (neue Zeit) when things are changing, or a condition that acknowledges 
that change has taken place. Newtime is a kind of time that is characterized by 
“an open future”: “The emphatic use of the expression ‘new time’ was not only 
sustained by previous inventions, innovations, and discoveries that, on looking 
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back, would have conferred an entirely new shape to the world, but this concept 
was likewise directed at the future in which new things would continue to come 
about” (Koselleck 2002: 165).
It has been long established that modernity produces a particular view of 
time as “uniform, infinitely divisible, and continuous” (Sorokin and Merton 
1937: 616). But modernity as a newtime isn’t itself just a position in this kind 
of time, but also time’s distinct quality. It is the present, marked by a constantly 
“open future,” that is, as a moment of constant epochal distinction of now and 
before. Sebastian Conrad, in this account of the making of global time as an 
extension of the modern clock time, notes a contradiction between the epochal 
time of modernity, which is about rupture, and the everyday modernist tempo-
ralities, which are about continuities (Conrad 2016). In chapter 1, I gave the 
example of the Soviet calendar reform of 1918 that adopted the Gregorian cal-
endar, thereby eliminating a two-week time difference with the Julian calendar 
that Russia had previously followed. It is this homogenization that introduced 
a gap between chronological and socialist epochal time. The “Day of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution” that happened on October 23, 1917, was now 
to be celebrated in November. In chapter 5, where I discussed modernity as 
time taking form of the Hobbesian gift, I started with a brief example of the 
construction of the early Soviet “culture base” on in Central Siberia. This base’s 
school, hospital, etc., has eventually brought about the homogeneous and ob-
jectified clock time as well as distinctly socialist new calendars, temporalities 
of compulsory work, or equally compulsory waiting time of queuing and state 
rituals that Katherine Verdery (1996: 39–58) conceptualizes as the “etatization 
of time.” But Hobbesian giving is a foundational rupture that both temporarily 
precedes all these varieties of modernist temporalities and also, more impor-
tantly, exists in a different temporal register. This highlights that what moderni-
ty is as time differs from the time that modernity gives and takes. It follows that 
if modernity produces homogeneous and objectified chronological time, this 
very temporal perspective is insufficient for understanding modernity itself. As 
a temporalization device, modernity is not just something homogeneous that 
takes over a local temporal multiplicity but is itself constitutive of multiplicity.
Temporalization
Koselleck points out that while the term modernity is coined in in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, its key notion of the present as an “open future” 
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retrospectively captures changes that were taking place since the eighteenth 
century. He agues that in this process one can see a particular temporality, such 
as a belatedness of conceptual development in relation to what these concepts 
describe, but also a “temporalization of history.” Modernity as newtime becomes 
foundational for the retrospective elaboration of not just itself but also epochal 
differences, such as those of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Refor-
mation—as well as the epochal, and not just chronological, concept of “century.” 
Koselleck finds it “striking” how new ways of designating such temporal dif-
ferences have “gained acceptance and been consolidated in shorter and shorter 
spans of time.” He notes that it took some time to coin and elaborate the con-
cept of the Middle Ages as extending over seven hundred to eight hundred 
years. However,
in comparison, the Reformation and the Renaissance were not only much more 
quickly accepted as periodizing concepts, but they also indicated correspond-
ingly shorter temporal units. The concept of capitalism, following upon and 
corresponding to the concept of feudalism, was only coined in the second half 
of the nineteenth century so that the new experiences that had amassed since 
the Industrial Revolution could be much more quickly conceptualized than the 
comparatively contourless, long-lasting stretch of so-called feudalism. Here, a 
similar rhythm of the shortening of time can be found again in the determination 
of periods, as we have observed with the employment of the other concepts in 
the span from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. (Koselleck 2002: 
164; emphasis added).
It is this classificatory impulse that seems to me clearly linked with the brief-
ness that I mentioned above. But the temporalities of contemporary field eth-
nography as well as the tempo of anthropological writing are related today to 
something that Koselleck does not consider: an increasing speed in which the 
new ages of today, rather than the ages of history, are identified in social theory. 
Classificatory categories of “late capitalism,” “postmodernity,” “globalization,” 
“the contemporary,” etc., are all attempts to specify historical novelty against 
the background of what by now appears not as modernity’s “an open future” but, 
conversely, as its retrospective predictability a slower time of “the Enlighten-
ment project” (which is not just longer but also “comparatively contourless,” to 
use Koselleck’s words, as it may include everything form Foucault’s “classical 
age” to Soviet socialism) and also, more recently, of deep time and anthropocene.
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In other words, the argument about modernity as time that I develop in this 
book is not just a way to approach socialist modernity but also to reread, from 
a new angle, current anthropology’s temporalization of the contemporary. This 
book’s outline of the workings of the Soviet newtime is an intervention at a time 
when anthropology is itself increasingly focused on the new. This interest has 
been expanding in the second half of the twentieth century, but one of its very 
clear turning points was a “spatial turn” of the late 1990s that critically addressed 
previously “assumed isomorphism of space, place and culture” (Gupta and Fer-
guson 1997a: 34). What is interesting for me is that this concern with space has 
also been a concern with time. It situated itself “at the end of an era” (Gupta 
and Ferguson 1997b). It was a form of reflection on the (un)bounding social 
space of transition from modernization to globalization. A notion of multisited 
ethnography was, for example, a way to understand the new shape of the world 
that was constituted “in a piecemeal way, integral to and embedded in discon-
tinuous, multi-sited objects of study” (Marcus 1995: 97). Laying open previously 
taken-for-granted assumptions about isomorphism of place, culture, and “the 
field” not only drew attention to but, it is argued, was enabled by cultural forms 
that are today “nonisomorphic with standard units of analysis” (Collier and Ong 
2005: 3). A “shift from two-dimensional Euclidean space, with its centers and 
peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multidimensional global space with un-
bounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating sub-spaces” (Kearney 1995: 
548) is a shift in time.
But investigations into these taken-for-granted assumptions about space leave 
unquestioned assumptions about time that enable this methodological reformu-
lation. Anna Tsing (2000) remarked that this perspective conceptually restates a 
cultural narrative that globalization tells about itself: that of the radical epochal 
break between before and now. But there is more than that. However unique this 
particular shift may be, it is also understood within a frame of a culturally neutral 
linear time that frames conceptualization of this new space. Linear time is pos-
ited as an objective measure of difference and a means of classification and dis-
cursive distribution of the global, whether we agree that modernity is no longer 
organized in “tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically self-conscious, 
or culturally homogenous” units (Appadurai 1991: 191; Hannerz 1989); or if 
we support a contrary view that the ecumenes of “interconnected space . . . al-
ways already existed” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997a: 37; Friedman 1994); or if we 
maintain “different historical moments” of global processes “cannot be linked in a 
developmental or teleological sequence” (Maurer 2000: 690–61).
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If this culturally neutral linear time appears here as a measuring device, what 
is a time frame that enables more recent formulations when time has been ex-
plicitly added to space? What are temporal assumptions of a kind of anthropol-
ogy that turned toward the study of the “here and now,” rather than “far-away” 
and “timeless” (Rees 2008: 7)? I leave aside an important question of exactly 
where, and whose is this here and focus on the now. Its new properties emerge 
when “anthropologists experience profound temporal turbulences”—when (and 
because) they “can no longer make assumptions about what is necessary for their 
method to produce rich ethnographic data—a temporally stable scene and sub-
ject of study” (Rees 2008: 7; emphasis added). The contemporary is marked 
by a time when “no single sensibility—modernist or otherwise—dominates, 
overarches, or underlies current affairs” (Rabinow 2008: 78; see also Rabinow 
2011). It is impossible, on the one hand, “to inquire into what is taking place” 
by “deducing it beforehand” (Rabinow 2008: 3). On the other hand, its cultural 
orientation on the present is marked by what Jane Guyer (2007) described as 
an “evacuation of the near future”—such as stable career prospects and the reli-
ability of either market economy or social welfare—in contrast to the infinitely 
deferred far-away and almost timeless horizon of the neoliberal market finally 
balanced or religious salvation taking place. In other words, the present time is 
marked by a nonlinear and unstable presentism.
To put this briefly, this turn to the here and now marks a double departure. 
Here, a departure of anthropology from non-Western or “traditional” societies 
to modernity coincides with a departure of modernity itself from a “Euclidian” 
stable time (Kearney 1995). As I elaborated in chapter 4, this double transforma-
tion is easily described as a shift or a “time’s arrow” (Hodges 2008) or “straight 
time” (Boellstorff 2007). George Marcus and Paul Rabinow suggested two con-
trasting ways of designing the anthropology of the contemporary, respectfully, 
around the notions of connection and flight. One historicizes it by looking at 
genealogies of the present—for instance, the present of anthropology coming 
“home,” driven by all kinds of historical reasons—while the other stresses an 
unprecedented novelty of the present as an object of research and its irreduc-
ibility to these historical links with the past. But what I suggest here is looking 
at the temporal frame—or indeed at the multiplicity of temporal frames—that 
underscores this very distinction. This, in turn, illuminates a different kind of 
genealogy in this perspective. This is not merely a genealogy that might link, 
for example, the contemporary of the early twenty-first century with the early 
twentieth-century socialist notions of new time that I discuss in this book, or 
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with a Baudelaire-esque sense of modernity as being constantly transient, fleet-
ing, and contingent, or with Koselleck’s “open future,” which goes back to the 
eighteenth century. Rather, what becomes apparent is that in their very interest 
in new, emergent forms, these anthropological debates retain a familiar (albeit 
much criticized in other contexts) temporal analytic of time and the other.
This is despite, or perhaps indeed because, this discursive orientation is no 
longer backwardness (Fabian 1983) but novelty: “new forms of cultural differ-
ence and new forms of imagining community” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997b: 36; 
emphasis added). The exploration of this new world could be performatively 
Malinowskian (Boellstorff 2008). However, overall it is not quite performa-
tively realist and historicist—and in this regard this move is not in continuity 
but in a sharp contrast with the reflexive turn of the 1980s that has engendered 
these subsequent shifts. It is within this frame that what I would call new time 
as the other assumes ethnography to be a linear chronicle of constant changes 
and turbulences (Rabinow 2008, 2011). It is this chronicle that is always late 
(Marcus 2003). As Hirokazu Miyazaki and Annelise Riles note, it is its concep-
tual incompleteness in which “a retreat from knowing” affirms “that little can 
be known about the world except for the fact of complexity, indeterminacy, and 
openendedness” (2005: 327). In other words, it is this chronicle’s failures that 
ultimately affirm this new world’s otherness. This incomprehensibility looks 
historically symmetrical with the constitution of the so-called primitive in early 
anthropology (Hodgen 1965). But if in early anthropology this incomprehensi-
bility was a starting point, here it is an endpoint.
However, let me reiterate that the point of approaching these debates 
through the lens of modernity as time is not just to historicize this new time 
as the other. If anything, it is to highlight that this historicization itself needs 
to be approached through the lens of the anthropology of time. The difference 
in question is between temporalizing—that is, highlighting exact differences 
in time and degrees of novelty—and exploring the work of temporalization. If 
modernity as a condition that has a particular temporal organization is a product 
of such temporalization, modernity as time is a temporalizing device. Looking 
at the former allows us to compare and contrast modernity with societal orders 
that are not modern, as well as distinguish early-, high-, late-, and post- modern 
forms, or modernity’s distinct types, such as capitalist and socialist (cf. Kotkin 
2001; Fitzpatrick 2005; David-Fox 2015). Exploring the latter illuminates how 
temporalization becomes a mode of relatedness. In the cases that I discussed 
throughout this book, modernity as time illuminates the making of Soviet-style 
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hierarchies that are both internal and external. In Siberia, they distinguish the 
modern from the backward and the traditional (cf. chapters 2, 4, and 5). I dem-
onstrated that whether or not the Evenki “Lenin” is a “contemporary Evenki” 
matters for how relatedness around him is structured. But for Lenin (the Soviet 
leader), modernity as time is a contested claim at the global stage. At stake 
in this kind of temporalization is what and who is truly modern, who is truly 
“ahead.” These claim’s categories are not modern versus premodern but modern 
versus modern. Soviet socialism, for instance, tried to position itself as an alter-
native modernity vis-à-vis capitalism. “To reach and overtake [America]” was 
to become one of the most popular industrial slogans of the 1930s. There were 
good arguments both of the Soviet and the post-Soviet era that Soviet socialism 
in fact lagged behind capitalism in many crucial aspects, such as work efficiency, 
quality of goods, and the quality of life, and that there were only some select 
areas such as math, space exploration, ballet, et cetera where it could be said it 
was leading. But neither this nor the acknowledgment of nuclear parity really 
changes the point of view from which the argument is made: modernity as a 
true difference in time, and in this Soviet versus Western instance (unlike in the 
case of technological and other differences between Western or Soviet-style 
economies and societies), this difference is epochal. What was debatable here 
was who was ahead; what was shared was this time perspective. The temporiza-
tion in this case takes the shape of a sequence or movement from one form of 
alternative and true modernity to another—what I call here the relations of 
change, which include the perestroika of the 1980s and post-Soviet transitions 
of the 1990s and the early 2000s.
The state, commodity, and gift
The implication of this approach to understanding socialist modernity is not 
just that it is a case of the “etatization of time” (Verdery 1996: 39–58). It is also 
the converse: what one might call a “temporalization of the state.” Katherine 
Verdery charts how time was used by state socialism as a state-building resource 
in a fundamentally political process. It takes the explicit and coercive form of 
the “seizure of time” (Verdery 1996: 40) while also working more subtly through 
the everyday politics of time. But I have shown that this “seizure” was also con-
strued as giving. There is a symmetry of the seizure of time and of the Soviet 
“given time” (Derrida 1992)—and indeed, not just symmetry but exchange be-
tween these temporalities (see chapter 3) and of giving and taking (chapter 5). I 
129MODERNITY AS TIME
argue that the politics of time in question include those of the Hobbesian gift—
that is, of the gift as a form of conquest and entrapment. I demonstrate that 
these politics of time also include wasteful expenditure—as in the episode of the 
waste of the combined fodder—and the politics of identity of this temporality 
of waste as Hobbesian timelessness, an incorrigible state of nature (chapter 2).
In 1980s Romania, what constituted Verdery’s (1996) case in point as to 
the etatization of time was that time was needed as a resource in order to re-
pay Western loans and survive in the self-imposed regime of austerity. In this 
regard, Verdery’s discussion and the reality that she focuses on, can be seen as 
being ahead of its time, as it is precisely the time of debt and austerity that 
becomes a very widespread form of temporalization (cf. Engelen et al. 2011; 
Guyer 2012; Dyson 2014; Blyth 2013). “Financialization” has become a global 
currency; it is political as much as it is economic, a new form of entrapment by 
modernity as time.
But what I explore articulates not merely a link between state time and 
commodity time. This link can be good to think about alterity of capitalism 
versus socialism or their analogy: the time of Romanian loans and the contem-
porary financialized debt, or novelty as a commodity or the state. But one of 
the temporalities in question is not just the time of commodity and the time of 
centralized state redistribution (Polanyi 1944; Verdery 1991) but also the time 
of the gift. We understand quite well how the giving of modernity happens in 
commodity form—how modernity is sold, bought into, and consumed. But this 
giving also takes the form of a gift of new time—as we saw in the aesthetics of 
the Eritis sicut deus sculpture (chapter 1), the Leninist notions of help (chapter 
2), and the Hobbesian gift (chapter 5).
Of course, this gift is not exclusively Soviet. As in the aesthetics of the 
sculpture Eritis sicut deus, with which I opened this book (see fig. 1, p. xvi), 
gifts of empire (Grant 2009) include both Christian and Darwinian “civilizing 
missions.” They temporalize imperial order as an assemblage of different stages 
of development. What I call the Soviet gift of modernity partially repeats this 
imperial ordering, which is visible, for instance, in the temporalization of the 
identity of Evenki “Lenin” from his own statements that he is “contemporary 
Evenki” to the collective farm’s director conviction that he is a like “a wolf who 
looks back the forest no matter how long it is fed.” But at the time of Lenin-
the-Soviet-leader, this partial repetition of imperial ordering happens in a pe-
culiar form of anti-empire. In space (in relationship to Western powers) and in 
time (in relation to prerevolutionary Russia), Lenin battles out anti-imperialism 
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militarily and theoretically. Imperialism for Lenin equals capitalism at its high-
est, last stage (he thinks)—despite his reliance on foreign specialists, including 
Armand Hammer, and despite his fascination with Fordism. Marxist-Leninism 
is a theory of the modern commodity—and only afterward a theory of modern 
empire. A Marxist theory of colonization—either in the respective chapters of 
Marx’ Capital or Lenin’s Imperialism—is a theory of the commodity extended to 
the theory of colonial socioeconomic and political forms. Marxism is famously 
laconic on exactly what communism is. But socialism and communism as “new-
time” temporalizes in great detail capitalism and imperialism as the “other in 
time.” This temporalization is, in turn, an instant “flashing,” in a sense of Doreen 
Massey (1992: 80) of another “other time.” My final, brief example of modernity 
as time and the gift will be a 1923 gift, which I used for this book’s cover. The 
workers of the United First and Second Electric Lamp Factory presented the 
12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) with a material 
artifact of a Leninist vision. This is a gift of an electric light bulb with a fila-
ment in the shape of Lenin (see fig. 2, p. 6). It gives a striking image of “Lenin’s 
light,” which at that time symbolized bringing a predominantly peasant Russia 
out of the darkness of villages with no electricity. Lenin’s hand points forward, 
setting the direction of Enlightenment. But socialism is itself here a gift of light, 
a marker of new time.
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